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ABSTRACT
Latta, Jennie Davidson. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2014. Being and
Person: An Introduction to Edith Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being. Major Professor: Dr.
Thomas J. Nenon.
Dr. Edith Stein (Sr. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce in religious life) devoted her major
philosophical treatise to three things: (1) a confrontation of medieval philosophy,
exemplified by Thomas Aquinas, with contemporary philosophy, exemplified by
Edmund Husserl; (2) a response to Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time; and (3) an
attempt to ascend to the meaning of being for all of reality, both finite and eternal. She
believed that a Christian philosophy was possible--one that made use of revealed truth in
the quest for the reasoned understanding of all that is. She believed that the
phenomenological method provided a bridge to the medieval philosophical system of
Thomas Aquinas. She wanted to share with her philosophical contemporaries the wealth
that she had discovered in Catholic philosophy by “transposing” the ideas of one culture
and time into her own. The task that she undertook was enormous. Like a true scientist,
she left the notes of her experiments and discoveries so that those who followed behind
her could take up her research for their own. Because the work could not be published in
her lifetime, she was never able to revise and focus the work in light of the response that
should have been its right, and the work was neglected for a number of years.
As the result of her canonization by the Roman Catholic Church in 1998,
however, a great deal of effort is being made now to make her work better known in
philosophical circles and to carry through the projects that she proposed. This dissertation
is intended as a contribution to that effort. It provides an introduction to Finite and
Eternal Being by including chapters on Edith Stein’s philosophical formation and
v

method, historical background and context, and the reception of the work upon its
publication. The core of the dissertation consists in two chapters devoted to a fairly
careful reading of two themes within the work, those of being and person. The conclusion
suggests enormous areas for further research. The dissertation is intended to provide a
way for students of phenomenology who are unfamiliar with Thomism, and for students
of Thomism who are unfamiliar with phenomenology, to take up the work for
themselves.
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PREFACE
I was introduced to Edith Stein’s life story by Fr. Emmanuel Charles McCarthy
some twenty years ago. I was immediately captivated by this woman who, against all
odds, achieved academic distinction and honor in pre-World War II Germany, only to be
compelled to set aside the academic life in the face of Nazi oppression. Like Edith Stein,
I am a convert to the Catholic faith. The Life of St. Teresa played the pivotal role in my
decision to become Catholic just as it did in the life of Edith Stein. Dare I also say that
the pursuit of truth has consumed my life as it did hers. Her courage and compassion in
the face of unspeakable horror are an inspiration to me just as they are to persons
throughout the world.
It was Edith Stein’s life that first attracted me. I knew very little about her
philosophy until after I began the pursuit of the doctoral degree, but I knew that after I
completed the master’s degree at Saint Meinrad School of Theology I wanted to continue
my studies. I was unable to find a doctoral program in theology that could accommodate
my other professional and personal responsibilities, and so, in a moment of prayer, I
formed the intention of pursuing the doctoral degree in philosophy at the University of
Memphis and writing my dissertation on the philosophy of Edith Stein. The audacity of
this shocks me still. I did not know how or whether I would be able to accomplish it, and
frankly, I did not know whether I would even like the philosophy of Edith Stein!
Still I proceeded, step by step, acquiring the skills that I would need to prepare a
dissertation. Because I attended a state university, I assumed that I would have to limit
my dissertation to some topic arising out of Edith Stein’s pre-conversion works. I looked
at Finite and Eternal Being a couple of times along the way without being able to make
vii

heads or tails of it. I even gave up the idea of writing about Edith Stein’s philosophy at all
at one point, thinking that I would “settle” instead for a topic in political philosophy
based upon the work of John Locke. After several false starts on that project, I happened
to be at a university gathering with Professor Thomas J. Nenon. He sought me out and
suggested that we start “doing some philosophy.” To my surprise, when I sat down to talk
with him about a topic, he asked about “that big book” of Edith Stein’s. I asked, “Do you
mean Finite and Eternal Being?” He responded, “Yes, why don’t you do that book?”
And so I found myself back on track again working toward completion of a dissertation
based upon the philosophy of Edith Stein.
When Edith Stein was asked about the reasons for her conversion, she responded,
Secretum meum mihi (My secret is mine). I have thought of this often as I have worked
and worked and worked to unlock the secrets of Finite and Eternal Being. Edith Stein
certainly does not give away her secrets easily, but I have found that she does respond to
patient and determined persistence. The effort has been well worth it. My hope is that my
feeble attempt to achieve some clarity about Edith Stein’s project and achievements will
prove to be of some use to others who desire to join the circle of her friends.
Memphis, Tennessee
February 1, 2014
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Edith Stein conceived of Finite and Eternal Being as an ascent to the meaning of
being. She undertook the work at the direction of her religious superiors. It bears the
marks not only of her thorough academic preparation and study, but also of many hours
of prayer and contemplation. The result is a synthesis of the medieval philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas and the phenomenological method of Professor Edmund Husserl.
While she took as her starting point the ontology of Thomas, she did not accept
his conclusions simply on the basis of authority, but instead subjected them to rigorous
phenomenological investigation. The result was a modification of Thomas’s position with
respect to the being of universals and with respect to the principal of individual being.
The key to both of these is Edith Stein’s concept of wesenhaftes Sein (essential Being), a
kind of being that ranges alongside conceptual being, ideal being and real being. Edith
Stein attributed essential being to ideal essences (Plato’s ideas), to the essences of
universals and species, and to the essences of individuals. Ultimately, she accepts the
teaching of St. Augustine that the Platonic ideas are actually creative essences of the
divine intellect. What is separated in the real world—i.e., essential being, conceptual
being, ideal being, and real being, she finds, is one in eternal being, which is the creative
source and archetype of all that is.
Edith Stein had another reason to confront the problem of being. She had read
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and was aware of the sensation that it was causing.
She felt that it fell far short of addressing the question of the meaning of being because it
was confined to discussion of the meaning of human being. It was in response to Being
1

and Time that Edith Stein formed the idea of producing a complete ontology, one that
included an account of both finite and eternal being. Only by including both did she
believe that it would be possible to come to an understanding of the full meaning of
being.
With this brief introduction to her project, we turn now to the philosophical
formation of this unique and innovative thinker.
The Philosophical Formation of Edith Stein
Edith Stein was born October 12, 1891, in Breslau, Germany, now Wrocław,
Poland.1 She was the youngest of eleven children born into a Jewish family. By the time
that she was thirteen, she no longer prayed and considered herself an atheist. In 1911 she
matriculated to the University of Breslau to study German and history. While she was
there, she became interested in psychology and women’s issues, and, through the lectures
of William Stern, was introduced to excerpts from the Logical Investigations of Edmund
Husserl. As a result, she read the second Logical Investigations on her own and decided
to transfer to the University at Göttingen where Husserl was a professor extraordinarius.
In 1913 Edith Stein took the introductory philosophy course under Adolf Reinach,
and was admitted to the Philosophical Society of Göttingen despite the fact that she was a
woman. The leaders of the Society at that time were Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach,

1

Biographical information about Edith Stein is available from many sources. She herself
was the author of Life in a Jewish Family, 1891-1917, trans. Josephine Koeppel, O.C.D.
(Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, 1986). Other important
biographical works in English are those by Hilda C. Graef, The Scholar and the Cross
(Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1955); Waltraud Herbstrith, Edith Stein: The Untold Story of
the Philosopher and Mystic Who Lost Her Life in the Death Camps of Auschwitz, 2nd ed., trans.
Bernard Bonowitz (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992); Mary Catherine Baseheart, S.C.N.,
“Light in Darkness: Edith Stein’s Life,” in Person in the World: Introduction to the Philosophy of
Edith Stein (Dordecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2010).

2

and Max Scheler; also included were Roman Ingarden, Hans Lipps, and Alexander
Koyré. Through these persons, Edith Stein also came to know Dietrich von Hildebrand,
and Hedwig Martius and Theodor Conrad, who later married each other. During her time
at Göttingen she followed the lectures of Scheler which provided the basis for his major
work, “Formalism in Ethics and the Material Value Ethics.”2 This material was especially
important to the preparation of her thesis, On the Problem of Empathy,3 completed in
1916.
At the outbreak of the First World War, Edith Stein decided to return to Breslau,
where she attended a course in nursing and served with the Red Cross in a military
hospital in Austria. The experience of nursing the wounded and dying affected her
profoundly. For her efforts she was awarded a medal of bravery. Adolf Reinach was
killed in service in 1917. Edith Stein was asked to prepare his papers for publication. She
credits her interactions with Anna Reinach, his widow, for opening her mind to the value
of religious faith.
After her service in the Red Cross, Edith Stein returned to her mother’s home in
Breslau where she worked as a substitute teacher and prepared her thesis. She followed
Husserl to the University at Freiburg im Breisgau, where she was awarded her Ph.D.,
summa cum laude, in 1917, one of the first women in Germany to achieve this
distinction.

22

Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt
Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
3

Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, 3rd ed., trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington,
DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, 1989).

3

Because male students were unavailable as the result of military service, Edith
Stein was offered the position of Husserl’s assistant. She took over the introductory
lectures formerly taught by Reinach, and prepared Ideas II and The Phenomenology of
Internal Time Consciousness for publication. After only eighteen months, however, she
left her position with Husserl because of the difficulty she had in getting him to attend to
the work.
After leaving Husserl, Edith Stein returned again to her home in Breslau, and
prepared two additional theses in the hope of obtaining a university position. These works
were Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, composed of two parts4 and An
Investigation Concerning the State.5 She applied for positions at Kiel, Hamburg, and
Göttingen, but failed to secure a position. As a result, she turned again to issues and
organizations related to the rights of women. She became of member of the Prussian
Society for Women’s Franchise and the German Democratic Party. She later described
herself during this period as a “radical suffragette,” but she eventually lost interest in
these organizations.”6
In the summer of 1921, while visiting the Conrad-Martius’s at their orchard in
Bad Bergzabern, Rhineland-Palentinate, Edith Stein read the autobiography of St. Teresa

4

Edith Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, trans. Mary Catharine
Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (Washington, DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications,
2000).
5

Edith Stein, An Investigation Concerning the State, trans. Marianne Sawicki
(Washington, DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, 2007).
6

“Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, Edith Stein (1891-1942),” Official Vatican biography,
The Holy See, http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/saints/ns_lit_doc_19981011_edith
_stein_en.html.
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of Avila.7 Upon completing the book in the early morning, she said to herself, “This is
the truth,” and went on to purchase a Catholic catechism and missal. She was baptized at
the parish church in Bad Bergzabern on January 1, 1922. Hedwig Conrad-Martius, who,
with her husband, had become a Protestant Christian, was her godmother. Edith Stein
wanted to join a convent immediately upon her conversion, but her spiritual advisors,
Vicar General Joseph Schwind of Speyer, and Fr. Erich Przywara, S.J., did not permit it.
Instead, she accepted a teaching position at St. Magdalen’s Convent School in Speyer,
where she remained until 1932.
The time at Speyer marked a period in which Edith Stein was becoming
acclimated to Catholic culture and intellectual life. She lived near the convent of the
Dominican sisters and attended daily Mass in their chapel. She spent Christmases and
Holy Weeks at the Benedictine Archabbey at Beuron, where Archabbot Raphael Walzer,
O.S.B., acted as her spiritual director. Under the guidance of Fr. Przywara, she undertook
the German translation of a volume of Blessed John Henry Cardinal Newman’s diary and
letters, as well as St. Thomas Aquinas’s Disputed Questions Concerning Truth. With the
publication of her translation of Thomas, Edith Stein again became known and active in
philosophical circles. She was invited to attend the conference of the Société Thomiste on
Phenomenology and Thomism on September 12, 1932, in Juvisy, near Paris, where a
paper was presented on the Phenomenological Movement by Fr. Daniel Feuling, O.S.B.

7

Saint Teresa of Jesus, baptized Teresa Sánchez de Cepeda y Ahumada (March 28,
1515–October 4, 1582), was a Spanish mystic and reformer of the Carmelite religious order. She
and St. John of the Cross are considered the founders of the Discalced Carmelites, the religious
order that Edith Stein eventually joined.

5

In the discussion that followed, Edith Stein was called upon to answer questions about
Husserl’s work.8
Earlier in 1932, Edith Stein had accepted a position as lecturer at the Roman
Catholic division of the German Institute for Educational Studies at the University of
Münster. She was compelled to resign this position in February 1933 because of laws that
prohibited non-Aryans from practicing the professions in Germany. Because she could
not work, she was allowed to pursue her dream of religious life. She entered the Carmel
at Cologne on October 15, 1933, at the age of forty-two. She was later transferred to the
Carmel in Echt, Holland, for her protection and the protection of the community with
which she lived. It was at Echt that she completed the manuscript of Finite and Eternal
Being.
On August 2, 1942, Edith Stein, her sister, Rosa, and other Catholics of Jewish
ancestry, were taken into custody in retaliation for the Dutch bishops’ protests against the
Nazi regime. She was sent to Auschwitz and died there on August 9, 1942. Edith Stein
was beatified on May 1, 1987, and declared a saint on October 11, 1998, by Pope John
Paul II. She was declared co-patroness of Europe on October 1, 1999.
This brief overview highlights the positive influence of a number of persons in
Edith Stein’s professional life. These include Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Max
Scheler, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Fr. Erich Przywara. The next section will consider
how these and other persons helped her to pursue the synthesis of medieval and modern
philosophy.
8

See Société Thomiste, “La phenomenology,” Journées d'études de la Société thomiste, 1
(Juvisy: September 12, 1932); see also Pat Lyne, Edith Stein Discovered: A Personal Portrait
(Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2000), 64.
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Preludes to Finite and Eternal Being
In a letter to her friend Hedwig Conrad-Martius dated November 13, 1932, Edith
Stein explains that, despite her feelings of incompetence, she will return “to tackle
questions that I have always been working on.”9 She had finished her translation of
Disputed Questions Concerning Truth and was eager to know what her friend thought
about it and about “the positive definition of metaphysics.” She had read Hedwig ConradMartius’s own article on metaphysics,10 and notes that she is of one opinion with her on
the demarcation of metaphysics from ontology, and on going beyond experience. But, she
says, she has “another idea about metaphysics: as a grasp of the whole of reality through
the inclusion of revealed truth, therefore grounded on philosophy and theology.11 This is
the earliest articulation of Edith Stein’s interest in developing an ontology of her own.
Sources for Finite and Eternal Being
When we look for the sources of the project that is Finite and Eternal Being, an
obvious one is the work of Edmund Husserl. Husserl was both a positive and a negative
influence for the work. Edith Stein clearly owes her method and her concern with
essences to the work of Husserl. Husserl had confronted the reductionist ontology of his
day by reintroducing the notion that there are certain kinds of things that are neither
physical (real) nor psychological (mental), but “ideal.” In this way, he provided a bridge

9

Edith Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 1916-1942, trans. Josephine Koeppel, O.C.D
(Washington, DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, 1993) (hereinafter “Self-Portrait in
Letters”), 126.
10

Edith Stein is apparently referring to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Metaphysische
Gesprächen (Halle, 1921). Unfortunately none of Conrad-Martius’s works is available in English
translation at this time.
11

Self Portrait in Letters, 126.
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to topics that had occupied medieval philosophy and even rationalist philosophy prior to
Kant. On the other hand, Edith Stein and Conrad-Martius were among those who were
interested in responding to Husserl’s turn toward idealism. Edith Stein agreed with
Husserl in using the method of descriptive analysis of the phenomena of consciousness,
and she supported the eidetic reduction, which proceeds from psychological phenomena
to essences, but she did not join him in the “¦B@6Z” (epoche) insofar as it involved a
permanent suspension of judgment concerning questions of existence. Edith Stein
insisted that essence and existence must be examined together. 12 Thus, her major
philosophical work is devoted to questions concerning being, rather than to those
concerning knowledge or ethics.
A second source for the project of Finite and Eternal Being was the work of
Martin Heidegger. Edith Stein was vitally interested in responding to Martin Heidegger’s
Being and Time, published in 1927. In the extended addendum concerning Heidegger’s
work which is appended to Finite and Eternal Being, she says:
It is not possible in a few pages to give a picture of the riches and power
of the often truly enlightening investigations in Heidegger’s great torso
Being and Time. Perhaps no other work has influenced contemporary
philosophical thought in the last ten years so strongly as this one.13
Clearly, Edith Stein acknowledged the importance of Heidegger’s work. She felt,
however, that she had important contributions to make toward corrections needed in
some areas of his thought. She expressed a number of concerns. First, she said that
12

See Sawicki, Person in the World, 22, 88.

13

Edith Stein, “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” in Endliches und ewiges Sein:
Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins, Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe bd. 11/12 (Freiburg:
Herder, 2006), 445-500 (hereinafter “ESG”); in English translation, Edith Stein, “Martin
Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy,” trans. Mette Lebech, Maynooth Philosophical Papers 4
(Maynooth, 2007) 57 (hereinafter “Lebech”).
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Heidegger appeared to claim that the essence of the human being is existence (Dasein).14
This was problematical because the equation of essence with existence is traditionally
reserved for God. Second, she thought that Heidegger had failed to realize that
“thrownness” (one of Heidegger’s descriptions of the being of Dasein) implies a thrower;
person (das Man) implies a community; “fallenness” implies a more original, authentic
state of being that preceded it, etc. In each case, Heidegger appeared to have absolutized
the self while providing no reference point for it. Third, she thought that Heidegger’s
definition of death as the end of Dasein was inadequate for a number of reasons. Fourth,
she felt that by limiting the target of the investigation into the meaning of being to
Dasein, Heidegger had failed to address the full range of being, most especially First
Being. Edith Stein insists that the meaning of being must be found in finite and eternal
being and the relation between them: “Finitude can only be understood in relation to
Infinity, i.e., to the eternal fullness of being. The understanding of being of a finite spirit
is as such always already a breakthrough from the finite to the Infinite.”15 The selection
of being for investigation in Finite and Eternal Being, may be traced, at least in part, to
Edith Stein’s determination to provide a corrective to the work of Heidegger.
A third source for the project of Finite and Eternal Being was the metaphysics of
Thomas Aquinas. Edith Stein did not engage in any philosophical work from the time she
entered the Catholic Church in 1922 until 1924 when she began her critical examination

14

This summary is based on the excellent work of Antonio Calcagno, “Heidegger and
Stein on the Question of Being,” The Philosophy of Edith Stein (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 2007), 113-131; see also Chantal Beuavais, “Edith Stein and Modern Philosophy,” in
Husserl and Stein, ed. Richard Feist and William Sweet (Washington, DC: The Council for
Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003), 157.
15

ESG 489/Lebech 86.
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of Thomas’s Disputed Questions Concerning Truth.16 This was only done after Fr. Erich
Przywara suggested to her that academic study was an appropriate part of the Christian
vocation. This work introduced her to Thomas’s positions concerning certain
fundamental questions in metaphysics.
At least as early as February 1926, Edith Stein was occupied with “attain[ing]
clarity regarding the connection between Thomistic and modern philosophy.” In a letter
from that period, she asked permission of her bishop to keep with her certain books that
were prohibited by the Catholic Church.17 In 1929 she published “Phenomenology and
the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Festschrift in honor of Husserl’s seventieth
birthday, her first expression of the synthesis that she would achieve in Finite and
Eternal Being.18
A fourth source for Finite and Eternal Being was the mystical writings of the cofounders of the Discalced Carmelites, St. Teresa of Jesus and St. John of the Cross. In
fact, the second of the two appendices that she added to Finite and Eternal Being is an
extended meditation on St. Teresa’s The Interior Castle.19 After providing an extended
16

Self-Portrait in Letters, 47.

17

Self Portrait in Letters, 49. The Index Librorum Prohibitorum, dating from 1559, and
the somewhat relaxed Tridentine Index, were lists of publications prohibited to Catholics. The
final (20th) edition was published in 1948. The Index was abolished by Pope Paul VI in 1966.
The books requested by Stein were these: Henri Bergson’s Les Données Immédiates de la
Conscience (Time and Free Will), L’Évolution Créatice (Creative Evolution), and Matière et
Mémoire (Matter and Memory); David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature; Immanuel Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason; John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Nature; and Baruch Spinoza’s
Opera omnia (complete works).
18

See Edith Stein, “Husserl and Aquinas: A Comparison,” in Knowledge and Faith,
trans. Walter Redmond (Washington, DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications), 1-63.
19

St. Teresa of Jesus, The Interior Castle, in The Collected Works of St. Teresa of Avila,
tr. Kieren Kavanaugh, O.C.D. and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D., vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Institute
of Carmelite Studies Publications, 1980).
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summary of St. Teresa’s work, Edith Stein added her own comments, which compares
and contrasts Teresa’s exposition of the soul with her own. Edith Stein notes that where
Teresa’s interest lay in describing her own experiences of the soul as the dwelling of
God, Edith Stein’s interest was in using the saint’s exposition to confirm her own
discoveries about the meaning of the soul and access to knowledge of it. Here, too, Edith
Stein makes note of the development in the nineteenth century of a “psychology without
a soul” (“Psychologie ohne Seele”),20 and about the efforts of Wilhelm Dilthey, Franz
Brentano, and Husserl to return to a scientific exploration of the “inner world.” She
makes special mention of the work of Alexander Pfänder’s Die Seele des Menschen [The
Soul of Man] (Halle 1933), which she says corresponds to her account of the soul even
though it lacks clarity in important points.21 Edith Stein notes that these writers have not
gone as far as they might for fear that they will encounter God, and thus, she says, the
most sure guides are the mystics, esp. St. Teresa and St. Augustine.22 Unfortunately, an
English translations of this important appendix has not yet been published.23
Finally, we must acknowledge Edith Stein’s circle of friends and colleagues as
sources for her project. In Finite and Eternal Being she draws extensively from the works

20

ESG 521.

21

ESG 522. The Editors of the German edition of Life in a Jewish Family note that Edith
Stein asked Hedwig Conrad-Martius to supply her with current philosophical material, naming
particularly Pfänder’s Die Seele des Menschen, while she was in the Carmel in Cologne. See
“Chronology,” in Edith Stein, Life in a Jewish Family, 428; 509-10, n. 227.
22

ESG 524.

23

A new English translation of Finite and Eternal Being is in the process of being
prepared by Dr. Walter Redmond, translator of Potency and Act. It is anticipated that the new
publication will include both appendices. Dr. Redmond very kindly provided me with a working
draft of the translation of the second appendix prepared by Sr. Josephine Koeppel, O.C.D.
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of Jean Hering and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. She makes use the work of Jean Hering in
formulating her theory of essentialities and essences, and she relies heavily upon ConradMartius’s essays, “Time” and “Heidegger’s Being and Time,” in formulating her
response to Heidegger, and her Die “Seele” der Pflanze24 and Realontologie.25
Potency and Act
In 1931 there was a possibility that Edith Stein would be appointed lecturer in
Catholic philosophy at the University of Freiburg. She consulted with Martin Heidegger
and Martin Honecker about this possibility on January 25 and received sufficient
encouragement to undertake the writing of a habilitation thesis. Again she selected as her
topic a comparison of the thought of Aquinas and Husserl. The thesis, entitled Potency
and Act,26 was essentially complete at the end of the summer of 1931 when it was sent to
a typist. Copies were provided to Husserl, Heidegger, and Honecker in October, but Edith
Stein was discouraged from making a formal application for the position due to alleged
economic circumstances.27
Potency and Act was laid aside for the time being, but Edith Stein was able to
incorporate some of her research into lectures on “The Structure of the Human Person,”
24

Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Die “Seele” der Pflanze, Biologisch-ontologische
Betrachtungen (Breslau 1934).
25

Hedwig Conrad-Martius, “Realontologie,” Jahrbuch für Philosophie und
phänomenologische Forschung, 6 (1923), 159 - 333
26

Edith Stein often reverses the order of these terms in her own writing. Unless used in
quotation or in the title of her book, I prefer to speak of “act and potency,” because of the
primordial nature of act with respect to potency, a theme that Edith Stein will develop in Finite
and Eternal Being.
27

See “German Editor’s Introduction,” Edith Stein, Potency and Act: Studies Toward a
Philosophy of Being, trans. Walter Redmond (Washington, DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies
Publications, 2009), xvii.
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given during the winter semester of 1932-33 at the Pedagogical Institute at Münster. In
February 1933, she wrote to Hedwig Conrad-Martius to ask whether she would be willing
to review her works in order to “discern the immanent teleology in [them] . . ., just as . . .
when you wrote about Heidegger and Hartmann.”28 Although Conrad-Martius’s reply is
lost, it was apparently favorable, as Edith Stein wrote to her on March 23 indicating that
she thought that Conrad-Martius already had copies of her works published in the
Jahrbuch. On April 5 she wrote that she would send “the paper” after all, presumably
referring to the manuscript of Potency and Act. Her work was interrupted again when she
entered the Carmel in October 1933.
After completing her postulancy and novitiate, Edith Stein was directed by her
religious superior to take up scholarly work again. On May 21, 1934, she wrote to
Hedwig Conrad-Martius saying that the Father Provincial had asked her to prepare
Potency and Act for publication.29 By July she had determined that the earlier manuscript
needed major revision. Although the Thomistic doctrine of act and potency would
continue to serve as her starting point, she says, the new manuscript would center on the
“inquiry into the meaning of being.”30 The comparison of Thomistic and
phenomenological thought would, therefore, proceed on the basis of the problem of the
meaning of being, the problem that had occupied Husserl’s former pupils for some years

28

Self-Portrait in Letters, 134.

29

Self Portrait in Letters, 206; ESG 4/Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt
at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being, trans. Kurt Reinhardt (Washington, DC: Institute of
Carmelite Studies Publications, 2002) (hereinafter “FEB”), xxviii.
30

ESG 4/FEB xxviii.
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and that had provided the foundation for Heidegger’s Being and Time.31 Edith Stein
explains that:
Both the search for the meaning of being and the attempt to arrive at a
synthesis of medieval thinking and vital present-day philosophy are not
only the personal interest of the author but dominate the philosophic
scene. And since many feel the inner need to find an answer to the
question, the author believes that her attempt, inadequate as it is, may yet
help others.32
The manuscript, Finite and Eternal Being, was essentially complete at the beginning of
1937, but the Aryan laws prevented its publication in Germany. Attempts to find an
American publisher also foundered because no English translation was available.33
There are, thus, three manuscripts in which Edith Stein attempts a synthesis of
medieval and phenomenological thought. Only the first of these, “Husserl’s
Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,” was published in her
lifetime. It first appeared in English translation in 2000 as “Husserl and Aquinas: A
Comparison,” in Knowledge and Faith. Finite and Eternal Being was first published in

31

Being and Time opens with: “Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what
we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the
question of the meaning (Sinn) of Being (Sein). But are we nowadays even perplexed at our
inability to understand the expression ‘Being’? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an
understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out
the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the
Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.” Martin
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers 1962), 1. (Because the translators give page numbers from the German edition,
reference is made only to those pages numbers. By that means, the place in Macquarrie and
Robinson’s translation is easily found.).
32

ESG 4/FEB xxviii.

33

See “Forward to Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications Edition,” FEB, xv.
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1950 as the second volume in the series Edith Stein Werke published at Louvain.34 Finite
and Eternal Being did not appear in English translation until 2002.35 The publication of
Potency and Act was similarly, but further delayed. It did not appear in German until
1998, and not in English translation until 2009. In addition, an earlier version of the
Festschrift piece, in the form of an imagined conversation between Thomas and Husserl,
was made available for the first time in German in1993, and in English translation in
2002.36 It is thus only in fairly recent history that Edith Stein’s attempts at a synthesis of
Thomism and modern philosophy may be laid side by side in order to discover the
progression of her thought and the growth of her understanding. It is clear that what she
attempted was not merely a comparison of the two, but a synthesis of the medieval
thought with the phenomenological method into a new philosophical system.37 Edith
Stein hoped that her efforts would establish a “vital contact with the great minds of the
past” and promote the realization that “above and beyond the limitation of historical
epochs and peoples, there is something in which all those share who honestly search for
truth.”38 The question, she says, is “whether the reborn philosophy of the Middle Ages

34

Edith Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein: Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins,
Edith Stein Werke 2, ed. Lucy Gelber and Romaeus Leuven (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1950;
Freiberg: Herder, 1986).
35

The publication history for both the German edition and English translation is
recounted in “Forward to ICS Publications Edition,” FEB, xiv-xxi.
36

“Husserl and Aquinas: A Comparison,” in Knowledge and Faith, 1-64.

37

Self-Portrait in Letters, 125. Referring to Conrad-Martius’s metaphysical article, Edith
Stein says, “[T]here one can see how a complete philosophical system—I prefer to call it an
‘organon’ rather than a system—is mature and only waits to be put in order with care.”
38

ESG 4/FEB xxviii.
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and the newly created philosophy of the twentieth century can possibly find a common
meeting ground in the one broad river of the philosophia perennis.”39
Obstacles to Reading and Understanding Finite and Eternal Being
There are certain obstacles to reading and understanding Finite and Eternal
Being. First among these is the sheer breadth of Edith Stein’s project.40 As she described
it, her work was intended to be a new ontology, a complete doctrine of being. On the way
toward this goal, she worked through the questions that occupied the pre-Socratics,
“What is that which is?” and “What is meant by being?,” and solutions suggested by
Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and Duns Scotus, before turning to the
contemporary existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the ontology Hedwig
Conrad-Martius. Moreover, she developed her own philosophical method drawing upon
the method of Husserl but modified to suit her particular task.
A second obstacle to an evaluation of Edith Stein’s work is her conscious goal of
obtaining a grasp of all truth, including revealed truth. She addresses the boundary
between philosophy and theology and the relation between them in her preface. One must
pay special attention in reading Finite and Eternal Being to realize that even when she
speaks of angels and the Holy Trinity, her project is philosophical rather than theological.
A third obstacle lies in the limits of translation. As valuable as the present English
translation of Finite and Eternal Being is, there are many instances in which Edith Stein’s
39

ESG 15/FEB 7.

40

One of the reviewers, Adolf Allers, also remarks on this problem. Adolf Allers, review
of Endliches und ewiges Sein: Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins, by Edith Stein, New
Scholasticism, 26 (1952), 480-85 (“It is not only the size of the work and the length of
discussions which render a report almost unfeasible, but more than anything the peculiarities of
German, especially Husserlian, terminology.” pp. 481-82).
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meaning can only be found by referring to the original. Not only is there the issue of
translation from the German, but there is also the fact that much of Finite and Eternal
Being is based upon translations of Greek and Latin texts into German. It is often
important to see how Edith Stein translated a particular passage because her choice of
words often gives clues to conclusions that she will draw much later in the work. For this
reason, I have generally provided my own translations of passages taken from Finite and
Eternal Being.
A fourth obstacle to the study of Finite and Eternal Being is the fact that the
indices in both the German original and the English translation are severely limited. It is
to be hoped that in the upcoming publication of a second English translation of Finite and
Eternal Being by ICS Publications this deficiency will be corrected.
Scope of this Dissertation
As a result of the density and breadth of Finite and Eternal Being, I have limited
the substantive discussion to two major themes: being and personal being. These subjects
form the very heart of Edith Stein’s project. Moreover, I have kept an eye on the
boundary between philosophy and theology. Edith Stein, of course, did the same; that is,
she endeavored to keep her work within the bounds of natural reason available to
believers and unbelievers alike. As a Christian, however, she accepted the revealed truths
of faith and theology as the ultimate measure of the truth of her work. Insofar as she was
successful in respecting the contemporary line between philosophy and theology, her
work should prove to be of interest to all readers, believers and unbelievers alike.
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Review of Related Literature
Although Edith Stein finished her manuscript by the beginning of 1937, Finite
Finite and Eternal Being was not published until 1950. The book received three reviews
reviews in English. One by James Collins in The Modern Schoolman, who noted that “her
phenomenological training inclined her … to a direct rethinking of the … [problem of
being] in its theoretical immediacy, with history playing a minor role”41; another by Fritz
Kaufman in the June 1950 issue of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, where
he hailed it as a “new Summa”42; and a third by Rudolf Allers in New Scholasticism, who
called the work a “highly provocative enterprise.”43 A review also appeared in the French
Bulletin de Philosophie written by Fr. L.B. Geiger, O.P., who described the work as one
“of contemplation, and of circular contemplation, much more than a work of scientific
investigation.”44 A more thorough discussion of these reviews is given below in
Chapter 6.
So far as I have been able to discover, the first portions of Finite and Eternal
Being to be made available to English readers appeared in Hilda Graef’s Writings of
Edith Stein published by Peter Owen Limited of London in 1956. Ms. Graef, herself a
German Protestant who became Catholic, fled to London to escape the Nazis in 1936. At
41

James Collins, review of Endliches und ewiges Sein, by Edith Stein, The Modern
Schoolman, 29 (1952): 139-45.
42

Fritz Kaufmann, review of Endliches und ewiges Sein: Versuch eines Aufstiegs zu,
Sinn des Seins, by Edith Stein, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12 (June 1952): 57277.
43

Rudolf Allers, review of Endliches und ewiges Sein: Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn
des Seins, by Edith Stein, New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 480-85.
44

L.B. Geiger, Review of Endliches und ewiges Sein, by Edith Stein, “Bulletin de
Philosophie,” in Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 38 (1954): 275-77.
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the very end of her book, she includes a translation of excerpts from volume two
of the German edition of Finite and Eternal Being.
A comprehensive bibliography of works by and about Edith Stein was
in 2012 by Francesco Alfieri entitled Die Rezeption Edith Stein.45 The following
works in English concern various aspects of Finite and Eternal Being.
James Collins of St. Louis University had an early interest in the work of
Stein. He published an extended article entitled, “Edith Stein and the Advance of
Phenomenology” in 1942,46 and later devoted a chapter to her work, a portion of
which discusses Finite and Eternal Being, in his Three Paths in Philosophy,
published in 1962.47
Sr. Mary Catherine Baseheart, S.C.N., devoted her doctoral dissertation to
“The Encounter of Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas
in Selected Writings of Edith Stein.”48 Her work was later published as Person in
the World: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Edith Stein.49

45

Francesco Alfieri, Die Rezeption Edith Steins: Internationale-Edith Stein-Bibliographie
1942-2012. Festgabe für M. Amata Neyer, O.C.D. Sondernummer das Edith Stein Jahrbuches
(Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 2012).
46

James Collins, “Edith Stein and the Advance of Phenomenology,” Thought, 17 (1942),

685-708.
47

James Collins, “Edith Stein as a Phenomenologist,” in Three Paths in Philosophy
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), 85-105.
48

Mary Catharine Baseheart, “The Encounter of Husserl’s Phenomenology and the
Philosophy of St. Thomas in Selected Writings of Edith Stein” (doctoral dissertation, University
of Notre Dame, 1960) (ProQuest 6002670).
49

Mary Catharine Baseheart, Person in the World: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Edith Stein (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998; 2010).
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Augusta Spiegelman Gooch’s dissertation, “Metaphysical Ordination: Reflections
on Edith Stein’s ‘Endliches und Ewiges Sein,’” provides an exhaustive and valuable
study of the difficult fourth chapter of Finite and Eternal Being which is concerned with
St. Thomas Aquinas’s reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.50
Karl Christian Schudt’s dissertation, “Faith and Reason in the philosophy of Edith
Stein,” focuses on Finite and Eternal Being and argues that Edith Stein project of
combining faith and reason in the discovery is sound even if her execution is sometimes
flawed.51
Sarah Borden’s dissertation was entitled, “An Issue in Edith Stein’s Philosophy of
the Person: The Relation of Individual and Universal Form in Endliches und ewiges
Sein,”52 Dr. Borden, now Associate Professor Sarah Borden Sharkey of Wheaton
College, is also the author of Edith Stein in the Outstanding Christian Thinkers Series,
which provides an introduction to Edith Stein’s life and writings,53 and of Thine Own
Self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s Later Writings, which is devoted to the problem of
individuation.54
50

Augusta Spiegelman Gooch, “Metaphysical Ordination: Reflections on Edith Stein’s
‘Endliches und Ewiges Sein,’” (doctoral dissertation, University of Dallas, 1982) (ProQuest
8216497).
51

Karl Christian Schudt, “Faith and Reason in the Philosophy of Edith Stein” (doctoral
dissertation, Marquette University, 2001) (ProQuest 3057012).
52

Sarah Borden, “An Issue in Edith Stein’s Philosophy of the Person: The Relation of
Individual and Universal Form in Endliches und ewiges Sein” (doctoral dissertation, Fordham
University, 2001) (ProQuest 3025014).
53

Sarah Borden, Edith Stein, Outstanding Christian Thinkers (New York: Continuum,

2003).
54

Sarah Borden Sharkey, Thine Own Self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s Later Writings
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010).
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Antonio Calgona’s The Philosophy of Edith Stein55 also provides a welcome
introduction to all of Edith Stein’s philosophical works, and has been especially helpful
to my project in his analysis of Edith Stein’s response to Martin Heidegger.
Of special importance to questions concerning Edith Stein’s view of the human
person is Sr. Marian Maskulak, C.P.S.’s Edith Stein and the Body-Soul-Spirit at the
Center of Holistic Formation.56
Significant articles touching on issues raised in Finite and Eternal Being include:
James B. Reichmann, S.J., “Edith Stein, Thomas Aquinas, and the Principle of
Individuation”;57 Sarah Borden Sharkey, “Edith Stein and Thomas Aquinas on Being and
Essence;”58 Victor M. Salas, “Edith Stein and Medieval Metaphysics”;59 and Chantal
Beauvais, Edith Stein and Modern Philosophy,” in Husserl and Stein, in the Cultural
Heritage and Contemporary Change series.60

55

Anthony Calcagno, The Philosophy of Edith Stein (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne
University Press, 2007).
56

Marian Maskulak, Edith Stein and the Body-Soul-Spirit at the Center of Holistic
Formation, American University Studies Series VII, Theology and Religion, No. 261 (New York:
Peter Lang, 2007).
57

James B. Reichmann, S.J., “Edith Stein, Thomas Aquinas, and the Principle of
Individuation,” in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 87 (2013): 55-86.
58

Sarah Borden Sharkey, “Edith Stein and Thomas Aquinas on Being and Essence,”
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2008): 87-103.
59

Victor M. Salas, Jr., “Edith Stein and Medieval Metaphysics,” American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2011) 2:323.
60

Chantal Beauvais, “Edith Stein and Modern Philosophy,” in Richard Feist and William
Sweet, eds., Husserl and Stein (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and
Philosophy, 2003), 155-175.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PROBLEM OF BEING

Why the Problem of Being?
We may well ask why Edith Stein devoted her major philosophical work to the
problem of being. Neither metaphysics nor ontology occupied her pre-conversion
writings. There are three sources or explanations for this choice.
The first source for Edith Stein’s taking up the question of the meaning of being
was her translation of Thomas’s Disputed Questions Concerning Truth. In the Forward to
Finite and Eternal Being, Edith Stein tells us that after her conversion to the Catholic
faith in 1922,
[s]he [speaking in the third person] naturally felt an increasing desire to
familiarize herself with the intellectual foundations of this world. Almost
as a matter of course she first seized upon the writings of St. Thomas
Aquinas. Her translation of the Disputed Questions Concerning Truth
paved the way for her return to philosophy.1
The translation was begun in 1925 at the suggestion of Fr. Erich Przywara2 and the
finished work was published in two volumes in 1931 and 1932.
Disputed Questions Concerning Truth was written between 1256 and 1259 while
Thomas was in Paris. It opens with the question, “What is truth?” One of the specific
questions that Thomas addresses is whether the true means exactly the same thing as that
which is (ens):

1

2

ESG 3/FEB xxvii.

See Edith Stein, Übersetzungen III, Thomas von Aquin, Über die Wahrheit I, Edith
Stein Gesamtausgabe 23 (Freiburg: Herder, 2008), xxiii.

It seems that the true is exactly the same as being (ens), for:
1. Augustine says, “The true is that which is.” But that which is (quod
est), is simply being (ens).
***
Now, as Avicenna says, that which the intellect first conceives as, in a
way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being
(ens). Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by
additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were
something not included in being–in the way that a difference is added to a
genus or an accident to a subject–for every reality [lit. nature] is
essentially…being (quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens). The
Philosopher [Aristotle] has shown this by proving that being cannot be a
genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to add to being
inasmuch as they express a mode of being not expressed by the term being
(in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non
exprimitur).3
Later in his response, Thomas specifies that the conformity of the intellect to that which
is (quod est) is true. What truth adds to that which is is conformity of an intellect to it.
Truth is therefore not that which is, but a mode of being (i.e., of existing) for an intellect,
i.e., being in conformity with that which is. Edith Stein was exposed to this argument and
Thomas’s way of thinking as she translated the Disputed Questions Concerning Truth. In
the quoted passage there are two claims that are important to Finite and Eternal Being:
(1) “every nature is essentially being,” which suggests Edith Stein’s concept of “essential
being” (wesenhaftes Sein); and (2) being is said to occur in various modes, one of which
is being-in-conformity-with that which is.
The second source for Edith Stein’s taking up the question of the meaning of
being, as we have already seen, was the publication of Being and Time in 1927. Edith
3

Thomas Aquinas, Questiones disputatae de veritate, questions 1-9 translated by Robert
W. Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), qu.1, a.1,
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer1.htm.
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Stein acknowledges the influence of Being and Time upon her own thought and
contemporary philosophical thought.4 Heidegger did more to resurrect the question of the
meaning of being than any other contemporary philosopher.
Heidegger was introduced to the question of the meaning of Being through Franz
Brentano’s On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle (1862).5 Brentano’s
work focused upon the question raised by Aristotle: “The question that was raised in
earliest times, that we raise today, and that will always be raised and will always be a
matter of perplexity: J\ JÎ Ð<? (“what is being?”).6 Brentano wrote a chapter on each of
four meanings that Aristotle assigned to Ð<:
(1) Being in its essential and inessential senses;
(2) Being in the sense of the true;
(3) Being in the sense of potentiality and actuality; and
(4) Being in the various senses derived from the schema of the categories.
In other places in the Metaphysics, Aristotle included other meanings of Ð<. Despite these
multiple meanings, Brentano asserted that Aristotle believed that all of them pointed to
one essential meaning. Heidegger found himself taken in by this question of the one
meaning of being. Years later, Heidegger described his reaction: “The following question

4

See Edith Stein, Potency and Act: Studies toward a Philosophy of Being, trans. Walter
Redmond, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 11 3-4; ESG 6-7/FEB xxxi.
5

See David Farrell Krell, “General Introduction: the Question of Being,” in Martin
Heidegger, Basic Writings, rev. ed. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 3. I have drawn
extensively upon this introduction in describing the history of the problem of being as presented
to Heidegger.
6

Aristotle, Metaphysics, in Aristotle in 23 Volumes, vols. 17 and 18 trans. Hugh
Tredenick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), VII, 1028b, 2-4,
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext %3a1999.01.0051.
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concerned me in quite a vague manner: If that which is [Seiende] is predicated with
manifold significance, then what is its leading fundamental significance? What does
Being [Sein] mean?”7
The question of the meaning of being had fallen out of favor long before
Heidegger picked it up. Auguste Comte was the first but certainly not the last to maintain
that the modern mind should abandon the idle questions of ontology (Ð<J"H (beings) +
8`(@H (account)) in favor of properly scientific inquiries. Nietzsche asserted that the
concept of being was but a necessary fiction for those who cannot endure ceaseless
becoming. Nevertheless, Heidegger continued his study, drawing from such sources as
Plato’s Sophist, especially 243d-244a, and Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics V, 3ff., and
Metaphysics IX, 10. By 1924 he had achieved three decisive insights:
(1) the logos of phenomenology would have to “make manifest” the way
that things themselves (as phenomena) “show themselves” to be.
(2) the fundamental sense of this “making manifest” in logos is disclosing
or uncovering; thus, the basic sense of truth (•-8Z2,4") is the unconcealment by which all beings show themselves to be. Truth is not
“correctness” or “correspondence” of an assertion, nor is it the
“agreement” of a subject and object. Instead, truth is the self-showing that
allows beings to be objects of assertions.
(3) insight into the character of •8Z2,4" as disclosedness or
unconcealment indicates that the leading meaning of being in Aristotle and
in the Western philosophical tradition is “presence” (Anwesenheit).
Phenomenology should make manifest what shows itself in
unconcealment as what it is (at) present. Therefore, the question of the
meaning of being raises the question of the meaning of time.8

7

Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper &
Row, 1972), 74.
8

Krell, “General Introduction to the Question of Being,” 17-18.
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There are clear echoes of the idea that being makes itself known in the present, in a
“now,” between a “no more” and “not yet,” in Finite and Eternal Being.
Heidegger started his investigation into the meaning of being by inquiring into the
being of the question; that is, by inquiring into the way the question of being presents
itself and shows itself to be. In order to do this, he found it necessary to reflect upon what
he was doing when he asked the question of being and thus to reflect upon the one for
whom being is a question. This was intended to open the way to the question of the
meaning of being in general, but this projected portion of Being and Time was never
written.
Heidegger called the being of the questioner Dasein (lit. “being there”=existence).
He eschewed traditional ways of talking about the being of human beings in Christian
dogma or in Cartesian subjectivism in favor of the inquiry into the being of the
questioner. Heidegger ultimately designated the being of Dasein as “care” (Sorge).
A number of Edith Stein’s colleagues and friends published responses to Being
and Time upon its publication. Among these, the works of Fr. Erich Przywara9 and
Hedwig Conrad-Martius10 were especially important to Edith Stein and made their
appearances in Finite and Eternal Being.
The third source or explanation for Edith Stein’s taking up the question of the
meaning of being was its suitability to her overarching project of providing a bridge
between medieval and contemporary philosophy. As the ancients discovered and asserted
9

Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis. Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal
Rhythm, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2014).
10

Hedwig Conrad-Martius, review of Sein und Zeit by Martin Heidegger,
Philosophischer Anzeiger 8 (1933).
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before her, being is the first thing apprehended in thought. It therefore provides the
logical starting place for any philosophy grounded in natural reason and knowledge. To
the extent that Edith Stein wanted to provide a way into her newly adopted intellectual
world of Catholic thought, there could have been no better basis for it than the question
of being. The fact that Husserl had reintroduced the question of essences and Heidegger
the question of being paved the way for Edith Stein’s approach.
Why did Edith Stein take up the question of the meaning of being? As we have
seen, there were three major reasons: (1) the question of the meaning of being was central
to the philosophy of St. Thomas which had become the focus of her study after her
conversion to Catholicism; (2) the publication of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time had
created a sensation and spurred at least two of her friends, Fr. Erich Przywara and
Hedwig Conrad-Martius, to respond; and (3) being proved to be an ideal starting point for
a philosophy based upon natural reason and natural knowledge, one that could bridge the
worlds of medieval philosophy and phenomenology.
What is the Question of the Meaning of Being?
In the prior section we discussed the reasons why Edith Stein took up the question
of the meaning of being in her major philosophical work. In this section, we will consider
what is entailed in the question of the meaning of being. Needless to say, this question
did not originate with Edith Stein.
As we have seen, the publication of Being and Time preceded Edith Stein’s turn
to the question of being in Potency and Act by only a few years. Being and Time opens
with a quotation from Plato’s Sophist: “For manifestly you have long been aware of what
you mean when you use the expression ‘being’ (Ð<).We, however, who used to think we
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understood it, have now become perplexed.”11 As Macquarrie and Robinson explain,
Heidegger translated the Greek Ð<, the present participle of ,Æ:\ (“to be”), with seiend,
the present participle of the verb sein (“to be”). Heidegger asserted that in his day there
was no better understanding of the question of the meaning of being (der Sinn des Sein)
than was portrayed in Socrates’ day in The Sophist. Note, however, the shift in the
question: Plato asked about the meaning of Ð< = “that which is”; Heidegger asked about
the meaning of Sein = “existence.”
In The Sophist the question of the meaning of Ð< was directed to those who
claimed that everything is one. That is, the question of the meaning of Ð< was the
question of how one expression, “Ð<,” can be applied to different things.12 The question
of the meaning of being for Plato was the question of the one and the many.13 The
question was how it is possible to account for the fact that all beings, when compared
with each other, appear to be many and diverse, yet, when taken together are a manifold,
i.e, a unity. Each thing is different from every other thing (because each thing is this thing
and not the other) and each thing is the same as every other thing (because each one is,
i.e.,–each one shares existence).
One solution to the problem of the one and the many, that of Parmenides, is to
assert that being is radically one—to assert that oneness alone is truly real while diversity
11

Heidegger, Being and Time, 1.
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Plato, Sophist, trans. Nicholas P. White, in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 243e-244a.
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My discussion of the problem of the one and the many is based upon W. Norris Clarke,
“Being as One and Many: Participation in Existence through Limiting Existence,” in The One
and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (South Bend: Notre Dame University
Press, 2001), 72-96.
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and change are merely illusions. Being is the object of the intellect; appearance and
illusions are merely the product of the senses. This solution is known as radical monism.
A second solution, that of mitigated monism¸ suggests that there is one allembracing something (e.g., God) and everything else is merely a mode or part of this one
being or substance. A form of this view was held by the Greek and Roman Stoics, Baruch
Spinoza, and Wilhelm Hegel.
These two solutions, radical monism and mitigated monism, affirm the unity of
being at the expense of the diversity of beings. Other solutions take the opposite
approach, affirming the diversity of beings at the expense of unity.
For example, some persons have maintained a radical pluralism based upon the
belief that the only things that can be said to be real are those that can be seen, heard,
touched, and measured. One example of this type of thought would be the empiricism of
John Locke. Locke asserted that “being” is nothing more than a mental construct,
unfounded in “reality.”
A second form of this solution, mitigated realism, affirms that there is some
objective reference for true judgment–there is something “out there,” but this view makes
no attempt to talk about this something. It focuses instead upon the object of true
judgment–what it is and how it is related to other objects of true judgment. These thinkers
are called essentialists because they focus on the essences of things, to distinguish them
from empiricists, who focus upon the existence of things.
We have seen that Heidegger was introduced to the question of the meaning of
being by Franz Brentano who set out the problem as described by Aristotle. Aristotle
noted that although the term JÎ Ð< has several meanings, when the question of the

29

meaning of being (Ð<) is asked, most people intend the question, “What is the meaning of
@ÛF\"?”,14 a term that was translated by Thomas as substantia (“substance”).15 With
respect to @ÛF\", Aristotle explained that “some assert that it is one and others that it is
many; some assert that it is finite and others that it is infinite.”16 Aristotle determined that
the investigation of @ÛF\" was the primary and practically exclusive concern of the one
science of first principles, the science which has come to be known as metaphysics.17
Heidegger sought to demonstrate the necessity for raising again the question of
the meaning of being on the basis of three presuppositions that had entered philosophical
thought and were believed to render the question of the meaning of being unnecessary.
The first was the presupposition that being is (simply) the most universal concept. To this
Heidegger responded that the universality of being is not the universality of a class or
genus. Rather, he said, the universality of being transcends any universality of genus.
Aristotle, said Heidegger, spoke of a unity of analogy with respect to being, but the
relation of this unity to the multiplicity of generic concepts remained and remains a
mystery. If being is the most universal concept, said Heidegger, this does not mean that it
needs no further explanation.
The second presupposition about being that had entered philosophical thought,
according to Heidegger, was the presupposition that the concept of being is indefinable.
14

Metaphysics, VII, 1028a, 15-16.
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For an overview of the difficulties that Latin translators had with Aristotle’s Greek, and
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16
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Heidegger agreed that being is not capable of definition, but argued that it nevertheless
remained a problem. From the fact that being cannot be defined, he said, all that can be
inferred is that being is not an entity. The indefineability of being, he asserted, does not
eliminate the question of its meaning.18
The third presupposition that had entered into philosophical thinking was the
presupposition that being is self-evident. Heidegger argued that the widespread and
unreflected use of the term “being” demonstrates instead that it is unintelligible. In any
being-toward beings as beings (Sein zu Seindem als Seiendem), he said, there lies an
enigma. That we live in an understanding of being while its meaning remains veiled in
darkness, he said, means that it is necessary to raise the question of its meaning again.19
Heidegger maintained that not only the meaning of being but also the formulation
of the question of the meaning of being is an issue for philosophy. Thus he proposed to
put the question of the meaning of being to the being for whom being is an issue.
This was how Heidegger raised the question of the meaning of being and how he
proceeded to investigate it. Edith Stein followed a different path. Edith Stein came to the
question of the meaning of being not only from reading Being and Time but also, and
perhaps primarily, as the result of her desire to form a new synthesis based between the
thought of Thomas Aquinas and that of Edmund Husserl. Thus her presentation of the
problem is not drawn directly from Plato or Aristotle, but from Thomas. Her intention
was to provide an objective analysis of Thomas’s thought using the phenomenological
method. For this reason, she did not rely upon Thomas’s Disputed Questions Concerning
18
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Potency, which was intended to provide a fuller treatment of certain questions raised in
the Summa Theologica and thus includes a mixture of theology and philosophy. Instead
she took as the starting point for her investigation of Thomas’s thought upon the question
of the meaning of being his earlier and purely philosophical work On Being and Essence.
In addition to the meaning ascribed to being by Plato and Aristotle, the question
of the meaning of being took on a specifically Christian significance as the result of the
need to distinguish God, who reveals himself as “I am,” (i.e., being), and who is the
creator of all that is, from everything that is not God. The Greeks never arrived at
monotheism and had no concept of creation comparable to that of the Judeo-Christian
tradition. The Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus and the unmoved mover of Aristotle’s
Physics are gods among gods.20 As Etienne Gilson affirms, “There is but one God and
this God is Being, that is the corner-stone of all Christian philosophy, and it was not
Plato, it was not Aristotle, it was Moses who put it in position.”21 For Christian thinkers,
God is Being; everything else is radically contingent. In God alone are essence and
existence one. In everything else, as Thomas ultimately formulated it, essence and
existence are separate. Existence is contingent in all save God and the reception of being
is the philosophical meaning of creation.
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See Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (Gifford Lectures 1931-1932),
trans. A.C.H. Downes, (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936; rpt. Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2012), 44. Edith Stein makes specific reference to this work only in connection with
the question of the possibility of a Christian philosophy. It is unclear whether she actually read it
or was merely aware of Gilson’s position on that question. In either event, because it is
contemporaneous with Finite and Eternal Being it provides a window into the state of the
understanding of the question of the meaning of being in medieval philosophy when Edith Stein
took it up.
21

Gilson, Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, 51.

32

In other words, in addition to the question of the one and the many, which was the
question of the meaning of being for the Greeks (and for Heidegger)—which is a
question of “how,” the question of the meaning of being for Christians is a question of
“why” –why is there anything rather than nothing?22
First Approach to the Problem of Being
Edith Stein’s first approach to the question of the meaning of being is found, of
course, in Potency and Act. That work had as its immediate concern the critical
comparison of medieval thought, represented by Thomas, with contemporary thought,
represented by Husserl. In a letter to Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein says that, “Potency
and Act … ‘grows into my “philosophical system,” which of course is a give-and-take
between Thomas and Husserl.’”23 Edith Stein began her reading of Thomas with a view
toward a possible study of his theory of knowledge and method.24 We must ask why she
turned from questions concerning a theory of knowledge to the question of the meaning
of being.
We know that the occasion for the writing of Potency and Act was Edith Stein’s
attempt to gain a professorship at the University of Freiburg and that Heidegger was a
member of the appointment committee. Edith Stein began work on Potency and Act just
22

Gilson, Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, 77; see also p. 81: “On the Greek side stands a
god who is doubtless the cause of all being, including its intelligibility, efficiency, and finality—
all, save existence itself; on the Christian side a God who causes the very existence of being. On
the Greek side we have a universe eternally informed or eternally moved; on the Christian side a
universe which begins to be by a creation.”
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1991), quoted in “German Editor’s Introduction,” Potency and Act, fn. 17 (hereinafter “German
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days after she returned from an interview with Heidegger at Freiburg. Her intent was to
“go over in [her] mind all the questions of principle between Thomas and Husserl.”25
Although the manuscript of Potency and Act was completed in the late summer of 1931,
she was advised not to seek the appointment, and therefore put the work aside. When she
decided to take it up again, she turned for advice to Hedwig Conrad-Martius who had
published a review of Being and Time in 1933. As we know, Edith Stein herself had
worked through Being and Time shortly after its publication. She felt the need to
distinguish her position from that of Heidegger and “[t]his need became more apparent as
she realized that her attempt to examine Thomism from the phenomenological
perspective was leading her to a comprehensive thematization of the question of being.”26
In the forward that she began to prepare for Potency and Act, she explains the
limits imposed on her scholarship by “external circumstances” (the rise to power of the
National Socialists and the resulting restrictions on persons of Jewish origin) and
concludes, “Hence all I can do now is show how far I have gotten in coping with the
great questions of being with my two sets of tools: the medieval and the modern way of
thinking.”27
The stated aim of Potency and Act was to gain an understanding of Thomas’s
method.28 This, however, was intended to lead to an understanding of “things” and their
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interconnection as Thomas conceived them.29 Already in the first pages of Potency and
Act Edith Stein explains that:
The idea of being and the basic forms wherein being is determined [are] a
core of the Thomistic organon. The contrast between potency and act
relate to the ultimate question of being. The discussion of these concepts
leads us at once to the heart of Thomistic philosophy.30
By this point Edith Stein had already achieved the understanding that the question of
being is at the heart of Thomas’s philosophy. Moreover, in Potency and Act she had
begun discussing the relation of analogy between finite and eternal being, which is so
important to her later study. Her discussion of Disputed Questions Concerning Truth in
Potency and Act starts with the note that Thomas distinguished two meanings of potency
and act, and that this was true of each of his concepts. Each of Thomas’s concepts, she
said, is “bisected by a radical dividing line.”31 Each expression, including being, means
one thing when used of God and another when used of creatures. That the same word or
concept can be used with respect to both, she says, is possible only because these words
are used analogically.32 This passage occurs in the only section that was taken over intact
into Finite and Eternal Being signaling its importance for the discussion that follows
there.
In Potency and Act Edith Stein explained why her study would be one of ontology
rather than theory of knowledge, the overwhelming concern of modern thinkers. She said,
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“so long as we do not understand being [Sein], we understand nothing.”33 In other words,
the certainty of being must come before knowledge. It is pre-reflective. Being, as
manifested in our own being, is the starting point behind which we can go no further, and
thus, a proper starting point for philosophy.34
A Note about Metaphysics and Ontology
In her letter to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Edith Stein said that she agreed with her
about a positive definition of metaphysics and the demarcation of metaphysics from
ontology. It will be helpful to try to understand what she meant. Unfortunately, Hedwig
Conrad-Martius’s texts are not readily available in the United States, and have not been
translated into English. Nevertheless, some idea of what Edith Stein meant by her
comments may be gleaned from her own comments in the Appendix on Heidegger. There
she says,
Heidegger has not given up the old sense of ‘metaphysica generalis’ as the
doctrine concerning ‘beings as such,’ but only emphasized that it is
necessary to clarify the meaning of being in regard to it. In this we agree.
He has, however, taken a step further and claimed that one, in order to
understand the meaning of being, must investigate the human
understanding of being, and as he found the ground for the possibility of
the understanding of being in the finitude of human beings, he saw the
task of founding metaphysics to lie in a discussion of human finitude.
Against this, reservations must be made from two sides: Metaphysics
concerns the meaning of being as such, not only of the human being. We
must of course question the human—that is our own—understanding of
being as regards the meaning of being. But this means that we must ask
what it intends when it speaks about being. And this question may not be
replaced by the other question of how such understanding of being
‘happens.’ The one who neglects the question of the meaning of being
implicit in the ‘understanding of being’ itself, and ‘projects’ it carelessly
as the human understanding of being, is in danger of cutting himself off
33
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from the meaning of being: and as far as I can see, this is what Heidegger
succumbs to.… Then consider this other point: We saw that the
understanding of being did not belong to finitude as such, as there are
finite beings which have no understanding of being. The understanding of
being belongs to that which distinguishes spiritual and personal beings
from other kinds of being. Internal to this, the human being’s
understanding of being must be distinguished from that of other finite
spirits, and all finite understanding of being must be distinguished from
infinite (divine) understanding of being. What understanding of being is as
such, however, cannot be explained without clarifying what the meaning
of being is. Therefore it remains that for us the fundamental question for
the foundation of metaphysics is the question of the meaning of being.35
Some explanation may help to clarify Edith Stein’s points.
The metaphysica generalis came to be distinguished from the metaphysica
specialis from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries forward.36 General metaphysics is
concerned with the general nature of reality, and thus, includes ontology, which is the
study of being or beings. Special metaphysics is concerned with problems concerning
specific kinds or aspects of being, especially God. Based upon Edith Stein’s comments in
the passage quoted above, she viewed ontology as the foundational science for all
metaphysics, rather than as a mere branch or part of metaphysica generalis. In support of
this conclusion, one may consult a footnote to Chapter V of Finite and Eternal Being, in
which Edith Stein comments: “Husserl demarcated the special field of formal ontology in
the first volume of Logische Untersuchungen; in the first section of Ideen; and in
Formalen und transzendentalen Logik; and even made formal ontology a part of logic.”37
She, on the other hand, she says, follows Alexander Pfänder who regarded “thoughts” as
35
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the proper objects of logic, and thus insisted that ontology and logic are separate
disciplines.38 Edith Stein regarded ontology, rather than logic, as the founding science of
metaphysics, and thus shows herself to be part of the Göttingen/Munich group who
understood Husserl’s turn as a move away from the steps toward a straightforward
ontology found in the Logical Investigations towards a more subjective approach that
founds ontology in logic.
As we have seen, Edith Stein departed from Heidegger insofar as his focus was
the understanding of being. The question of the understanding of being is a question of
second instance, or conceptual, being. The question of the meaning of being is a question
of first instance, or real being. As Edith Stein notes, the inquiry into the meaning of being
and of that which is as such (des Seins und des Seiendes als solchen) are, according to
Aristotle, the tasks of first philosophy.39 This is the science that came to be called
metaphysics.40
The Analogy of Being
In addition to an understanding of metaphysics and ontology, some understanding
of the analogia entis or analogy of being, is crucial to the reading of Finite and Eternal
Being and of the metaphysics of St. Thomas.41 Edith Stein explains that Aristotle spoke
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of the analogy of being in a more limited way than did St. Thomas. Aristotle used the
concept of analogy to explain the similitude that exists among all existents, including the
world and its gods. Thomas used it more specifically to refer to the relationship that
exists between creatures and the creator. As Etienne Gilson explains, “beings, which are
given as facts, have no sufficient reason save in Being.”42 In other words, the mere fact
that we encounter beings in our experience gives some access to their cause, which is to
be found in being itself. Moreover, Gilson explains, we know from our experience of
ourselves as causes that our actions or the products of our actions receive their existence
as effects from our being as cause. In other words, effects “partake” of the being of their
cause.43 For this reason, says Gilson, we say that what we produce is ours. And what we
produce resembles us as its cause. Thomas repeatedly asserted that: omne agens agit sibi
simile (every agent makes something similar to itself).44 This resemblance makes
knowledge of the agent from its effect possible. And the relation between the agent and
its effect is one of analogy. Just so, our own agency is an analogue of divine agency—
divine being or the creator who is the cause of all that is. As Gilson explains, “It is
precisely in its existence and substantiality that the creature is the analogue of the
Creator.”45
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Edith Stein likewise speaks of the analogy between finite and eternal being-between the being of creatures and the being of God. In fact, she agrees with Thomas that
the relationship between the multiplicity of finite beings and the divine “I am” is the
primordial analogy of being.46 At the end of her first phenomenological derivation of
eternal and temporal being, Edith Stein suggests that what is meant by the analogia entis
becomes “faintly visible” in the relation between real being, as it is revealed in the
moment, and being itself, which is suggested by it as the fullness of being not subject to
any temporal change. There she makes reference to the solemn definition of the analogy
by the Fourth Lateran Council: “between the Creator and the creature no similarity can be
noted, however, great, without compelling one to observe the greater dissimilarity
between them.”47 She explains that the real, temporal being that one experiences as her
own is an analogue of divine, eternal being. It is similar, but always dissimilar. Edith
Stein devotes Chapter VII of Finite and Eternal Being to creation as the image (or
analogue) of the Trinity.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STRUCTURE OF FINITE AND ETERNAL BEING

It is sometimes very difficult to follow the flow of the argument in Finite and
Eternal Being. One reason for this is the failure of the present English translation to
translate certain key terms consistently. Another is that Edith Stein presumes a familiarity
with certain works of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine. Therefore, it may be
helpful to sketch out a map of Edith Stein’s study. The key is that even when she does not
refer directly to On Being and Essence, its terms and argument provide the underlying
structure for her questions.
First Starting Point
As we have seen, the first starting point for Edith Stein’s inquiry into the meaning
of being is Thomas’s Disputed Questions Concerning Potency, which opens with the
question, “Is there potentia in God?”1 Thomas answered that potentia is spoken of in
relation to actus, and actus is spoken of in two ways: (1) actus which is the forma; and
(2) actus which is operatio.2 Potentia, he said, also is spoken of in two ways: (1) as
potentia activa, which corresponds to actus as operatio; and (2) as potentia passiva,
which corresponds to the first actus which is forma.3 Thomas explains that actus, which
1
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2

Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potententia dei (Disputed Questions on
Potency), trans. English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1952),
HTML edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P., I, q. 1, a. 1, http://dhspriory.org/thomas
/QDdePotentia.htm.
3

I have retained the Latin expressions here in order to highlight Edith Stein’s
development of these terms.

may be translated as “act” or “actual” or even “acting” in English, was first used in the
sense of operatio, meaning “action.” It came secondarily to mean formus (“form”)
because form is the principle of action. (More will be said about this later.) In English
potentia activa is translated “power,” and potentia passiva is generally translated as
“potency” or “possibility.” Following Aristotle, Thomas said that God is pure act (actus
purus). In other words, when act is said of God it is not said in relation to a possibility.
Rather, in God there is nothing that is not act and thus his potentia (power) is his act.
God’s potentia is potentia activa, or “power” (Kraft), but not in the same sense that
power is said of any creature, because in every creature act and power/potency/possibility
occur in relation to each other.
The meaning of all of these terms should become clearer as we proceed. For now
the most important point is that this is but one example in which Thomas uses terms in
one way with respect to God and in another way or ways with respect to creatures.
Thomas explains why this is so:
We must also observe that our mind strives to describe God as a most
perfect being. And seeing that it is unable to get at him save by likening
him to his effects, while it fails to find any creature so supremely perfect
as to be wholly devoid of imperfection, consequently it endeavours to
describe him as possessing the various perfections it discovers in
creatures, although each of those perfections is in some way at fault, yet so
as to remove, from God whatever imperfection is connected with them.4
We speak of God in the best ways that are available to us by ascribing to God in an
analogous way the perfections found in creatures. This is one way to understand the
analogia entis.
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Second Starting Point
Realizing that in On Potency a theological rather than philosophical point of view
prevails, Edith Stein makes a second start or statement of the problem in Finite and
Eternal Being, this time relying upon Thomas’s early philosophical work On Being and
Essence. For ease of reference and because it provides the framework for what will
follow, a translation of the passage in which she summarizes Thomas’s findings and
makes her initial comments is set out below:
Even in this brief outline of an ontology, Thomas considered the totality of
beings as an ordered kingdom. He distinguishes three principal orders.
1. Material or composite things (composed of matter and form), which
comprise the physical world—the “dead” things and all living things,
including man.
2. Intelligences or simple [things]; while Aristotle was thinking of the
intelligences by which, in his opinion, the stars are moved, the
medieval thinkers meant by these terms the angels. “Simple,” Thomas
called them, because he looked upon them as “pure forms.” (The
question of whether the structure of the “pure intelligences” required
something material (stoffliches) was disputed in his time.)
3. The First Being [erste Seiende]56—God. That the First Being, the
cause of everything else, is totally simple, pure being, was agreed.
Now, one who denied, with Thomas, to the created intelligences
composition of matter and form [Stoff und Form] had to find another
means to distinguish them from First Being. In this context, Thomas
comes to the separation of form and being [Form und Sein] in the
created intelligences. (“Form” is equivalent to “Wesen”—“essentia”).
“…the intelligence [Geistwesen] (intelligentia) is form and being and
has its being from the First Being, which is only being, and this is the
first cause, which is God. But everything that receives something from
5

See Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia (On Being and Essence) (1965), adapted and
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another is in relation thereto in potency, and what is added to it is the
other’s act.7 So must the quiddity [Washeit] or form itself be, which is
the intelligence, in relation to the being, which is in the manner of act.
And so there is potency and act in the intelligences, but not form and
matter.… And because the quiddity (quidittas) of the intelligence is
the intelligence itself, so its quiddity or essence [Wesen] (essentia) is
just what it itself is, and its being, which it has received from God, is
that whereby it has independent being (selbständige Sein) in the real
world (wirklichen Welt) (quo subsistit in rerum natura)…”8 “And
since it is believed that there is potency and act in the intelligences,
there can easily be found a variety of intelligences [Edith Stein’s
footnote: “unlike the First Being, which is one”], which would be
impossible if there were no potency in them … So there is a distinction
between them according to the degree of potency and act, so that the
higher, which stand closer to the First Being, have more actuality and
less potentiality, and correspondingly the others. 9
The small snippet shows clearly how closely in the ontology of St.
Thomas the terms “act” and “potency” are related to a number of other
basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy—form, matter, substance
(=what “subsists”), etc. It will therefore be necessary subsequently to go
into that as well. To rely on it now would be to explain one unknown by
another. Therefore, provisionally only, what can be inferred about the
terms “act” and “potency” without discussion of those concepts [i.e., form,
matter, substance, etc.] will be extracted from the quoted passage.10
This passage gives an excellent map of Finite and Eternal Being: Chapter II is devoted to
act and potency; Chapter III clarifies Edith Stein’s position concerning the divisions of
being; Chapter IV takes up the concepts of form, matter and substance in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics; and Chapter VIII is concerned with individual being, which must be seen as
the goal toward which the entire work is aimed.
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The points that Edith Stein emphasizes in her comments on the passages from On
Being and Essence are the following:
(1) With respect to the pure spirits or intelligences, Thomas distinguishes what
they are from their act of existing.
(2) The First Being, however, is pure being and pure act.
(3) Whatever receives being is in potency with respect to the being it receives.
(4) Based upon the literal meaning of potentia (*b<":4H), which indicates
“ability” or “capacity,” esse in potentia indicates a “being in capacity,” or
“being in possibility to be”; or a “being-ability.”
(5) That which “can be” lacks the “power” (Macht) to move into [actual] being by
itself.
(6) On the other hand, having “being-ability” means more than: “there is nothing
that precludes the addition of being (das Hinzutreten des Seins).”
(7) Rather, implied in the “having the possibility of being” is already being in a
dual sense:
a. Being ordained or being oriented toward actual being; and
b. A certain mode of being (Seinsweise=modus entis).11
(8) “Being possible” does not simply mean “not being.”
(9) If possible being were not already a mode of being it would make no sense to
speak of “degrees” (Graden) of “potentiality.” [But Thomas does speak of

11

See Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions Concerning Truth, q. 1, a. 1 “Some
predicates may be said to add to being inasmuch as they express a mode of being not expressed
by the term being (ens).” Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, questions 1-9 trans. Robert W.
Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), http://dhspriory.org/QDdeVer.htm.
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degrees of potency and act with respect to the simple intelligences. Therefore,
potency is a mode of being].
(10)

If there were only one meaning of “being” (Sinn von “Sein”) [that is, if

the only meaning of being were “act”], and act and being coincided absolutely
[that is, if the only kind of being were actual being], then it would be
impossible to say that something is more or less act, or thus that something is
closer to or further away from the First Being. [But Thomas does say that a
higher intelligence which is closer to the First Being has more actuality and
less potency than an intelligence that is further away from the First Being.
Therefore, there must be more than one meaning of “being” and more than
one kind of being].
(11)

So we come to distinguish gradations of beings, and act and potency as

modes of being.
(12)

The transition from potency to act, from possible being to actual being, is

a transition from one mode of being to another, from a lower one to a higher
one.
(13)

Even within possible being and actual being there are gradations.

(14)

Only thus is talk of “pure act” understandable, and it is clear that pure act

must designate the highest [kind of] being.12
In this discussion, Edith Stein stakes her claim to certain positions which cannot
be understood in the first (or even the tenth) reading of this first section. She knows
where she is headed even if the reader does not. She has taken the position that being has
12

ESG 39-40/FEB 33-35.
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more than one meaning. In fact the mere title of her work, Finite and Eternal Being,
indicates that she will assert that being has more than one meaning (and thus should not
be limited to finite being) contrary to the position of Heidegger in Being and Time.13
Moreover, she has introduced the concept of “modes of being,” also suggesting that in
some way, “being” is multivalent.
The original point made by Thomas was that there are different grades of being
and different degrees of potency and act. This was important to him because he needed to
distinguish the intelligences (angels and the human soul), from, on the one hand,
composed substances, and, from, on the other hand, God.
On Being and Essence as the Guide to Finite and Eternal Being
One of the reasons that Finite and Eternal Being is a rather difficult book to read
is that Edith Stein takes the arguments of On Being and Essence out of order. The
discussion of act and potency in On Being and Essence occurs fairly late. Edith Stein
assumes familiarity with the arguments of On Being and Essence throughout Chapters II
and III of her book. Without familiarity with the structure of On Being and Essence, it is
very difficult to follow the course of Edith Stein’s thought. The introduction of modes of
being in Chapter II is just one example. Thus, before proceeding to Edith Stein’s working
out of the problem of being–her original analysis–a short outline of Thomas’s
presentation will be helpful.
In the first paragraph of On Being and Essence, Thomas explains that his topic is
being and essence because, according to Avicenna, they are what is first conceived by the
intellect. His intent is to clarify (1) what is meant by “being” (ens) and “essence”
13

In fairness to Heidegger, Edith Stein only saw part of his projected work.
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(essentia); (2) how they are found in various things; and (3) how they relate to logical
intentions such as genus, species, and difference.14
Thomas next explains the procedure that he will follow. He says that it is best to
acquire knowledge of what is simple from what is composed, and to come to what is
prior from what is posterior. He says that he will proceed from the meaning of “being” to
the meaning of “essence,” which signals that being is composed where essence is simple,
and being is posterior to essence which is prior.
Two meanings of being
Immediately, Thomas gives two meanings of being (ens per se) from Aristotle’s
Metaphysics. Being is said: (1) to indicate that which is divided into the ten genera (i.e.,
real being); and (2) to signify the truth of propositions (i.e., true being). Thomas explains
that being used in the first way indicates only something in reality (quod aliquid in re).
Being used in the second sense, however, includes everything about which we can form
an affirmative proposition, including, for example, privations and negations.15
Edith Stein takes up this part of On Being and Essence at the beginning of
Chapter IV of Finite and Eternal Being.
Derivation of essence from being
Thomas next turns to the derivation of essence from being and various terms
related to the essence. He says that the word “essence” is not taken from the word
“being” in the second sense, but from “being” in the first sense, i.e., from being as
divided into the ten genera. He notes that Averroes accordingly concluded that “being” as
14

On Being and Essence, 1-2.

15

On Being and Essence, 4.
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used in the first sense points to the essence of a real thing (essentiam rei).16 Since “being”
is used with respect to the ten genera, Thomas says, the “essence” must signify something
common to all natures (omnibus naturis) by means of which diverse beings (entia) are
placed into diverse genera and species; e.g., humanity is the nature of man.17
Edith Stein quotes this section at the end of the first section of Chapter IV of
Finite and Eternal Being before devoting the balance of the chapter to an analysis of
Aristotle’s concepts of à80 (matter), and :@DNZ (form) in order to compare the meaning
of Wesen with Thomas’s essentia and substantia and Aristotle’s @ÛF4". She also gives
some attention to the distinction between “nature” (Natur) and “essence” (Wesen) in
Chapter IV section 3, parts 2, 6, and 7.
Various meanings of “essence”
Thomas continues his discussion of essence (essential) by naming other terms that
have been used to describe or name “essence.” These are: (1) “Quiddity” when it refers to
what the real thing is as expressed in a definition; Thomas identifies this as what Aristotle
called quod quid erat esse (JÎ J\ μ< ,É<"4) (the what it was to be). (2) “Form” to
indicate the full determination of a real thing. (3) “Nature” (natura) in the first of four
meanings of nature given by Boethius when it signifies that which can be grasped by the
intellect. (4) “Nature” as described by Aristotle as something by which real beings are
ordered to their proper operations or activities; (5) “Essence” (in distinction to
“quiddity”) from the fact that through it and in it a real being has existence.18
16

On Being and Essence, 5.

17

On Being and Essence, 6; quoted at ESG 116/FEB 125.

18

On Being and Essence, 7-11.
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Edith Stein takes up these terms in Chapters II and III of Finite and Eternal Being
without any additional quotation from or reference to On Being and Essence. Her
attempts to find suitable German terms for the Latin expressions make these chapters
very difficult to follow. An attempt will be made to map her terms onto those of Thomas
in a later section.
Being as substance and accident
Thomas next narrows his discussion to consideration of essence as used with
respect to “substances” as opposed to “accidents.” This is because, according to Aristotle
as we have seen, “being” is used absolutely and with priority to substances. Substances
are divided into simple and composed substances. Essence is present in each of these, but
in a preeminent way in simple substances, because they–especially God–are the cause of
the composed substances. Thomas begins with consideration of composed substances
because “the essences of the simple substances are more hidden from us.”19
In the composed substances, says Thomas, are found form and matter, as, for
example, soul and body are found in a human being. But neither matter alone nor form
alone in a composed substance can be said to be its essence. Rather, because essence (as
quiddity) is what is signified in the definition of a real thing, and the definition of natural
substances includes both form and matter, the essence of a real thing must refer to the
substance as a whole.20
Questions relating to the meaning of @ÞF4" and its relation to substance, essentia,
and Wesen are addressed by Edith Stein in Chapter IV of Finite and Eternal Being.
19

On Being and Essence, 12-13.

20

On Being and Essence, 14-21.
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The principle of individuation
Thomas moves next to consideration of the principle of individuation, which he
identifies as formed matter.21 This might raise the question, he says, of whether essence
(which includes form and matter) is only particular and not universal. If this were true, he
says, universals would not have a definition because essence is what is signified by the
definition. Therefore the principle of individuation cannot be matter taken in just any
way; rather, says Thomas, matter as designated matter is the principle of individuation.22
The principle of individuation is carried forward in Chapter Three of On Being and
Essence, the longest chapter in terms of numbers of paragraphs, in which Thomas
discusses the relation of matter and form to genus and species.
Edith Stein takes up the question of individual being in Chapter VIII of Finite and
Eternal Being.
The logical intentions
Chapter Four of On Being and Essence turns to the question of how the essence of
a composed substance is related to the logical intentions: genus, species, and difference.23
Edith Stein takes up the question of the universals in Finite and Eternal Being Chapter
III, section 10, and questions related to form and matter, genus and species in Chapter IV
of Finite and Eternal Being.

21

On Being and Essence, 8, 22.

22

On Being and Essence, 22-23.

23

On Being and Essence, 50-65.
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The essence of separated substances
In Chapter Five of On Being and Essence Thomas turns to the question of the way
that essence is in the “separated substances,” that is, in the human soul, in the
intelligences (angels), and in the First Cause.24 We have already seen that Edith Stein
draws from this section to make her second presentation of the problem of being in
Chapter I of Finite and Eternal Being. In addition, she devotes Chapter VII, Section 5, to
the “created pure spirits,” and Chapter VII, Section 6, to the contrast between the creator
and his creation. Chapter VII, Section 9, is devoted specifically to the image of God in
human beings, and is concerned, among other things, with distinguishing the human soul
from “lower forms” and “pure spirits.”
A summary
Chapter Six of On Being and Essence summarizes the discussion of how essence
is found in all substances: how it is found in God, how it is found in the simple
intelligences, and how it is found in composed substances.25 Edith Stein takes up these
questions in Chapter VII of Finite and Eternal Being.
The essence of accidents
Chapter Seven of On Being and Essence is devoted to how essence is found in
accidents and how accidents are related to the logical intentions.26 Edith Stein touches on
these matters in her own discussion of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Chapter IV of Finite
and Eternal Being.
24

On Being and Essence, 66-87.

25

On Being and Essence, 88-98.

26

On Being and Essence, 99-113.
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Additional Sources for Finite and Eternal Being
Edith Stein devotes Chapter V of Finite and Eternal Being to the structure of
beings as such; i.e., to the transcendentals: ens, res, unum, aliquid, bonum, verum, and
pulchrum. This topic is not taken up by Thomas in On Being and Essence, but in
Disputed Questions Concerning Truth. In addition to drawing directly from Thomas,
Edith Stein relies heavily upon volume II of Joseph Gredt, O.S.B.’s Elementa
philosophiae Aristotelico-thomisticae.27
For her discussion of the “image” of God in human beings versus the “vestiges”
of God in other creatures in Chapter VII, Edith Stein looks to Thomas’s Summa
Theologica and Summa contra Gentiles, Augustine’s On the Trinity, and PseudoDionysius’s On the Celestial Hierarchy.28
For the discussion of individual being in Chapter VIII, in addition to On Being
and Essence, Edith Stein’s primary sources are Marie-Dominique Rosalind-Gosselin,
O.P.’s article on this problem in his edition of On Being and Essence;29 and Gredt’s Die
aristotelisch-thomistische Philosophie, a German translation/paraphrase of his
Elementa.30

27

Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, 5th ed.
(Freiburg: Herder, 1929).
28

[Pseudo]-Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, http://www.esoteric.msu.edu
/VolumeII/CelestialHierarchy.html.
29

Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin, Le “On Being and Essence” de S. Thomas Aquin
(Kain, Belgium: Le Saulchoir, 1926), 51.
30

Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., Die aristotelisch-thomistische philosophie, 2 vols. (Freiburg:
Herder, 1935).
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Concluding Summary
It is easy to get lost in Finite and Eternal Being because of the detail of the
phenomenological investigations undertaken by Edith Stein. The key to understanding
why she takes up the topics that she does is Thomas’s On Being and Essence. After her
first presentation of the problem, drawn from Chapter Five of that work, she generally
follows Thomas in the presentation of topics. She begins with the concepts of being and
essence, then moves to the concepts of substance, form and matter, and the logical
intentions, genus, species, and difference, as found in Thomas and Aristotle’s
Metaphysics. She inserts a chapter on the transcendentals before returning to questions
related to essence as it may be found in God, the intelligences, and the human soul. She
completes the work with consideration of two questions addressed by Thomas: the
“image” of the First Being in all other beings, and the principle of individuation.
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CHAPTER 4
EDITH STEIN’S METHOD

In the text of Finite and Eternal Being, Edith Stein gives several appraisals of the
work that she hoped to accomplish. We will focus on two of them. The first occurs in the
Forward and the second in the Introduction. A review and comparison of these sections is
very helpful in understanding what Edith Stein is about in Finite and Eternal Being.
First Appraisal
The Forward, which appears to have been written after the work was nearly
complete,1 starts with the note that, “This book was written by a learner for fellow
learners.”2 Reinhardt renders it, “This book was written by a beginner for beginners,” but
this does not fully capture what Edith Stein intended. Although Edith Stein claims that
she was a “newbie” (ein Neuling) in the field of scholastic philosophy, she had in fact
been reading and translating Thomas for more than ten years. Her translation of and
commentary on the Disputed Questions Concerning Truth had been published, and she
demonstrates familiarity with eight other works of St. Thomas in the text of Finite and
Eternal Being. More importantly, her initial statement expresses her style of approaching
philosophical questions—that of a determined, yet docile, seeking after truth. This is
reflected in the subtitle of the work, “An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being,”
1

Cf. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., “ICS Introduction,” in Edith Stein, The Science of the
Cross, trans. Josephine Koeppel, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies
Publications, 2002). Fr. Kavanaugh says with respect to The Science of the Cross: “Concluding
her study with the death of St. John of the Cross, Edith wrote the preface, which was for her the
normal thing to do: write the preface after finishing the work,” p. xxxvii.
2

ESG 3/FEB xxvii.

which recalls The Ascent to Mount Carmel, by St. John of the Cross, the subject of her
final, unfinished work, The Science of the Cross.3 The Ascent of Mount Carmel, a classic
of Western spirituality, presents a systematic treatment of the souls’ ascent of the
metaphorical Mount Carmel toward union with God. In Finite and Eternal Being, Edith
Stein presents a careful and systematic ascent toward the meaning of all being, which is
found ultimately in eternal being, which is God.
Edith Stein explains that Finite and Eternal Being is a continuation of her efforts
to confront the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas with that of Edmund Husserl. She had
taken up her prior manuscript, Act and Potency, and found that it needed major revision.
In her new attempt, she says that she started again with Thomas’s doctrine of act and
potency, but this time the project was focused on the question of meaning of Being
(Sein).4 The confrontation between phenomenological and scholastic thinking took place
in her objective (sachlichen; i.e., factual) treatment of this question. Although historical
solutions sometimes provided starting points for her investigation, it was the analysis of
consciousness that provided the initial means of gaining access to the realm of all that is
but which is not God (Seiende=ens). What she intended was an ontology, not a
philosophical system; therefore, questions of knowledge and of logic were not taken up.

3

St. John of the Cross, O.C.D. (1542-December 14, 1591) was the pupil of and then
collaborator with St. Teresa of Avila in the reform of the Carmelite Order known as the Discalced
Carmelites. The religious community that Edith Stein entered was one of the “Carmels” in the
Discalced tradition. She regarded St. John and St. Teresa as her spiritual forbearers. Edith Stein’s
last, unfinished, work, The Science of the Cross, is an extended study of the works of St. John of
the Cross prepared for the fourth centenary of his birth.
4

ESG 4/FEB xxviii. From this point forward, in an attempt to avoid confusion, “Being”
(with the initial capital) will be used to indicate that what is being discussed is “Sein.”
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Her aim was the truth about being, unconditioned by any particular time or culture.5 In
the course of the work, she compared the results that she achieved to the solutions of
Aristotle, Plato, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and Duns Scotus. In the end, she found that
she identified more with the thought of Plato, St. Augustine, and Duns Scotus than that of
Aristotle and St. Thomas, even though Thomas provided her initial point of departure. In
addition to the thought of Husserl, she also engaged contemporary works of Martin
Heidegger and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Edith Stein makes special note of Martin
Heidegger’s Being and Time which she says that she read shortly after its publication.
Although she was deeply impressed by it, she says that she was not at that time able to
evaluate it objectively. She also explains that after Finite and Eternal Being was
complete, she added a section on Heidegger’s philosophy of existence as an appendix.
She notes that the reader will find repeated evidence of the influence of Heidegger and
Conrad-Martius in the course of the work. The Forward is signed at Cologne-Lindenthal,
September 1, 1936.
As the result of the Forward, we see that Edith Stein assessed the work as
encompassing three projects: (1) the confrontation of the thought of St. Thomas with that
of Edmund Husserl; (2) a systematic and objective (i.e., factual) treatment of the question
of the meaning of Being; and (3) an engagement with the philosophies of Martin
Heidegger and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. She refers to three different points of departure:
(1) St. Thomas’s doctrine of act and potency as set forth in On Being and Essence; (2) the
analysis of consciousness; and (3) the thought of Thomas and Aristotle. As to method,
Edith Stein makes clear that what she felt that she accomplished was preeminently an
5

I.e., Übergeschichtlicher Wahrheit (supra-historical truth).
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objective or factual inquiry. That is, in true phenomenological style, her focus was “the
things themselves.” Whatever use she made of historical commentaries or solutions was
always checked against her own investigation and experience. We may say that the
solutions of Thomas were used as the starting point in the sense that they provided the
questions to be considered, while her own investigation provided her solutions. These
were then checked against the historical solutions and against revealed truth. In the end,
she discovered that her solutions were more akin to those of Plato, St. Augustine and
Duns Scotus, than to those of Aristotle and St. Thomas, but she says that she could not
have known this when she started. She believes that the record of her explorations may
prove helpful to others who take up the question. The impression that she gives is that of
a natural scientist making careful notes of each hypothesis, experiment, and result, in
order to make her researches available for those who will follow after her.
Second Appraisal
The second appraisal of Edith Stein’s project—second in the sequence of the
finished work, but first in time of writing—appears as Chapter I, which is subtitled,
“Introduction: The Question of Being.” This chapter provides additional insight into
Edith Stein’s project and method. As stated, internal clues point to its having been written
before the other chapters and the Forward. This chapter is divided into four sections:
§1 First Introduction to the Doctrine of Act and Potency of St. Thomas Aquinas; §2 The
Question of Being through the Ages; §3 Difficulties of Linguistic Expression; and
§4 Being and the Possibility of a “Christian Philosophy.”
The first section of Chapter I is the only one in the entire work in which text is
taken over intact from Potency and Act. Here Edith Stein takes as her starting point the
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first question of Thomas’s Disputed Questions Concerning Potency: “Does God have
potency?” Thomas’s answer, she notes, reveals a dual meaning in the term potency and in
its correlative term, act. The fact that each of these terms can be understood in two ways,
she says, reveals a division that bisects all basic concepts, starting with Being, for,
quoting Thomas, “nothing can be said in the same sense of God and creatures.”6 Thus,
whenever identical terms are used for God and creatures, these terms are not intended
either univocally (having only one possible meaning) or equivocally (capable of different
meanings), but analogically (having a meaning based upon a relationship). The dividing
line itself, she says, may be called the analogia entis (analogy of being).7 The balance of
this first section is a paraphrase of St. Thomas’s response to the question concerning
God’s potency.
Section 2 takes up the question of Being from the historical perspective. Edith
Stein connects Thomas’s doctrine of act and potency to its foundation in Aristotelian
philosophy, but here her starting point is not the Disputed Questions Concerning Potency,
but the much earlier On Being and Essence. Aristotle had said that the ancient and
baffling question, “J\ JÎ Ð<?” (“What is “being,” i.e., all that is?”), is the same as the
question, “J\H º @ÛF\"?” (“What is substance?”). Thomas, she says, took up the question
of existence where Aristotle left it. In On Being and Essence Thomas translated Ð< with
ens, and @ÛF\" with essentia. Thomas then took a decisive step beyond Aristotle when he
distinguished within the realm of ens (Seienden) between esse (Sein) and essentia
6

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province
(Benziger Brothers, 1947), http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa (hereinafter “S.Th.”), I, qu.13, art.
1.
7

See the discussion of the analogia entis supra.
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(Wesen). With this distinction, Thomas was able to isolate Being as such, “both from that
which is and from the abyss (Abgrund) that separates this from that.”8 With this
distinction, she says, a way was opened to grasp the whole manifold of that which is.9
From consideration of this central accomplishment of Thomas–the distinction in
the realm of that which is between existence and essence, and thus the distinction
between God, whose essence is Being, and everything else, Edith Stein turns to
consideration of modern philosophical thought. While the question of the meaning of
Being was central to Greek and medieval thinkers, though in different ways, she says that
modern thinkers (starting with Descartes) increasingly turned from the question of Being
to the question of knowledge. As a result, modern philosophy separated itself from
Catholic-scholastic philosophy. Modern philosophers tended to dismiss the idea of a
philosophia perennis as a religious affair best confined to the seminaries. At the same
time, Catholic scholars lost touch with their own intellectual tradition. This state of
affairs began to change, she says, in the latter half of the nineteenth century when
Catholic scholars were recalled to the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,10
and modern philosophers found that they could go no further on the path they had been
following for about three centuries.11 Edith Stein writes:
8

EGS 12/FEB 4.

9

ESG 12/FEB 4.
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See Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical on the Restoration of Christian Philosophy Aeterni
patris (The Holy See, August 4,1879), http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii
/encyclicals/documents/hf_1-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris_en.html; see also Pope Pius XI,
Encyclical on the Catholic Priesthood Ad catholici sacerdotti (The Holy See, December 20,
1935), http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals /documents/hf_
p_xi_enc_19351220_catholic-sacerdotii_en.html.
11
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From the quicksand (Versanden) of materialism it initially sought
salvation through the return to Kant, but that was not enough. NeoKantianism of different stamps was replaced by philosophies that turned
again in the direction of reality (Seienden). They brought the despised old
name ontology back into favor. First came the Wesensphilosophie
(essential philosophy), the phenomenology of Husserl and Scheler; then
the Existenz-philosophie (existential philosophy) of Heidegger on one side
and the Ontologie (ontology) of Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the other as
its polar opposite.12
Is it possible, she asks, that the reborn philosophy of the Middle Ages and the newborn
philosophy of the twentieth century can come together in the one philosophia perennis?
This was not possible at that time, she says, because modern philosophy and medieval
philosophy spoke different languages. Thus, part of Edith Stein’s project is to find (or
create) a language common to both.
The third section of Chapter I turns to the question of philosophical terms. Here
Edith Stein discusses the particular challenges posed for philosophy resulting from the
diversity of cultures and languages. She takes note of translations being made of the
German mystics and of the Summa Theologica highlighting the difficulties in transposing
the thoughts and spirit of one people as expressed in their language to the language of
another. She notes that even Seneca struggled to find an apt Latin term for the syllable,
Ð<.13 One of the tasks that she set for herself in the project of confronting the thought of
Thomas with that of Husserl was to bring forward scholastic terms into the German
language precisely and consistently.14

12

ESG 15/FEB 6-7.
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ESG 16/FEB 8.
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It goes without saying that English readers and translators face yet another challenge:
bringing forward the sense of Edith Stein’s German translations into English.
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In order to do this, Edith Stein established certain principles of translation: she
says that (1) she will present scholastic thought in scholastic terminology; then (2) she
will attempt to find a German expression that corresponds as closely as possible with the
Latin phrasing;15 (3) in order to do this, she will look for both the historical and factual
(sachlichen)16 origins of the Latin phrase; and finally, (4) because her philosophic
“home” is the school of Edmund Husserl, she will use as her starting point the method of
phenomenology in order to “find her way to the great cathedral of Scholasticism.”17
With this third section, another layer is added to Edith Stein’s method. In the
Forward she indicated that: (1) she would take her starting point in historical philosophy
insofar as it identifies the question for consideration; (2) she would begin her own
phenomenological investigation starting from the point of personal consciousness; (3)
only then would she return to historical solutions to see how the results that she achieved
in her own investigation match those of previous thinkers. In this third section she
indicates that in addition to the steps outlined in the prior section, she will undertake the
important task of transposing the relevant terms from scholastic philosophy into German.
She will do this by (4) seeking both the historical and factual roots of the relevant Latin
terms. Even with respect to the task of translation, Edith Stein’s method is
phenomenological.

15

That is, she will first undertake to render a formal rather than a dynamic equivalence in
her translation.
16

Sachlichen is the same term that was translated as “objective” in connection with the
overall project that Edith Stein set for herself: an objective, i.e., factual, inquiry into the meaning
of existence.
17
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Section 4 of Chapter 1 of Finite and Eternal Being addresses the concern of some
philosophers that what Edith Stein was attempting was theology rather than philosophy.
Even greater than the language barrier, she says, are the differing attitudes of medieval
and modern philosophy toward knowledge and faith, philosophy and theology. The issue
is whether there is enough common ground for the project she envisions, the
confrontation of the thought of Thomas with that of Husserl, to go forward. An
affirmative answer, she notes, was given by Thomas himself, who directed his Summa
contra gentiles to those outside the Christian faith. Thomas believed that philosophy
could be founded on pure natural reason and that in this realm a way could be found for a
common intellectual endeavor with persons who do not share a common scriptural
heritage with Christians and Jews. The quest for the truth about the meaning of existence,
Thomas asserted, can proceed on the basis of natural reason alone.
Thomas recognized two ways of gaining truth: natural reason and supernatural
faith. He also believed that the truth of faith provides the measure of all truth. Thomas
submitted the conclusions he reached by the use of natural reason to the test of revealed
truth. And he used revealed truths as the starting points for many of his investigations.
Thomas believed that revealed truths are more firm than the truths arrived at by natural
reason. This, says Edith Stein, would seem to place an insurmountable obstacle to the
possibility of a Christian philosophy that could provide a common meeting ground for
scholasticism and phenomenology. The question of whether it was possible to speak of
Christian philosophy received a great deal of attention in the early twentieth century.18

18

See Gregory B. Sadler, ed. and trans., Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s
Christian Philosophy Debates in France (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2011).
With respect to the phenomenologists, Sadler contrasts Husserl, Heidegger, and Scheler, “who
either made no philosophical space for a ‘Christian philosophy,’ or explicitly rejected its very
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With respect to this question of the possibility of a Christian philosophy as
distinct from Christian theology, Edith Stein adopted the solution of Jacques Maritain,
which is summarized in Finite and Eternal Being. Maritain distinguished the nature of
philosophy from its actual situation. 19 By its nature, said Maritain, philosophy is entirely
distinct from faith and theology. As it has been actualized in Western culture, however,
philosophy has developed against the backdrop of Catholic Christianity. In this sense, one
may speak of a Christian situation or condition of philosophy.20 Philosophy may be
spoken of in two ways, both as a vital intellectual activity and as an enduring intellectual
habit.
In addition to these two, says Edith Stein, philosophy is also a science
(Wissenschaft). As a science, it tends toward truth (Wissen). Both the Latin word scientia
and the German word Wissenschaft denote knowledge both as habit and as act, but also as
science. Theological usage associates the term science with the meaning of knowledge
when it calls scientia a gift of the Holy Spirit. Modern thinkers, on the other hand, mean
by Wissenschaft a mental construct independent of thinking minds set off from other
sciences according to its sphere of objects. Even so, says Edith Stein, this understanding
of science presupposes the existence of an objective reality and of knowing intellects of
the specific kind that acquire their knowledge “step by step” by means of discursive
notion,” with Edith Stein and Dietrich von Hildebrand, who regarded their work as Christian
philosophy, pp. 37-38. For a discussion of the relation between Edith Stein and von Hildebrand,
see Alice von Hildebrand, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Edith Stein: Husserl’s Students (rpt., Ft.
Lauderdale: Roman Catholic Books, 2013).
19

Jacques Maritain, An Essay Concerning Christian Philosophy, trans. Edward H.
Flannery (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955; rpt. 2007). Edith Stein also specifically
mentions Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy.
20

ESG 22/FEB 13.
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reasoning. Viewed in the first way, science has an objective reality that transcends
individuals, generations and nations. Viewed in the second way, science is seen to be a
particularly human endeavor. Insofar as any Wissenschaft tends toward knowledge, it
tends toward truth.21
The dilemma for Christian philosophers is that what is revealed to be true in
revelation lies outside any experience based on purely human foundations. Christian
philosophers who want to remain true to the goal of understanding all of reality are
compelled by their faith to extend their reflections beyond that which is naturally
accessible to them.22 As a result, their findings are often discounted as theology (in a
pejorative sense) by non-Christian philosophers.
Edith Stein maintains that the tasks of theology and philosophy are distinct but
related. It is the task of theology to establish the facts of revelation and to elaborate their
specific meaning and interrelation, while it is the task of Christian philosophy to
harmonize the truths of revelation with the propositions at which it arrives by using its
own methods. Only thus, she says, can philosophy fulfill its goal of making the whole of
reality intelligible in its ultimate reasons and causes. For this reason, Christian
philosophers should submit their findings to the measure of faith. 23
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In scholastic thought, the proper object of knowing is the true, just as the proper object
of willing is the good.
22

ESG 29/FEB 21. The question of the objectivity of religious experience was one that
intrigued Edith Stein in her early years. Reference to this problem occurs as early as her
dissertation On the Problem of Empathy. Her acknowledgment of the overwhelming genuineness
of St. Teresa’s religious experience is reflected in Edith Stein’s exclamation, “This is the truth!”
upon completing Teresa’s Life.
23

ESG 30-31/FEB 23.
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As a final note, Edith Stein asserts that unbelievers should have no reason to
distrust Christian philosophy because it relies upon theology as the measure of the truths
of reason as well as the truths of faith. What the Christian philosopher takes as the theses
of faith, she says, others may accept as hypotheses to be tested. In this way, unbelievers
may calmly consider whether they are able to accept the synthesis which results for
Christian philosophers from the two sources of reason and revelation. And they may
judge for themselves whether by accepting this additional knowledge they gain a deeper
insight into that which is.24
With this fourth section of the Introduction still another layer has been added to
the method of Edith Stein. The method may be summarized thus:
1. The historical solutions of Thomas concerning the meaning of existence will
be subjected to an original, phenomenological inquiry.
2. The results of the phenomenological analysis will be examined to determine
whether or not they square with an historical solution.
3. The revealed truths of the Christian faith will be used to test the results of the
investigation; and
4. The terms of Thomas (and the underlying terms of Aristotle) will be
transposed into German, contributing to the establishment of a specifically
German philosophical language and a continuation of the philosophia
perennis.

24

ESG 36/FEB 28-29.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MEANING OF BEING
After what has seemed a rather long preparation, we may now turn to Edith
Stein’s own investigation of the meaning of Being. She begins with an analysis of
consciousness.
The Analysis of Consciousness
In order to evaluate Thomas’s teachings on the meanings of Being and essence,
Edith Stein performs her own phenomenological analysis. This initial phenomenological
analysis of the kinds Being is but one of many careful analyses that are included in Finite
and Eternal Being. Space simply does not permit the inclusion of all of them, nor of the
details of any of them. The phenomenological method requires patient attention both for
the philosophical writer and for the philosophical reader. Thus, a summary of the
investigation is no substitute for the careful working through of the investigation itself. At
best it can serve two purposes: (1) to provide a guide to the reader; and (2) to isolate
conclusions for further consideration. As we shall see (and as Edith Stein herself tells us),
the phenomenological investigation resulted in Edith Stein taking certain positions that
differ from those of Thomas. In this chapter we will be considering her differences with
Thomas on the question of universals. In the next chapter we will make reference to her
differences with Thomas on questions concerning individual being.1

1

Edith Stein’s position concerning individual being is the subject of Sarah Borden
Sharkey’s Thine Own Self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s Last Writings. No attempt will be made
to duplicate that excellent study here.

At the close of Chapter I, section 1, Edith Stein hinted that the mere
understanding of terms cannot give adequate understanding of the content of those terms.
For that, experiential knowledge is required. This was a point made by Husserl as well.
Thus, she undertakes a phenomenological analysis in order to obtain a better
understanding of the grades or levels of beings, and of act and potency as modes of
Being. This understanding is sought from a new point of departure–the human mind’s
certain knowledge of its own existence.
Edith Stein takes her new point of departure from certain passages in St.
Augustine’s On the Trinity.2 As with Thomas’s On Being and Essence, more of the
passage is referred to by Edith Stein than is strictly clear from excerpts that are included
in quotation marks. The following excerpt from On the Trinity goes a little beyond the
one given by Edith Stein in order to set her argument in context:
First, of what sort and how great is the very knowledge itself that a man
can attain, be he ever so skillful and learned, by which our thought is
formed with truth, when we speak what we know? For to pass by those
things that come into the mind from the bodily senses, among which so
many are otherwise than they seem to be, that he who is overmuch pressed
down by their resemblance to truth, seems sane to himself, but really is not
sane—whence it is that the Academic philosophy has so prevailed as to be
still more wretchedly insane by doubting all things—passing by, then,
those things that come into the mind by the bodily senses, how large a
proportion is left of things which we know in such manner as we know
that we live? In regard to this, indeed, we are absolutely without any fear
lest perchance we are being deceived by some resemblance of the truth;
since it is certain, that he who is deceived, yet lives. And this again is not
reckoned among those objects of sight that are presented from without, so
that the eye may be deceived by it; in such way as it is when an oar in the
water looks bent, and towers seem to move as you sail past them, and a
thousand other things that are otherwise than they seem to be: for this is
2

Augustine, On the Trinity, trans. Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, First Series, vol. 3, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo: NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co.,
1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight,
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1301.htm.
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not a thing that is discerned by the eye of the flesh. The knowledge that we
know that we live is the most inward of all knowledge, of which even the
Academic cannot insinuate: Perhaps you are asleep, and do not know it,
and you see things in your sleep. For who does not know that what people
see in dreams is precisely like what they see when awake? But he who is
certain of the knowledge of his own life, does not therein say, I know I am
awake, but I know I am alive; therefore, whether he be asleep or awake he
is alive. Nor can he be deceived in that knowledge by dreams; since it
belongs to a living man both to sleep and to see in sleep. Nor can the
Academic again say, in confutation of this knowledge: Perhaps you are
mad, and do not know it: for what madmen see is precisely like what they
also see who are sane; but he who is mad is alive. Nor does he answer the
Academic by saying, I know I am not mad, but I know I am alive.
Therefore he who says he knows he is alive, can neither be deceived nor
lie. Let a thousand kinds, then, of deceitful objects of sight be presented to
him who says, I know I am alive; yet he will fear none of them, for he who
is deceived yet is alive.3
Edith Stein compares the certitude of Augustine with Descartes’ method of universal
doubt: “It remained to him [Descartes] as an indubitable residue the fact of doubt and–
generally speaking–of thought itself, and in the thinking, Being: cogito, sum.”4 By her
formula, “cogito, sum,” (which does not appear exactly in that form in Descartes), Edith
Stein indicates that existence is not a conclusion from thinking, but is implicitly given in
thinking, as was shown by Augustine.5
Edith Stein also compares the conclusion of Augustine with the result of the
¦B@6Z (epoche) of Edmund Husserl.6 When the natural world and the validity of

3

Augustine, On the Trinity, XV, 12.

4

ESG 41/FEB 35-36; Rene Descartes, Discourse de la Methode, IV, 1 (1637) (“je pense,
donc je suis”); see also Meditation II, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641) (“ego sum, ego
existo”), and Principia Philosophiae (1644), Part 1, article 7 (“ego cogito, ego sum”).
5

ESG 41/FEB 36.

6

See Edmund Husserl, “Second Meditation: The Field of Transcendental Experience
Laid Open in Respect of its Universal Structures,” in Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to
Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 27-55.
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scientific deductions are crossed out, as Husserl directs, what is left is being-conscious-of
(Bewußt-sein) in the sense of Ich-leben (I-am-living).7 In each of these ways,
Augustine’s, Descartes’, and Husserl’s, she says, what is discovered is the same “I am.”
Most people, most of the time, simply take the fact of their existence for granted.
When someone does stop to reflect upon it, however, Edith Stein suggests that three
questions arise:
(1) What is the Being in which I am held? (Was ist das Sein, dessen ich inne
bin?).
(2) What is the I, which is held by its Being? (Was ist das Ich, das seines Seins
inne ist?)
(3) What is the intellectual movement in which I am and in which I am conscious
of myself and it? (Was ist die geistige Regung, in der ich bin und mir meiner
und ihrer bewußt bin?)8
These questions provide the entry way for Edith Stein’s analysis:
If I turn to my Being, as it is in itself, it shows itself to have a double face:
that of Being and that of Not-Being. The “I am” [on the other hand] will
not stand the look (i.e., scrutiny). The “wherein I am” is in each case
another, and the Being and the spiritual movement are not separate since
the Being in which I am is also the Being of each other case; the Being of
“just now” is gone and the being of “now” has taken its place.9 The Being
in which I am held as my Being is not to be separated from temporality. It
is “actual” Being, i.e., presently-real–punctual10: a “now” between a “no
7

ESG 41/FEB 36.

8

ESG 42/FEB 37.

9

Cf. Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, trans. James S.
Churchill (Blommington: Indiana University Press, 1971), 46. This, of course, was one of the
works that Edith Stein prepared for publication during her assistantship.
10

In the sense of a “point” in time.
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more” and a “not yet.” But as it in its flowing character is split into Being
and Not-Being there is revealed to us the idea of pure Being, in which
there is no Not-Being, in which there is no “no more” and no “not yet,”
which is not temporal, but is eternal.11
Starting from this foundational analysis of human consciousness, Edith Stein will develop
her own theory of Being.
Temporal and Eternal Being
The excerpt in the prior section gives a flavor of the depth of analysis that is
found throughout Finite and Eternal Being, and suggests the careful attention that must
be paid to the analysis. In the quoted passage, Edith Stein asserts that anyone can become
aware of two kinds of Being by reflecting upon his own consciousness of his existence.
Consciousness of one’s own existence reveals: (1) pure Being, which is eternal, and (2)
real Being, which is temporal. Moreover, in the reflection on consciousness, one will also
become dimly aware of three kinds of something: one whose Being is eternal, pure
Being; another whose Being is always actual, but temporal; and another whose Being is a
movement from Not-Being to Being and back to Not-Being. These divisions discovered
within the reflection upon consciousness correspond to the divisions found in On Being
and Essence: eternal, pure Being is the Being of the First Cause, which is God; received,
actual Being is the Being of the intelligences (human souls and the angels); and temporal
Being, the Being of coming to be and fading away, is the Being of composite substances.
Edith Stein’s analysis proceeds with a discussion of actual and potential Being.

11

ESG 42/FEB 37.
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Actual and potential Being
Within the reflection upon consciousness not only did Being and not-Being
appear, but also a Being that was termed actually present. This is the Being of the “I am”
or ego. Because it is the being of an “I,” a person, it can also be called “fully alive
Being.” We will ultimately see that it is the Being of the simple intelligences.
We have already seen that the fully alive “now” occurs between a “no more” and
a “not yet.”12 The interesting thing is that the “that which once was but is no longer” and
the “that which will be but is not yet” is not simply Not-Being. Edith Stein says that the
“no more” and the “not yet” have Being in two senses: First, the “no more” and the “not
yet” have Being in memory and anticipation. That is, they have esse in intellectu
(intellectual or mental being), which Edith Stein will term “gedankliche Sein” (lit.
“mental Being”) to distinguish it from Existenz, a kind of Being that is independent of
any knowing (finite) mind.13 14 Within Existenz Edith Stein includes both Dasein (real
Being) and the being of ideal objects such as geometrical objects. The point for now is
that one’s “no more” and “not yet,” one’s past and future, exist now in one’s intellect.

12

All of this section draws heavily from On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of
Internal Time. Heidegger, too, incorporated some of Husserl’s descriptions in his own work.
13

See ESG 281-283/FEB 328-29.

14

St. Anselm of Canterbury drew the distinction between esse in re and esse in intellectu
in his Proslogion. Anselm said that even the fool who says in his heart, “God is not,” understands
what is meant when Anselm says that, “God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.”
What the fool understands is (i.e., exists) in his understanding if not in reality. “For it is one thing
for a thing to be in the understanding and another to understand that a thing is.” (Aliud est enim
rem esse in intellectu; alius intelligere rem esse). Anselm, Proslogion II, trans. Jonathon Barnes,
The Ontological Argument (London: Macmillan, 1972), 5,
http://mally.stanford.edu/cm/ontological-argument/barnes-translation.html. Edith Stein
distinguishes her way of coming to know the existence of God from Anselm’s “ontological
proof” in Chapter III, Section 12, of Finite and Eternal Being.
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The second way that Edith Stein says that the “no more” and the “not yet” exist
now is as possibilities or capabilities: “My present Being contains the capability to
generate future actual Being and presupposes a capability in my previous Being. My
present Being is actual and potential Being, real and possible at the same time; and so far
as it is real, it is the realization of a possibility [or capability] that existed earlier.”15 The
Being of human consciousness is a mixture of potentiality and actuality.
Edith Stein next anticipates somewhat her future discussion of essence in the
following passage which compares the Being of the human being with the Being of God:
What a human being does is a realization of what he can do, and what he
can do is an expression of what he is; by his ability to realize his
capabilities in his actions, his essence (Wesen) comes to its higher Beingunfolding (Seinsentfaltung).16 What confronts us here as separated is one
in God. As all of his capability is realized in fact, so is his whole essence
eternal—unchangeable in highest Being-unfolded (Seinsentfaltung)—yes,
his Being is his essence: God is “Who is” (Der ist); which is the name by
which he has called himself, and in this name is—according to
Augustine—best expressed what He is.17
We have previously seen that in On Being and Beings, Thomas designated God as pure
act (actus purus). Unlike God’s Being, every other Being is a mixture of actuality and
potentiality. All other Being has two modes: in potentia esse and in actu esse. God’s

15

ESG 43/FEB 38-39.

16

As will be discussed infra, Enfaltung (unfolding or being-unfolded, i.e., development)
will prove to be the meaning of Being in Edith Stein’s analysis. See, e.g., ESG 284-285/FEB 331.
17

ESG 46/FEB 41; see Exodus 3:14 in which God reveals himself to Moses as YHWH, a
name which out of reverence is never pronounced. Adonai or Kyrios (“Lord”) is substituted for it.
The meaning of the Tetragrammaton is explained variously as “I am, “I will be,” “I live,” or “I
give life.” See “Names of God,” Jewish Encyclopedia (1906).
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/11305-names-of-god#164; see also Congregation for
Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, Letter to the Bishops’ Conferences on
“The Name of God” (The Holy See, June 29, 2008) http://www.liturgyoffice.org.uk/Documents
/Name_CDW.pdf.
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Being is in actu esse, but in a way that is distinct from every other Being because in
God’s Being there is no unrealized potency.
To recap, actuality and potentiality have been identified as two modes of Being,
and the Being of the ego has been described as a mixture of act and potency, i.e., actual
Being and potential Being. Edith Stein next gives the following description of Thomas’s
teaching on in potentia esse and in actu esse:
Thomas said of the what that receives Being that it is in potentia with
respect to the Being it receives,18 but Being itself he described as act (he
was speaking of “Being” in the excellent sense of real or perfect Being
(wirkliches oder vollendenten Sein)). In contrast, he says that potentia is
not, strictly speaking, “possible Being,” but the “possibility to be” or
ordered to real Being. Whatever is real or can become real, is “in actu” or
“in potentia,” actual or potential. “Actual and potential,” “actual and
potential Being,” “real and possible Being” express the modes of Being
(Seinsweisen) of something that can enter into real Being. Act and potency
are the names for the modes of Being themselves and independently of the
what that enters into them. In German we will say: Sein in Vollendung
[Being in perfection] or wirkliches Sein [real Being] and Vorstufe zum
Sein [precursor to Being]. Potenzualität and Aktualität (Möglichkeit and
Wirklichkeit) [potentiality and actuality] (possibility and reality) denote
the modes of Being of something in general; i.e., without ascribing them
to a particular being.19
In this passage, Edith Stein continues the clarification of terms. It is important to see that
she is paving the way for the discussion of the essence. Before we take up essence,
however, we must take up the contrast between becoming and Being.

18

Edith Stein does not give a reference for this discussion of in actu esse and in potentia
esse in Thomas, but a similar discussion can be found at On Being and Essence, 81; see also
Summa Contra Gentiles II, q. 52, a. 7, trans. James F. Anderson
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles2.htm (“every form and act is in potentiality before it
acquires being (esse)”).
19
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Becoming and Being
In Edith Stein’s reflection upon consciousness, not only did Being itself and the I
become present but also the intellectual movement in which the I finds itself held in
Being. Edith Stein’s next consideration is the kind of Being that belongs to certain
structures of the intellectual movement. These structures are designated by the
phenomenological term “experiential units” (Erlebnis-Einheiten). These experiential
units are described as “a whole that builds up in the conscious life of the I during a period
of time and fills this time.”20
The experiential units raise a vexing problem. We previously said that what is
actual is only the present moment. Only the present moment of consciousness is “fully
alive.” Everything else in the flux of consciousness is either coming into Being from NotBeing or fading away from Being into Not-Being. This raises the question of how it is
possible to speak of an enduring unit that fills a span of time when there is no actual
“Being” in the past or in the future. We experience our consciousness as a continuous
movement or flux. How is it possible, then, to “capture” our experiences as “units”?
The problem of Being and becoming was, of course, one that occupied the preSocratics Heraclitus and Parmenides. Heraclitus held that the only true Being is the
constant flux–a perpetual becoming.21 Parmenides took the opposite view. For him the
only true Being was the eternally immutable One. For him, the world of becoming was

20

EGS 47/FEB 43.
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See Plato, Cratylus, 401d and 402a, trans. C.D.C. Reeve, Plato: Complete Works, ed.
John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 119-20.
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simply illusory.22 Edith Stein alludes to this contrast and asserts that the relation between
Being and becoming is, in fact, the analogia entis. She explains:
Becoming cannot be separated from really, true Being, Being in the full
sense of the word. It cannot be real and true Being itself because it is a
transition to Being. By itself, as coming to be, it is nothing. By itself it is
nothing other than that which is determined by Being (das Sein zu
bestimmen). If one were to deny the possibility of Being as distinct from
becoming, then one would have to deny the possibility of becoming and
would end up at nothing. So the coming to be and passing away that we
find within our own consciousness constantly points beyond itself. It
“strives toward Being” in a metaphorical sense, but only touches Being
from moment to moment. In this way our reflection on the Being of the
experiential units reveals the idea of true Being, the perfect, ever
changeless–the pure act.23
It might not be immediately clear why the denial of Being entails the denial of becoming.
As will be made clear, Edith Stein believes that one can only talk of becoming in relation
to a “something” that is becoming.24 Unless there is something–some timeless and
unchanging meaning—that is coming to be, it is impossible to speak of becoming. Any
attempt to do so would simply be an attempt to talk about the becoming of “no-thing.”

22

Parminedes, On Nature, trans. John Burnet (1892), http://philoctetes.free.fr
/parmenidesunicode.htm.
23

EGS 49-50/FEB 45-46. See also Jacques Maritain, Existence and Existent: An Essay on
Christian Existentialism, trans. Lewis Galantiere and Gerald B. Phelan (Garden City, NY: Image
Books, 1956), 33 (“[T]his concept of existence, of to-exist (esse) is not and cannot be cut off from
the absolutely primary concept of being (ens, that-which is, that-which exists, that whose act is to
exist). This is so because the affirmation of existence, or the judgment, which provides the
content of such a concept, is itself the ‘composition’ of a subject with existence, i.e., the
affirmation that something exists (actually or possibly, simply or with such-and-such a predicate).
It is the concept of being (that-which exists or is able to exist) which, in the order of ideative
perception, corresponds adequately to this affirmation in the order of judgment. The concept of
existence cannot be visualized completely apart, detached, isolated, separated from that of being
and it is in that concept of being and with that concept of being that it is at first conceived.”).
24

In a slightly different vein, see Gilson, Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 66, where the
author explains, “All movement implies some being, for if there were no being there, there would
be nothing that could move; wherever, then, there is movement, there is something that moves.”
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The structure and conditions of the experiential units
Reflection upon the experiential units led to an understanding of the relation
between becoming and Being. Edith Stein takes the strong position that becoming would
not be possible without Being. Indeed, she says that the experiential units receive their
Being from “true Being. (wahre Sein).25 This is a new term. In order to understand how
Being can be “true,” we might recall that at the beginning of On Being and Essence
Thomas listed two meanings of “ens per se”: Being is said: (1) to indicate that which is
divided into the ten genera (i.e., real being); and (2) to signify the truth of propositions
(i.e., true being). In introducing the term “true Being,” Edith Stein moves the discussion
into the realm of meaning.
First she discusses the structure of the experiential unit. In the experiential unit it
is possible to distinguish the “I,” in whose consciousness the experiential unit arises,
from a “what” that comes to be and passes away. This “what” she says, is called in
phenomenological terms the “experiential content” (Erlebnisgehalt).26 Edith Stein
illustrates experiential content with the example of the joy that one experiences upon the
receipt of good news. In her example, the experiential content is “joy.” There is
something, she says, in this experiential content which marks it as joy. Moreover, it is
also possible to distinguish the object of the experience of joy–the good news, and the “I”
who receives the good news, from joy as such. In phenomenological terms, the good
news is the “intentional object.” In my joy, I “tend toward” the good news. It is possible,

25

EGS 50/FEB 46.
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For Edmund Husserl’s various discussions of experiential content, see, e.g., Edmund
Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2 vols., International Library of Philosophy, trans. J.N. Findlay
(London: Routledge, 1970; 2001), III, §2; V, §§ 3-4, 14, 45; VI, §§58, 62.
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however, that when I receive the news, which is “objectively good,” I am distracted or
otherwise unable to attend to it, and thus fail to experience joy. When I try to give an
account of why I am unable to experience joy, I may or not be able to do so.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that the reason lies within me, not with the news itself,
which is admittedly good. From this Edith Stein concludes that the kind of self that is
under consideration is one in which there are things hidden from immediate
consciousness. In this experiment, she says, the self is seen to transcend the stream of its
experiential units.27 In other words, there is a depth to the self that is not accessible to
immediate consciousness.
The pure ego and its modes of Being
The discussion of the “I”–the self–was intended to lead to an understanding of
true Being. The connection needs further clarification. In the thought experiment
concerning the joy at receiving good news, Edith Stein identified an “I” given in
immediate consciousness and a hidden self that lay beyond this immediate consciousness.
Edith Stein is drawing on the work of Husserl, who designated the self of immediate
consciousness the pure ego (reine Ich). He said that it has no content and that it cannot be
described as it is in itself.28
This pure ego is alive in every experience, is inseparable from them, but
nevertheless is not a part of any experience. In fact, says Edith Stein, the life of the pure
ego is precisely the flux of the experiential contents. The ego is alive in these contents,

27

For further reflection on intentionality, the “I” (or ego), and the intentional object, see
Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson
(London/New York: Routledge 1931; rpt. 2002; Routledge Classics, 2012), §84.
28

Recall Edith Stein’s comment that the “I am” cannot withstand scrutiny.
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and its life is its Being.29 The living ego does not come to be and pass away like the
experiential units; rather its life is filled with these changing contents. In every moment,
its Being, its life, is presently-real, i.e., is actual (gegenwärtig-wirklich, aktuell).30
The experiential contents themselves are not real; in fact, by themselves, they are
incapable of becoming real. But, says Edith Stein, they receive a share in real Being by
virtue of the living ego whose life they are. They are dependent upon the ego. Edith Stein
says that the relationship between the ego and the experiential contents is that between a
carrying and a being carried (das Tragende und das Getragene).31
Edith Stein has said that the ego is alive by virtue of its experiential contents.
Without these contents it is nothing. Thus, she asks, what kind of Being does the ego
have? It is not potential Being in the sense of a precursor to real Being, because if it is not
alive, i.e., if it is not in real Being, it is nothing. The ego itself, on the other hand, is
empty. It receives its fullness from the experiential contents, which receive their Being
from it. The experiential contents are both that by virtue of which the ego is alive, and
that which receives its Being from the ego. This should become clearer in the discussion
of essences. In the meantime, the question is what kind of Being the pure ego has.
Recall that Thomas said that anything that receives Being is in potentia with
respect to the Being it receives. Edith Stein remarks that so long as the ego is, it is actual.
In the reflection upon its past, however, the ego is unable to arrive at any memory of its
beginning. And the failure to reach its actual beginning gives rise to the possibility that
29

ESG 51/FEB 48.

30

ESG 52/FEB 49.

31

ESG 52/FEB 49. The term “carrier” (Träger) will be very important in the discussion
of personal Being in the next chapter.

79

the ego may also reach an end. In a sense, the ego finds itself suspended over an “abyss
of nothingness.”32 Edith Stein says that the Being of the ego is nevertheless preeminent in
a dual sense: (1) as Being-always-alive in comparison with that which is “no more” and
“not yet,” and (2) as Being-a-carrier in relation to what is carried. This preeminence,
however, she says, is fragile. The ego is always alive, but it cannot bring itself into Being
or sustain itself in Being. It receives its life only from moment to moment. It finds itself
placed into existence and sustained in existence. In Heidegger’s terms, it finds itself
“thrown into existence” (ins Dasein geworfenes),33 but this reveals that its Being is the
opposite of autonomous, necessary Being. Therefore, says Edith Stein, further inquiry is
needed about the nature of this received Being.
The Being of the ego and eternal Being
The Being of the ego is actual, but lacks fullness of Being. In contrast to pure
Being, the Being of the ego is dependent. Edith Stein identifies two possible sources for
its Being: either (1) the ego receives its life and the content of its experiences from one or
both of the transcendent worlds, internal and external, which manifest themselves in its
experiences, or (2) it owes its life, which is its Being, immediately to eternal, changeless,
autonomous (selbstherrlich), and necessary (selbstverständlich) pure Being.34 The second
possibility, she says, does not exclude the first; that is, the ego may receive its life from
the internal and external worlds in which it finds itself while ultimately receiving its
Being from pure Being. Indeed, Edith Stein says there is no other source from which it
32
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could receive Being because there is no source of Being outside of pure and eternal
Being. Where the experiential units received their momentary Being from the ego at the
present actual moment between coming to be and passing away, the ego receives its
Being at every moment from the fullness of Being.
The ego arrives at the idea of eternal Being not only from the coming to be and
fading away of the experiential units, but also from its own Being, which is received from
moment to moment. Edith Stein explains that, “The ego shrinks away from the possibility
of its nothingness … and arrives at the idea of fullness or plenitude (Idee der Fülle) by
crossing out from its own Being the privation that it finds there.”35 Nevertheless, it finds
itself sustained in existence. Edith Stein says that despite its manifest limits and the Angst
(existential anxiety) that accompanies every unsaved person (unerlösten Menschen) in
many disguises that ultimately is “the fear of its own Not-Being,”36 the ego finds that it is
from moment to moment. It is held securely in Being, “not even in the certain safety of a
man who stands on firm ground under his own power, but in the sweet and blissful
security of the child who is supported by a strong arm.”37 In my own Being, she
concludes, I encounter another kind of Being that is not mine but is the ground and
sustainer (Halt und Grund) of my Being.38
What can be known about this Being based purely on reason? Edith Stein affirms
the following based upon the teaching of Thomas:
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(1) It must be of itself. Its Being, unlike everything else that has a beginning,
cannot not be; its Being must be necessary (Thomas’s third proof of the
existence of God);39
(2) It must be Being itself. Because its Being is not received, there can be no
separation between what it is (and could or could not be) and its Being.40
(3) It must be one. This Being, which is of itself and necessary, without beginning
and without cause, must be one, because if there were many such beings, a
distinction would have to be made between what distinguishes one from the
other, and makes it to be this one, and what is shared with the others [and
makes them the same]. There is no such distinction in the First Being.41
Then, drawing upon the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, she also affirms that:
(4) While it may be that my fleeting Being has a “support” in something finite,
this cannot be the ultimate support and ground [of my Being]. All temporal
Being as such is fleeting and therefore needs an eternal support. If my own
Being is bound to another finite being, I am held in Being with him. The
existential security (Seinssicherheit) that I feel in my fleeting Being indicates
an immediate anchorage in the ultimate support and ground of my Being
(irrespective of possible mediate supports).42
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This concludes Edith Stein’s phenomenolgocial demonstration of eternal Being. She
notes that the feeling of security that results from the phenomenological analysis of my
own Being can hardly be called knowledge, and gives some attention to the results that
might be achieved if the way of faith were also followed. The way of faith, she says,
gives more than the way of reason. Faith reveals “the God of personal nearness, loving
and merciful, and a certainty that no natural knowledge can give.”43
Summary
In this section we have followed rather closely Edith Stein’s demonstration of
eternal Being from reflection upon human consciousness. We have distinguished eternal
Being from temporal Being, we have talked about the distinction between real Being and
conceptual Being, and we have seen how act and potency are characteristic of both
eternal and temporal Being, but in different ways. In fact, we have seen that Edith Stein
takes the position that every concept that is formed concerning Being is used analogously
rather than univocally with respect to eternal Being and temporal Being. In the next
section we will take up the question of the source of meaning and will thus be confronted
with a third sort of Being: essential Being.
The Realm of Meaning
Edith Stein asserts that in addition to the realms of real Being and conceptual
Being, there is a third realm, a realm of meaning, that makes both of them possible. The
subtitle of Finite and Eternal Being is “An Ascent to the Meaning of Being.” I previously
suggested that the subtitle calls to mind St. John of the Cross’s Ascent to Mount Carmel.
It also calls to mind Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, which had as its aim to “raise
43
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anew the question of the meaning of Being.”44 Edith Stein makes explicit reference to
Heidegger’s aim at the beginning of her reflections on Being and Time45 and has much to
say in critique of Heidegger’s position on the meaning of Being not only in her
discussion of Being and Time, but also in her discussion of Heidegger’s Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics.46
Critique of Heidegger
Martin Heidegger restricted meaning to the sphere of Dasein. He said, “Meaning
is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying behind them, or
floating somewhere as an ‘intermediate domain.”47 Meaning is “[t]hat which can be
articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse.”48 It is that
wherein,
the understandability (Verstehbarkeit) of something maintains itself—even
that of something which does not come into view explicitly and
thematically. ‘Meaning’ signifies the ‘upon-which’ (das Woraufhin) of
primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its
possibility as that which it is. Projecting discloses possibilities—that is, it
discloses the sort of thing that makes possible.… Strictly speaking,
‘meaning’ signifies the ‘upon-which’ of the primary projection of the
understanding of Being.”49
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For Heidegger, Dasein is distinguished from other entities in that Being is an issue for
it.50 Understanding of Being is a characteristic of its Being. It is ontically distinctive in
that it is ontological, which for Heidegger means “being in such a way that one has an
understanding of Being.”51 But the Being that Dasein understands primordially is its own
Being, and its understanding of the Being of all other entities depends upon itself: “If to
interpret the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity to
be interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards
what we are asking about when we ask this question.”52
Edith Stein, following Hedwig Conrad-Martius, criticizes the wisdom of using
Dasein and its understanding as the starting point for the way toward the meaning of
Being.53 Instead, she says that although a thing cannot understand being and cannot talk
about its Being, it nevertheless expresses a meaning in and through its outer appearance.
This self-revelation, she says, belongs to the meaning of thingly-being. Heidegger, she
says, cannot accept this because he does not recognize meaning apart from
understanding.
Moreover, because his focus is on the temporality of Being, she says, he raises
barriers to opening up a view upon the eternal. He does not distinguish essence from
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existence or meaning from understanding. He acknowledges no “eternal truth” apart from
human understanding.54
Edith Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s position concerning meaning is even more
pointed in response to Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In that book,
Heidegger emphasized the importance of clarifying the meaning of Being in order to
develop a doctrine concerning “beings as such.” Edith Stein agrees with him in this. She
does not agree with him, however, insofar as he asserts that in order to understand the
meaning of Being, one must investigate the human understanding of Being, nor does she
agree that the ground for the possibility of the understanding of Being lies in the finitude
of human beings.55 She emphasizes that metaphysics concerns the meaning of Being as
such, not simply the meaning of human Being.56 When we question the human
understanding of Being, she insists, we must ask what we intend when we speak about
the meaning of Being rather than about its understanding. Underlying or implicit in the
understanding of Being is its meaning. Understanding and meaning should not be
confused with each other. Without this focus on the intended object of understanding–
that is, the meaning of Being as such–there is a risk of being cut off from the meaning of
Being.
Further, says Edith Stein, the understanding of Being does not belong to finitude
as such. There are any number of finite beings which have no understanding of Being.
The understanding of Being belongs to spiritual-personal beings. It is what distinguishes
54
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them from other kinds of beings. The human being’s understanding of Being may be
distinguished from the understanding of other finite spirits, and all finite understandings
of Being may be distinguished from the infinite understanding of Being, but underlying
understanding of Being as such is the meaning of Being.
The fundamental question of the meaning of Being is the foundation of
metaphysics. In order to ask the question of the meaning of Being, we must be the sort of
Beings for whom the meaning of Being is accessible (for having access is the meaning of
understanding), but it is not necessary to ask how understanding occurs in order to ask the
question of meaning. Conversely, however, it is not possible to investigate the
understanding of meaning without including the meaning of Being.57 The fundamental
question of metaphysics is the meaning of Being, not the understanding of Being (an
epistemological question). For if we designate a thing as a being, we mean that it itself is¸
i.e., that it has Being independently of our understanding of its Being.
“Thrownness,” says Edith Stein, might have been used to disclose the meaning of
Being and the meaning of the understanding of Being, but Heidegger stopped short of the
natural implication of thrownness, i.e., a “Thrower.” Thrownness (=finitude) implies a
that which gives meaning and towards which all understanding is directed. Finitude
implies infinitude. Heidegger “stops in front of the ‘infinite,’ without which nothing finite
and the finite as such can be comprehended.”58 The finite itself gives rise to a vision of
the infinite. Knowing oneself as ‘finite’ means knowing oneself as something rather than
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everything.59 In this recognition, “‘everything’ is envisaged, even if not ‘comprehended,’
i.e. enclosed and mastered by human knowledge.”60 Edith Stein continues:
Human understanding of being is only possible as a breakthrough from
finite to eternal being. But since finite spirit only glimpses eternal being
without being able to comprehend it, finite being, and also its own being
remain uncomprehended, a magis ignotum quam notum [more known than
unknown]: the eternal embarrassment, the •,Â •B@D@b:,<@< [always
baffling] which we met as the starting point for Aristotle’s metaphysics,
and which come to an end in Heidegger’s foundation of metaphysics.61
Consistent with the idea that she announced to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Edith Stein
determined that if one is to obtain a grasp of the whole of reality (the proper subject of
metaphysics), one must consider the meaning of Being when applied to both finite and
eternal Being. Edith Stein’s response to Heidegger shows where she felt that Heidegger
fell short: in conflating the meaning of being with human understanding of finite being.
More needs to be said now about two meanings of finitude.
Two meanings of finitude
Edith Stein asserts that finitude can be understood in two ways: finite can mean
(1) “temporal” and it can also mean (2) “objectively limited.”62 A finite thing is one that
59

See ESG 62/FEB 61.

60

ESG 492/Lebech 89.

61

ESG 493/Lebech 89. The Greek phrase, which may be translated, “always baffling,” is
from Aristotle’s Metaphysics VII, 1028b. The full quotation is given at ESG 11 /FEB 3: “Indeed,
the question which was raised long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles us—
“What is being; i.e., that which is [Ð<]?”–is in other words “What is substance [@ÛF\"]?”
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols. 17, 18, trans. Hugh Tredenick (Cambridge: MA: Harvard
University Press, 1993, 1989), http://www.perseus. tufts.edu
/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D7% 3Asection %3D1028b.
Aristotle does not mean to negate other meanings of Ð<; rather, he asserts that @ÛF\" is the
primary meaning of Ð< and thus that it is what is generally meant by the question, JÆ JÎ Ð<--what
is being? See Metaphysics VII, 1028a.
62

ESG 62/FEB 61.

88

requires time to attain to Being. Finite in this sense is also used to describe those things
that receive their Being from another (i.e., all things that are not the First Being). Finite in
the second sense means to be something rather than everything. Edith Stein acknowledges
that temporal things are finite, but asserts that not everything that is finite is temporal.
In the investigation of the experiential units, they were found them to be a sort of
structure that arises in the temporal flux of consciousness, yet is able to be retained in
consciousness as a unit (the experience of joy at receiving good news), despite the fact
that its Being is rising from nothingness to the height of Being only to fade away again
into nothingness. There was also a discussion about the experiential content—the what
that comes to be and fades away—such as the joy that is experienced upon the receipt of
good news. Edith Stein shows that the experience of joy comes to be and passes away,
but joy as such does not. It is possible to distinguish the joy-of-one’s experience from joy
as such.
Joy as such is an example of finitude in the second sense—it is not temporal, but
it is objectively limited. It is “joy” rather than “justice,” for example. The joy-of-my
experience is a particular instance of joy. This raises the sort of questions that occupy
Socrates in Plato’s Dialogues: (1) what is the ontological status of “joy as such”? and (2)
what is the relation between “joy as such” and the various instances of joy?
Together with Plato, Edith Stein designates “joy as such” as an idea, or form, or,
in phenomenological terminology, a Wesenheit, which will be translated “ideal
essence.”63 Unlike the many instances of joy, this ideal essence “joy” has no Being in
63
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time or space. Unlike the many instances of joy, the ideal essence “joy” is one. The
individual instances of joy are said to be actualizations or realizations of “joy as such,”
and the individual instances of joy take their name from the ideal essence “joy.”64 Edith
Stein asserts that there could be no experience of joy unless there was the ideal essence
“joy” before the experience.65 But the ideal essence “joy” has no Being in time or space,
i.e., “real Being.” In order to determine what sort of Being the ideal essences have, Edith
Stein turns again to the phenomenological examination of consciousness.
The ideal essences were experienced and discovered in the life of the ego. With
regard to that experience, they are called “experienced essences” (Erlebnis-Wesenheiten).
Edith Stein says that in comparison to the experiential units, the experienced essences are
a kind of first being (erste Seiende) because without them, the life of the ego would be an
“inextricable chaos.”66 In other words, the ideal essences are the ground for the structure
and meanings found in the experiential units. Edith Stein explains: “With the ideal
essences come unity and multiplicity, structure and order, meaning and intelligibility.”67
What then is the meaning of meaning?
The meaning of meaning
With the ideal essences, says Edith Stein, one comes face to face with the
primordial source (Urquelle) of meaning and intelligibility. Meaning cannot be explained
or defined, she says, because meaning (Sinn=8`(@H) is the ultimate ground (letzter
64

ESG 63-64/FEB 63.

65

ESG 64/FEB 64.

66

ESG 65/FEB 65.

67

ESG 65/FEB 65.

90

Grund) of all definitions: “All human speech rests on the certainty that words have a
meaning, and every explanation and argument rests on the conviction that all our
questioning and reasoning arrives in the end at an ultimate intelligible reason or ground.
Meaning is what can be understood, and understanding is the grasping of meaning.”68
The intellect, explains Edith Stein, proceeds step by step, with one definition leading to
another, until at last it comes to rest in some ultimate meaning which cannot be derived
from any other or reduced to any other. This is the real (=genuine) ideal essence (echten
Wesenheit)69 or pure form (reine Form),70 which is neither a thing nor a concept.
An ideal essence should not be mistaken either for the realities or the concepts
that receive their names from it. For example, the meaning “ego” is neither a living ego
nor the concept of a living ego.71 Ideal essences are distinguished from concepts in a
number of ways:
(1) Ideal essences are discovered; concepts are formed.
(2) Ideal essences cannot be defined, but only pointed to; concepts can be
expressed as definitions.
(3) We have some freedom in defining concepts; we have no freedom with
respect to ultimate meanings.72
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We are able to call our particular experience of joy at receiving good news “joy” because
that experience is an instance of the ideal essence or meaning “joy.” Although these have
been called “experienced essences” in the discussion of consciousness, in fact, in the
realm of real Being, they are not experiences, but the preconditions of experience.
It is helpful to substitute “ultimate meanings” in sentences in Finite and Eternal
Being that use the word Wesenheit. In this way, I think, it is easier to remember and
understand that what is being discussed is not a something–the mistake of exaggerated or
extreme realism attributed to the Platonists by Aristotle.73 When Edith Stein asks about
the Being of the ideal essences, she is not asking about an object (except in the sense that
everything that can be talked or thought about may be called an object) or even of a
concept, but about the Being of meaning itself.
The Being of meaning
In line with her overall ontological project, Edith Stein asks what the Being of
meaning might be. Meanings are distinct from things, which generally have real Being,
and from concepts, which have mental or conceptual Being. The Being of meanings is
not the coming to be and passing away of the experiential units, nor is it the vitality of the
ego. The only other Being described up to this point in Edith Stein’s discussion has been
eternal Being; thus, she asks whether this is the Being of the ideal essences. Edith Stein
notes that neither Plato nor Aristotle found it necessary to distinguish the Being of the
divine being or First Cause from that of the ideas or intelligences (because they accepted
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the presence of multiple gods within the context of all that is). It was Christian thinkers
who found it necessary to make this distinction.74
Edith Stein provides her own description of this distinction. The Being of
meanings, she says, can be distinguished from that of First Being. First Being is perfect
(i.e., complete), infinite, abundant, and vital. The Being of meanings is perfect in a sense,
but not in the same sense in which First Being is perfect. The Being of meanings is
complete in itself–it is and will always be what it was–but compared to the infinitude of
First Being, the Being of the meanings is finite in the sense that it is objectively limited:75
The ideal essence rose is not the ideal essence joy, for example. Moreover, compared
with the vitality of First Being, the Being of the ideal essences, raised above time and
unchanging, is neither living nor efficacious.76
The meanings are not the precursors to real Being–they do not enter into real
Being–but they are the conditions of the possibility of real Being.77 Real things are
instances of various meanings. This means that something in the real thing corresponds
to or is an image of the ultimate meanings or essences. For this reason, says Edith Stein,
74
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the not-real Being of the ideal essences cannot be called Not-Being. Rather, Edith Stein
designates this Being, “essential Being,” to distinguish it from both real Being and from
conceptual Being.78
Essential Being
Before proceeding with the discussion of Edith Stein’s theory concerning the
instantiation of meaning, a word should be said about essential Being (wesenhaftes Sein).
As Dr. Victor M. Salas, Jr., has made clear, the concept of essential Being (esse
essentiae) is generally associated with Henry of Ghent, a secular master in the faculty of
theology at the University of Paris who succeeded Thomas and preceded Duns Scotus.79
As Salas explains, Edith Stein’s concern was the kind of Being that would have to be
attributed to essences if they were to serve as the foundation for real Being. Salas
explains:
Like Stein, Henry articulates a threefold account of essence and, once
again, Avicenna’s own distinctions direct the discussion. Essence, Henry
explains, can have being (esse) in extra-mental things, or it can have being
in the mind, or, third, it can have a being unto itself, an esse essentiae. By
way of example, Henry notes that “animal” taken together with its various
accidental properties in singular things is a “natural thing” (res naturalis),
that is, an individual animal; taken with its accidents in the soul or mind,
however, “animal” is simply a thing of reason (res rationis) and attains to
universality; further still, taken simply in itself (secundum se) it is a “thing
of essence” (res essentiae) of which, much as Stein herself maintains, it is
said that its being (esse) is prior or indifferent to both real and mental
being.80
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According to Henry, “though esse essentiae is constituted in its intentional relation to the
divine ideas, it is not identical to those ideas or merely reducible to the divine being.
Rather, esse essentiae is a term of that relation, and, as such, distinct from the opposing
term, God.81 Edith Stein makes no reference to Henry in Finite and Eternal Being so it is
unclear how she arrived at the concept of wesenhaftes Sein. In what follows, we will try
to discover how the concept functions in her overall theory concerning the meaning of
being.
The instantiation of meaning
Edith Stein uses the terms realization or actualization to describe the process
whereby real things and concepts receive their Being as images of ultimate meanings. It
is helpful to think of this process as “instantiation” in order to remember that what is
being described is the discovery that this thing or this concept is an instance of one or
more meanings.
One of the questions that has long perplexed philosophers is how to explain the
way in which the things of the real world share in ultimate meanings or become instances
of ultimate meanings. Edith Stein asserts that the essence (Wesen) plays a pivotal role in
this process.
Clarification of terms
Edith Stein uses the term Wesen to indicate neither an ultimate meaning nor a
concept. Edith Stein says that unlike the ideal essences, which have only essential Being,
essences have both essential Being and real Being in particular things. Essences serve as
the mediators of meaning and Being to particular things.
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It is often difficult in Edith Stein’s descriptions to distinguish essences (Wesen)
from quiddities (Washeiten), and essences from natures (Natur). These terms frequently
appear together. To complicate matters even further, Edith Stein also speaks of a full quid
(volles Was) and an essential or substantial quid (Wesenswas). An attempt will be made
to clarify these and related terms in the discussion that follows.
In order to get closer to Edith Stein’s meanings, it is helpful to look back to
Thomas’s explanation for the terms “quid” and “essence.” Although Edith Stein uses
German words (i.e., Was, Wesen, and Natur), it seems likely that she took as her starting
point the underlying meanings that she found in Thomas.
Thomas distinguished a number of meanings of essentia:82 (1) Essentia is “that
which all that is real being has and all that is true being has not[;] … that which real
beings have, and beings of reason have not.”83 (2) Essentia is “something by virtue of
which real beings can be differentiated from one another and can be placed into one or
other of the ten categories.”84 (3) Essentia is “something which can furnish the answer to
the question, ‘What is it?’”85 This is called “quiddity” when it refers to what the real
thing is as expressed in a definition; this as what Aristotle called quod quid erat esse (JÎ
J\ μ< ,É<"4) (the what it was to be)86. (4) Essentia is called “form” to indicate the full
determination or identity of a real thing, “in the sense of the totality of the thing’s shared
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characteristics.”87 (5) Essentia is called “nature” (natura) in the first of four meanings of
nature given by Boethius when it signifies that which can be grasped by the intellect:
“For a real thing is not intelligible except through its definition and essence.”88 (6)
Essentia is called “nature” as described by Aristotle as something by which real beings
are ordered to their proper operations or activities: “[w]hat a real thing does is determined
by what it is.”89 (7) Essentia is called “essence” (in distinction to “quiddity”) from the
fact that through it and in it a real being has existence. It is “something by virtue of which
real beings are there as something positive…. It is to be taken as the most fundamental of
the answers to the question ‘What is it that all that is real being has, and all that is true
being has not.’?”90
In addition to Thomas (or perhaps primarily), Edith Stein takes her cues from Jean
Hering, who formulated the following “Law of Essences” (Hauptsatz vom Wesen):
“Every object (whatever its mode of Being may be) has one and only one
essence, which, as its essence, constitutes the fullness of its particular
nature (Eigenart).” Conversely, and this says something new, “Every
essence is by its essence the essence of something, namely, the essence of
this and no other something.” So the essence is the “particular nature
constituting the object,” “the stock of essential predicables.” Hering also
refers to the essence as Sosein (B@Ã@< ,É<"4). Because it is the essence of
something, the particular nature of an object, this means that it is
something not-self-standing (Unselbständiges). It is that by which the quid
of the object is determined (das Was des Gegenstandes bestimmt ist) (J`
J\ μ< ,É<"4). Therefore, an “essence-less” object is unthinkable. [An
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essence-less object] would no longer be an object, but only the empty
form of an object.91
Hering, moreover, maintained that not only things and persons, but also qualities and
experiences have their own individual essences. He said that, “’Two completely identical
(individuelle) objects have two fully the same essences but not identically the same; two
of the same flowers, two congruent triangles, each have their own essence.’”92 Hering
further asserted that some essences have an abiding core while others do not.93 It seems
that it is from Jean Hering that Edith Stein adopts the idea of the particular or individual
essence (Einzelwesen).
In order to understand Edith Stein’s own position, it is necessary now to clarify a
number of related terms.
(1) allgemeines Wesens. Universal essences which are “hidden” in each
individual essence.94 They are distinguished from individual essences in that
they can be communicated to other essences. The universal essence is one
wherever it is actualized in individual essences. The universal essences seem
to differ from the Wesenheit in that they are not completely simple, but are
composite structures of meaning, such as living thing, animal, human, etc.
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(2) Begriff. The concept, formed as the result of abstracting identifying marks
from an object.95
(3) Einzelwesen. The individual essence; that which is unique and cannot be
communicated to others. The individual essence can be actualized only in its
proper object.96
(4) Gegenstand. The term “object” (Gegenstand) has several meanings: In its
broadest sense, (a) an object is that which stands counter to a knowing
intellect. In this sense it is equivalent to something or anything at all. It
signifies everything that is not nothing, everything that can be known and
about which something can be predicated (i.e., subjectum logicum). In a more
narrow sense, (b) Gegenstand signifies something that stands aside or apart
from other things–something that is self-standing or standing alone. Then it
has Being-in-itself (Edith Stein’s footnote adds. i.e., substantia subsistens or
hypostasis. This meaning entails no relationship to a knowing subject, which
is implied in the first meaning.). In this sense, “things” and “persons,” are
objects, and in a way, so, too, are numbers and concepts (but not in the strict
sense). Qualities and experiences, and essence are not objects.97 Edith Stein
adds a note to her discussion of Gegenstand: “In modern philosophy “Objekt”
is that which faces, i.e., “stands opposite” (gegenübersteht) a knowing
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“Subjekt.” Scholasticism also uses this word in this sense. Primarily, it sees in
the object a subjectum, i.e., a (Unterlage) or carrier (Träger).”98
(5) Natur (NbF4H). Edith Stein includes an extended excerpt from the
Metaphysics concerning the various meanings of NbF4H. Of these various
meanings, Aristotle said that NbF4H in its primary sense is the @ÛF\"
(Substanz) of things that have their source of movement in themselves; i.e.,
natural things as opposed to artificial things. Edith Stein notes that he has in
mind the ‘substantiale Form’ (Wesensform)(in Aristotle’s terminology JÎ
,É*@H 6"Â º @ÛF\"). In the broader sense, she says, ‘Natur’ in a broader sense
extends to @ÛF\" in the broader sense of all that exists in general.99
(6) Substanz. ?ÛF\" in the narrowest and most proper sense; i.e., an entity resting
in itself and encompassing (umfassendes) and unfolding (entfaltendes) its own
Wesen.100
(7) Träger (ßB`FJ"F4H) or subsisting substance. It may be applied to the selfsustaining whole or to the empty form of the self-sustaining whole. It is the
carrier of the content of the whole. Träger is the broader term for carrier,
which corresponds to Person, the carrier of a rational nature.101
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(8) vollen Wassein. The full quid (volles Was) is the common content between a
present experience and a remembrance of, for example, joy.102 The full quid is
distinct from the essence. Edith Stein draws two distinctions:
a. If we take the essence as B@Ã@< ,É<"4 (how something is) or as J\
,É<"4 (what something is), it [the “full what”] is not the what, but the
what-ness (thus-ness) (Wassein; Sosein) and the quidditive
determination (Wasbestimmtheit) of joy.
b. To the full what-ness (in which we now include every B@Ã@< ,É<"4
(how it is)) also belongs how great the joy is [i.e., the magnitude of the
joy].103
A difference between the full quid and the essence occurs only in those
objects that undergo change. This includes experiential units and all objects of
sense; i.e., all that is included when we speak of nature (Natur).104 This
difference does not occur in the case of ideal objects such as numbers,
geometrical forms, pure colors and sounds, etc. For objects of sense it is
possible to distinguish in what an object is at any given time between stable
elements and changing elements. The full quid of an object is made up of both
the essential and nonessential elements.105
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(9) Was. The “what” or “quid”: that which is determined by the essence and
seized in the concept. It is that which is designated by Aristotle J\ ¦FJ4 (what
it is). The essence refers to the Being-what of an object. The essence of a red
rose, for example, is Being-rose. What it is, its quid, is rose. Being-red tells
how it is. This is another kind of determination, which Aristotle termed B@4`<
¦FJ4 (how it is). The quid has several meanings:
a. It can refer to the object with its full quid; i.e., both essential and
nonessential elements;
b. It can refer to the full quid taken by itself; and
c. It can signify what an object is according to its universal or individual
essence.106
(10)

Wesen. Is the essence (essentia) as irrevocably belonging to the Being of

an entity, giving rise to its quidditative determinateness (Wasbestimmtheit).107
Edith Stein makes clear that the essence (Wesen) is neither an ideal essence
nor a concept.108 The ideal essence (Wesenheit) or ultimate meaning is
separate from any particular instantiation of it. The concept (Begriff) is formed
as the result of abstracting certain identifying marks from an object. The
concept, in fact, is formed as the result of the intellectual grasp of the essence
of the object.109 Edith Stein explains that, “[t]o the essence of the object
106

ESG 80/FEB 82.

107

ESG 238/FEB 275.

108

ESG 70/FEB 70.

109

ESG 73/FEB 73.

102

belongs all (and only) what must be preserved so that ‘this object’
remains.”110 Moreover, she says that, “The essence shows a structure of
essential features or traits (Wesenzügen) that can be brought into relief and
conceptualized. The essence is what is conceptually grasped and that by which
the object is grasped and determined.”111 At one point, Edith Stein equates
Wesen with the expression “Was-Sein,” indicating that essence is the existing
what or quid.112
(11)

Wesenheit. An ideal essence or ultimate meaning. Edith Stein says that all

names are actually and ultimately expressions of ideal essences.113 They are
the ultimate ground of all intelligibility and linguistic understanding and
communication.
(12)

Wesenswas. The essential quid or quid of the essence, which represents

the stable elements in an object of sense. It is neither a mere name nor a mere
concept, but something objective.114 This would include a person’s character,
for example, but even the character of a person can change in certain
instances. In this case, it is possible to distinguish the carrier (Träger) of the
essence from the essential quid.
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(13)

Wesenszüg. Essential features or traits. These copy the ideal essences and

come together as the structure of essences.115
The Being of universals
With this background, we now turn to the question of the Being of universals.
What Edith Stein has called whatness (Washeit), quid of the essence (Wesenswas), or
essential quid (wesenhaftes Was), she says, is called by the scholastics the universale.116
Edith Stein uses a passage from Joseph Gredt to describe various positions that have been
taken concerning the Being of universals:
According to the original meaning of the word, the universale denotes
unum versus alia seu unum respiciens alia (the one as against others, or
the one with respect to others). And since the one can be related to another
in different ways—either designating, representing, or causing it, or
related to it in its being—we distinguish a fourfold meaning of the
universal: universal words, universal concepts, universal cause (God), and
universal natures.
The controversies concerning the correct interpretation of
universals are almost as old as philosophy itself. From the days of the PreSocratics there have always been nominalists, who were willing to admit
only to universality by names and who related the meaning of these
universal names exclusively to individual things. There have always been
conceptualists, who conceded that there was a universality of concepts but
who regarded these concepts as constructs of the mind with no
corresponding reality. And there have always been realists, who were
convinced that there actually existed a nature which corresponded to the
universal name and concept.
Realism itself is divided into different branches. The Thomistic
school brands the idea that the universal exists as such either aside from or
within things as exaggerated or extreme realism. To this category of
thought belongs Platonism (according to the interpretation it has received
at the hands of the scholastics, who based their verdict on Aristotle),
which attributes to the universal an existence apart from the mind and
115
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apart from individual things.117 Duns Scotus, on the other hand, taught that
the universal exists in individual things. The Thomists—leaning above all
on the authority of such thinkers as Aristotle, Boethius, St. Anselm, and
St. Thomas—call their own point of view moderate realism. They make a
distinction between the matter (or the quidditive content) of the universal
concept (i.e., the nature) and the universal form: To the matter they ascribe
a being in the individual thing, while to the form they attribute being only
in the mind.118
Edith Stein allies herself with the realists, who are of three kinds:
1. The Platonists, who ascribed Being to universals apart from either objects or
human minds.
2. The Scotists, who ascribed Being to universals in individual things.
3. The Thomists, who divided things into matter and form, and ascribed real
Being to the universals in the matter of individual things, and conceptual
Being to the universals as forms of individual things.
Edith Stein describes her view as that of Duns Scotus.119 Let us look carefully at her
position.
By “essence” and “quid,” Edith Stein designates things that are found in objects,
although she does not attribute actual Being to them apart from real objects. In this way,
117
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she distinguishes essences and quids from concepts, which are formed, not found. Edith
Stein identifies the essential quid (wesenhaftes Was) with the Scholastic universale. She
agrees with moderate realism in distinguishing matter from form in the universale.
“Matter” (materie), she says, is the quid of essence regardless of whether the essence
possesses actual or essential Being.120 She agrees that matter has its Being in individual
things. She questions, however, what can be meant by the “Being in the mind” which is
attributed to the form of the universal.
Thomas said that the mode of cognition differs from the mode of being.121
Specifically, in response to his understanding of Plato’s arguments he said:
Now to one who carefully examines Plato’s arguments it is evident that
Plato’s opinion was false, because he believed that the mode of being
which the thing known has in reality is the same as the one which it has in
the act of being known. Therefore, since he found that our intellect
understands abstractions in two ways: in one way as we understand
universals abstracted from singulars, and in another way as we understand
the objects of mathematics abstracted from sensible things, he claimed that
for each abstraction of the intellect there is a corresponding abstraction in
the essences of things. Hence he held that both the objects of mathematics
and the Forms are separate.
But this is not necessary. For even though the intellect understands
things insofar as it becomes assimilated to them through the intelligible
form by which it is put into act, it still is not necessary that a form should
have the same mode of being in the intellect that it has in the thing known;
for everything that exists in something else exists there according to the
mode of the recipient. Therefore, considering the mode of the intellect,
which is other than the nature of the thing known, the mode of
understanding, by which the intellect understands, must be one kind of
mode, and the mode of being, by which things exist, must be another. For
120
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although the object which the intellect understands must exist in reality, it
does not exist there according to the same mode [which it has in the
intellect]. Hence, even though the intellect understands mathematical
entities without simultaneously understanding sensible substances, and
understands universals without understanding particulars, it is not
therefore necessary that the objects of mathematics should exist apart from
sensible things, or that universals should exist apart from particulars. For
we also see that sight perceives color apart from flavor, even though flavor
and color are found together in sensible things.122
The key to this passage for Edith Stein’s purposes is this, “It still is not necessary that a
form should have the same mode of being in the intellect that it has in the thing known;
for everything that exists in something else exists there according to the mode of the
recipient.” The quotation that she gives (the source of which I have not been able to
discover) addresses the point that, “What reason knows in the thing must be the same [as
that which exists in the mode of being] but reason does not know it in the same
manner.”123
Edith Stein’s point is that this “same” has its own mode of Being--essential Being,
and can also acquire two additional modes of Being: (1) wirkliches Sein, if the thing is
real, and (2) Sein im Geist, if the thing is also known.124 This “same,” she says, is the
essential quid.
When the essential quid is said to be “in the mind” this does not mean that it is a
constituent part of the knowing mind or of actual knowledge understood as an
experiential unit. The knowing mind is an individual actuality. The thing known,
however, does not by its being known become an individual actuality. Rather, it merely
122
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becomes something encompassed by the spirit/intellect while remaining transcendent to
it. Edith Stein explains that the thing known is not “mine” in the same way that my
knowledge is mine. “‘What’ I know can be known by many others. My knowing it does
not make it inaccessible to others.”125
Thus, Edith Stein says that Being in the mind is added to what is known in the
same way that real Being is added to what is realized. In other words, “Being in the
mind” and “real Being” are different modes of Being (Seinswiesen) for the same essential
quid. When the essential quid is realized in the real world (in rerum natura), it may also
become an actual object of knowledge in spirit/intellect--an actu intelligible in intellectu.
“What” is realized in the real world or in an intellect preserves its integrity in either case.
It is indifferent to being realized or to being intellectualized. Edith Stein says, “It is what
it is, whether it is realized or not and whether it is recognized or not.”126 This “Being
indifferent” to realization or intellectualization is precisely what Edith Stein calls
essential Being.127
The process of intellectualization implies more than the mere “encompassing by
the intellect” because thought “tends toward” an object through a concept by which it
seeks to grasp the quid of the object. The perfect or ideal concept would be perfectly
congruent with the essential quid without being identical to it. The concepts that are
formed by individual human beings aim at this ideal, but lags more or less behind it. Each
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human being occupies his own “conceptual world,” which may be more or less congruent
not only with the real world but also with the world of ideal concepts.128
Because the same essential quid is found in a multitude of separations, we give it
the “meaning of universality”; that is why the waiver of the meaning of this separation is
possible: it belongs to this meaning and is called abstraction. In itself, the essential quid is
neither “universal” nor “individual.” It has no equal in the field of essential Being--this it
has in common with the individual. But it is mediate and admits of separations—which
distinguishes it from the individual in the full sense of the word and makes it possible to
attribute “universality” to it.
This, Edith Stein says, makes clear that her answer to the problem of universals
goes beyond the position of moderate realism (which she apparently believed attributed
“Being in the mind” to the forms of individuals) without going so far as Platonic realism
(which was said to have attributed substance to these forms). She does not ascribe to the
essential quid the same Being that is enjoyed by real things. Nor does she consider
essential quids to be individuals or “substances.” She rather ascribes essential Being to
the essential quids, and makes them the mediators between ideal essences and particular
individuals. She believes that her conception is that of Duns Scotus, but gives no specific
information about his position with which her position might be compared.
The instantiation of meaning (reprise)
We have seen that the essential quid occupies the mediate position between ideal
essences and individual things. We have also seen that the Being proper to the essential
quid is essential Being, but that it can acquire real Being and intellectual Being. The
128
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question remains, however, how Edith Stein accounts for the instantiation of meaning.
What accounts for the dynamism or movement, if you will, of realization? Before we
address this question, it is important to review her position concerning the instantiation of
meaning. She says:
[T]he essences [Wesenheiten] are the constitutive elements of the
composite structures called whatnesses [Washeiten]. These later in turn
enter into the full quid of things as their substantial core [Kernbestand].
Only through the media of the whatnesses and essences do the ideal
essences enter into a relation with the real world. The whatnesses and
essences acquire reality in things as their solid substance [Bestand], while
the full quid is actualized in things as their fluctuating substance.129
Essential Being, the Being of meaning, is organized into a hierarchical realm. Edith Stein
states:
(1) There is a realm of meaning, characterized by “essential Being” (wesenhaften
Sein) that is distinct from the realms of real Being (wirklichen Sein) and of
conceptual Being (gendankliche Sein) or “im Geist sein” (lit. be-ing in the
intellect).130
(2) The realm of meaning is a hierarchically ordered realm composed of:
a. The simple and archetypal highest stage of the ideal essences
(Wesenheiten).
b.

“Essential features” (Wesenszüg), formed in the image of ideal
essences, which come together into composite structures called
essential quids (Wesenswas).

c. Essences and quiddities, which show more or less universality.
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d. At the lowest level, individual essences and quiddities.131
(3) Each of these stages is a stage of essential Being, not a group of “things” or
“beings.” These are the ways in which meaning unfolds at various levels.
Meaning is that which imparts unity and multiplicity, structure and order, meaning and
intelligibility to the life of the ego—the flux of the intellectual movement—and to every
other object as well. Thus, meanings may also be understood as “laws,”132 indicating their
role in determining what a particular thing is/will be.
As an overarching term, Edith Stein uses “Wesen” to designate all that which is in
the manner of essential Being. The Being of that which is considered essentially is
“wesen,” indicating an enduring be-ing, an enduring reposing-in-itself.133 The verb
wesen, be-ing-in-repose, is opposed to be-ing-in-motion.134 Essential be-ing—wesen—is
the abiding be-ing of meaning. It is neither a precursor to real Being nor is it efficacious
Being (wirksames Sein).135 We must look elsewhere for the efficacious Being that
explains the instantiation of meaning.
Summarizing what was discovered in the exploration of consciousness, Edith
Stein affirms that nothing temporal, i.e., nothing whose Being is coming to be and
passing away, and no living ego, whose Being is received from moment to moment, can
exist without a supra-temporal ground. Likewise, nothing temporal can exist without a
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timeless formal structure [Gestalt] which regulates the particular course of its
development.136 These timeless formal structures are the meaningful content of
experience. It is recognition of this timeless meaning, she says, that makes knowledge
possible.137
The fleeting Being of the ego, which must be received from moment to moment,
reveals the need for, and thus the existence of, a giver. Edith Stein asserts that only a
person who is in possession of Being, and thus is the Lord of Being, can be the giver of
finite Being.138 This person, she says, could not be the Lord of Being if anything were
exempt from his Being-power (Seinsmacht)—if independent of him there could be either
Being or Not-Being. As a result, the units of meaning also must receive their Being from
him. The units of meaning do not receive independent Being, however. They do not
subsist. Rather, they come into Being as the finite consciousness receives its Being. It is
not the meaning itself that receives real Being, but real Being is given simultaneously to
the unit of meaning as it is given to the ego as the gift of its Being. Thus, Edith Stein
asserts that the Lord of Being must also be the Lord of meaning. All fullness of meaning,
she says, is contained in eternal Being.139 It is not possible to conceive the Being of
essences and quids as independent from eternal Being. Instead, “[i]t is the eternal Being
itself that molds the eternal forms in itself--in a non-temporal process--according to
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which it creates the world in time and with time.”140 “Creation” is thus a theological
expression describing the process of the reception of real Being.
The motivating power that accounts for the instantiation of meaning is none other
than the essentially real Being that is First Being. First Being not only encompasses all
finite meaning, but is the causal archetype of all finite beings.141
Confirmation by revealed truth
Edith Stein pursues confirmation of her findings concerning the instantiation of
meaning in Christian revelation, taking for her texts: “W< •DP− 7`(@H”142 and “6"Â
"ÛJ`H ¦FJ4< BDÎ BV<JT< 6"Â J BV<J" ¦< "ÛJè FL<XFJ0P,4<.”143 Edith Stein
acknowledges that the introduction of Scripture carries the discussion beyond that which
is purely philosophical, but says that the philosophical meaning of 8`(@H may help us to
gain an understanding of the theological meaning of the Word, and vice versa.
According to the first text, 7`(@H, or Word, or meaning, is that which was from
the beginning. St. John identifies this Word as a divine person;144 that is, according to St.
John, the Word is not just a reality, but it is supreme reality. Through this eternal
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meaning, all things came to be,145 and in him, according to St. Paul, all things “subsist
and cohere.”146 Edith Stein explains that the divine 7`(@H should be understood as the
real essence (wirkliches Wesen) of God, and according to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity,
as the “divine essence” (das göttliche Wesen).147
This essence is called meaning (Sinn) because it is what is known by God as the
content of divine knowledge (geistiger Sinn).148 The divine knowledge is called word
because it comprises the Word of God, i.e., the content of revelation, and thus carries
linguistic meaning (sprachlicher Sinn). (This also is true at a more fundamental level
because the word is spoken and is generated in speaking.) Finally, the meaning of the
Word is real; i.e., it has factual meaning (sachlichen Sinn), because eternal Being is
essentially real and because, as First Being, it is the author of all Being.149
The essential Being of the divine essence cannot have had a beginning for two
reasons: (1) The divine essence, as meaning, is essential Being as such. The essential
Being of the divine essence is coextensive with the real Being that is First Being. In fact,
they are the same. (2) The divine essence is that which is understood by the divine
spirit/intellect (Geist). Edith Stein states: “The real Being of the divine spirit/intellect is
life and is living understanding. Intellectual life, i.e., understanding, is not possible
145
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without a content, without a ‘spiritual/intellectual meaning.’ [Thus] [t]his meaning
[7`(@H] must be equally eternal and changeless as the divine spirit/intellect itself.”150
The essential Being of the divine essence cannot have had a beginning because it is
impossible to separate the essential Being of 7`(@H from its actual Being.
In the expression, W< •DP− 7`(@H, Edith Stein explains, the •DP− does not refer
to a beginning in time, but to “First Being,” the primordial Being (das “erste Seinde,”
das Ur-Seiende). As a result, she says, the first line of St. John’s Gospel should be
interpreted thus:
In First Being was the Logos (the “meaning” or “the divine essence”)–in
the Father was the Son–meaning enclosed by the primordial reality (UrWirklichen).151
The “generation” of the second person of the Trinity thus implies the settlement
of the divine essence upon the new person-reality (Person-Wirlichkeit) of the Son.
This generation, however, results in now diminution of the primordial-reality of
the Father.
As “proof” of the existence of God, Edith Stein suggests that it is impossible to
conceive of First Being without Being because if Being were not, nothing would remain.
The quid, essence, and the existence of First Being, she says, are neither really nor
conceptually distinguishable. This is the proper foundation, she suggests, for an
“ontological proof” of the existence of God. This demonstration is more compelling than
Anselm’s proof,152 she says, because it begins from Being rather than from the most
150
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perfect being.153 According to Thomas and thus, Edith Stein, God is pure act (actus
purus); the very idea of God (i.e., God’s essence) necessitates his existence.
The question, though, is whether Christian revelation confirms the philosophical
result indicating that First Being must be a person and the source of all meaning and
Being. Edith Stein asserts that it does. She explains that the name 7`(@H when applied to
the second person of the divine Trinity, indicates that what is intended is the divine
essence as known or encompassed by the divine spirit/intellect. This is analogous to the
encompassing of 8`(@H by a human spirit/intellect, and is an example of the analogia
entis—applying to the deity terms that describe the place that meaning (8`(@H),
understood as the positive content of things, and thus the content of our knowledge and
our language, has in our own experience.
The scriptural passages go beyond this, however, in saying that all things were
created through the divine 7`(@H and are sustained in existence by the divine 7`(@H.
Edith Stein notes that the medieval reading of John1:3-4 was: “what was made was life in
him” (quod factum est, in ipso vita erat).154 This, she says, suggests that all created things
have their life, their actual Being, in the divine 7`(@H. She connects this with the

Anything that can be thought is perfected in existence. All perfections are attributed to God.
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Augustinian conception of the Platonic ideas as “creative ideal essences in the divine
spirit/intellect” (schöpferischer Wesenheiten im göttlichen Geist).155
Augustine discusses the divine ideas at Question 46 of his Eighty-three Different
Questions.156 Augustine first says that no one can be wise without understanding those
things that Plato termed “ideas” (whatever they may be called). In Latin, he says, the
Platonic ideas are literally translated by either formae or species, but are also rendered
rationes, which literally translates the Greek 8`(@4, not Æ*X". Nevertheless, he says, the
meaning is correctly rendered by 8`(@H:
[F]or in fact the ideas are certain original and principal forms of things;
i.e., reasons, fixed and unchangeable, which are not themselves formed
and, being thus eternal and existing always in the same state, are contained
in the Divine Intelligence. And though they themselves neither come into
being nor pass away, nevertheless, everything which can come into being
and pass away and everything which does come into being and pass away
is said to be formed in accordance with these ideas.157
Only the rational soul can contemplate these ideas, says Augustine, by use of its most
excellent part, its reason, which is like an inner eye. In fact, not every soul is capable of
this vision, but only the soul which is holy and pure. No person, however, would deny
that it is God who produces all things as their cause. Or that God is that by which all
things live that live. Or that God orders and governs all things by his laws. Thus no one
would dare to say that God has created all things without a rational plan. As a result,
individual things are created in accord with reasons (i.e., ideas) unique (propriis) to them.
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These reasons, says Augustine, must be thought to exist in the mind of the
Creator. For, he says, it would be sacrilegious to think that God relied upon something
outside himself when he created in accordance with which he created. “It is by
participation in these [ideas],” he says, “that whatever exists in whatever manner does
exist.”158
Augustine goes on to say that of all the things that have been created, the most
excellent is the rational soul. In the measure that it is pure and clings to God in love, the
rational soul is able to discern, not with physical eyes, but with its own highest past, i.e.,
its intelligence, “those reasons whose vision brings it full blessedness.”159 He concludes,
“Those reasons (rationes), as was said, may be called ideas, or forms, or species, or
reasons; and while it is the privilege of many to name them what they wish, it is the
privilege of very few to see them in their reality.”160
Without giving any further explanation to the rich background of Augustine’s
understanding of how the Being of things is said to subsist in the divine 7`(@H, Edith
Stein notes that the Church has determined how the Being of things in the 7`(@H should
not be understood. She refers to the condemnation of certain errors of Anton Günther, an
Austrian Roman Catholic philosopher, whose work was condemned in 1857.161
Specifically, Edith Stein notes that created things are not in God as parts of a whole, and
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that the real Being of things is not divine Being, but their own Being, distinct from divine
Being.162
Edith Stein asks then what can be meant by the saying that things “stand and
cohere” (Bestand und Zusammenhang) in the divine 7`(@H. First she addresses the
question of standing-with. Coherence, she says, means that all that which is (alles
Seiende) is a unity, which should be conceived as a Meaningful-Whole (Sinn-Ganzes). To
illustrate her meaning, she gives an example from her own life. She says that she selected
a particular to pursue a particular course of study in which she was interested. This, she
says, is an example of the coherence of motives and circumstances. But at that university,
she met someone “accidentally” and engaged in a conversation which later turned out to
be of decisive significance for her life. In other words, she says, “what did not lie in my
plan lay in God’s plan.”163 From God’s point of view, nothing is accidental, but
everything is part of a perfect coherence of meaning (Sinn-zusammenhang). This, she
says, can be compared to a work of art, in which each feature has its own place and
contributes to the harmony of the whole. “What we grasp of the ‘meaning of things,’
what ‘is received in our understanding,’ bears the same relation to the Meaningful-Whole
as individual lost tones borne to me on the wind from the sounding of a distant
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symphony.”164 In theological language, she says, this coherence of meaning of all that
which is in the divine 7`(@H is called the divine plan of creation. Its actualization is the
history of the universe. But behind this plan is the eternal fullness of divine Being and
life.
Edith Stein then turns to the question of the meaning of standing-with; that is,
what does it mean to say that things stand or live (Bestand) in the divine 7`(@H? The
Being of things in the divine 7`(@H cannot be real Being, she says, because otherwise it
would be meaningless to distinguish a “plan” of creation from its “actualization.” Instead,
the name 7`(@H indicates that what is intended is the meaning of things; thus it is their
essential Being that is found in the 7`(@H: “That which, as a member of the divine plan
endures from eternity, is ‘imparted’ to things and “realized in them as their meaning.”165
As we have seen, it pertains to essential Being to be capable of being realized in a
multitude of things in this manner.
The Being of the divine 7`(@H is not simply essential Being. If it were, it would
not be possible to call this Being life or to speak of “creative ideal essences.” Instead,
says Edith Stein, in the divine Logos, essential Being and real Being cannot be separated.
According to St. John, all things were created through the divine Logos: “What is real in
things is not only prefigured in the Logos as something ‘unreal’ (i.e., as a lifeless
archetype) but is in him real and efficacious: the becoming real of things is the effect of
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this effectiveness. This is how the interpretation of the ‘ideas’ as creative archetypes in
the divine spirit/intellect is to be understood.”166
Based upon explanations of Thomas in On Truth, Edith Stein arrives at a two-fold
meaning of the Being of the Infinite in the Eternal: it is (1) the “Being-encompassed” of
all “meaning” by the divine spirit/intellect; and (2) the archetypal-primordial causal
“Being-ground” of all that is in the divine essence.167 In the first sense, the ideas which
are encompassed in their own Being by the divine 7`(@H are the quid of all that is; in
other words, they are “what” the manifold of meaning (Sinn-Mannigfaltigkeit) is as it is
spanned by the divine spirit/intellect.168 Edith Stein explains: “In this created manifold of
meaning, the ideas have their own determined place. Their own Being, vis-à-vis Beingin-Logos, is not a later and derived Being, but, encompassed by the Logos, is timeless
and changeless Being, in contrast to real Being, which begins and flows in time.”169
In the second sense, the ideas are the primordial cause (Ursache) of all finite
beings. Here, she says:
As such they are the simple divine essence to which every finite being,
both timeless and temporal, stands in a curious image-relation. The
“archetype” (understood not as the temporal beginning, but as the limit) is
regarded as the first and the “images” as derived, which receive their
meaningful existence through the image-relation; in this way, all that is
finite is set into separate existence (Sondersein) through that which is
original and simple, and in this sense is created.170
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From these reflections, Edith Stein concludes that the divine 7`(@H (= meaning)
occupies a mediating position between the one and simple divine essence and the created
manifold of meaning, which is spanned by the divine spirit and is an image of the divine
essence.
Throughout this discussion, Edith Stein has transposed the language of Christian
revelation into the language of philosophy. She has used the truths of faith to provide a
solution to the philosophical problem of the one and the many. On the one hand the
analysis of the Being of consciousness led to First Being which must be one and simple:
quid, essence and Being in one. On the other hand, the quid of finite beings led to a
manifold of ultimate essential elements. It was impossible, she says, to arrive at a purely
philosophical understanding of this ‘double countenance’ of ‘First Being’ because reason
is unable to command a full view of First Being.171 Edith Stein concedes that theological
considerations cannot lead to a purely philosophical solution, but suggests they can open
up a view of a possible solution beyond the frontier of philosophy (but not beyond what
can be grasped philosophically). Conversely, philosophical exploration opens up the
meaning of the truths of faith.
Summary
Where Heidegger found meaning to originate in Dasein; i.e., in human existence,
Edith Stein finds meaning to originate within First Being. It is expressed, she says, in the
generation of the divine 7`(@H, and through the divine 7`(@H, in the creative essences
or ultimately simply meanings, which in turn are instantiated in the created world.
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The Meaning of Being
With this background in the three kinds of Being and the meaning of meaning, we
turn at last to consider the meaning of Being. Chapter VI of Finite and Eternal Being is
devoted to the meaning of Being. It provides a summary of all that has gone before it.
This chapter follows chapters in which Edith Stein considered the traditional AristotelianThomistic doctrine of Being and essence and another in which she considered the
transcendentals.
In contradistinction to Heidegger, who proposed as the meaning of Being,
“presence,” Edith Stein proposes instead that the meaning of Being is “unfolding.” In this
way, although she has been called an essentialist,172 she preserves the underlying
dynamism of Being:
Finite Being is unfolding of meaning; essential Being is timeless
unfolding, beyond potency and act; real Being is unfolding out of an
essential form, from potency to act, in time and space; conceptual Being is
unfolding in several senses.173
Unfolding is the common constituent element of each of these kinds of Being. But Being
is the Being of a meaningful whole, of all that which is, not simply of an empty form.
172
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When we speak of “being” (das Seiende, ens) we mean this meaningful whole; the full
meaning of Being must be commensurate with this meaningful whole. Our minds cannot
comprehend it, says Edith Stein, but it is the goal of all our knowledge.174
Thus, Edith Stein says that “be-ing at its height,” i.e., in its fullness, is essentially
“Being-consummated/perfect.”175 The difficult Greek phrase JÎ J\ μ< ,É<"4 (the what it
was to be), she says, finds its fulfillment here. What is essentially is that which it was
immutably. More specifically, the difference between present, past, and future is
suspended in essential Being. What is essentially does not come into existence and it is
not temporal. Because it is independent of time, it is at every moment. This is what is
expressed by the German verb “wesen,” which, she says, expresses even more
emphatically than the Latin “essentia – esse” the close connection between Being and
essence:
Becoming and passing away on the one hand, and “wesen” on the other,
stand opposite each other as moving and static Being. Both are Being. But
if one factually precedes the other, it is “wesen.” For just as all movement
aims at rest, all becoming aims at “enduring be-ing” (wesen). In order for
something to be and for something to be, “Wesen” (essence) and “wesen”
(enduring be-ing) are both required.176
The particular Being of each individual thing is part of the meaningfully ordered whole of
all that which is (das Seiende). All self-enclosed meaningful units must be regarded as

174

ESG 286/FEB 332.

175

ESG 88/FEB 92-93.

176

ESG 88-89/FEB 92-93.

124

part of this whole. The oneness of Being is the Being of this whole, and all of its parts
partake or participate in this Being.177
The world that Edith Stein intends is not simply the world of nature or sense
experience. It is instead that world which is comprehensible; it is the created world united
with created spirits/intellects. And this created world refers back to eternal archetypes, or
divine ideas, which are the foundation for all that is. The manifold of divine ideas is
united in one divine Being, which is from eternity both essential and real, meaningful and
efficacious. Every finite Being and every link in its Being refers back to this
beginningless and endless, primordial ground: First Being or BDfJ0 @ÛF\".178
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CHAPTER 6
PERSONAL BEING
In the discussion on Being, Edith Stein recognized the Christian distinction
between First Being (God) and all other Being, which is the distinction between eternal
Being and finite Being. Overlying this distinction, however, Edith Stein identified three
modes of Being: real Being, conceptual Being, and essential Being. These apply to both
finite and eternal Being, but not in the same way. They apply analogically. In eternal
Being or First Being, there is no real but perhaps a conceptual distinction between real,
conceptual, and essential Being.1 In the realm of finite Being, however, these three are
distinct.
The realm of finite Being can be divided in a number of ways. Based upon
Thomas’s On Being and Essence, everything that is not First Being is divided between
composite material structures and simple intelligences. The structure of composite
material structures is addressed in Finite and Eternal Being Chapter IV; it will receive
treatment here only to the extent necessary to understand Edith Stein’s discussion of
personal Being. Like real, conceptual, and essential Being, personal Being also overlies
the distinction between finite and eternal Being and is used analogically of them.
Personal Being traditionally is marked by two characteristics: reason and freedom. It is
the Being proper to God, and in an analogical sense, to spirits/intelligences. These
include both the separated intelligences or angels, and the human soul. Personal Being is

1

Edith Stein asks whether it is possible that there can be no conceptual distinction at ESG
291/FEB 339 .

the height of Being. Our discussion, like that of Edith Stein and St. Thomas, will begin
with the personal Being of God.
First Being as Personal Being
Edith Stein introduces the concept of person in Finite and Eternal Being in
connection with her explanation of the received Being of the ego. In Chapter III she says
that the Being of the ego must receive its Being from one who truly possesses Being and
who is able to give Being as a gift. This, she says, can only be a person: the Lord (Herr)
of meaning and of Being.2 In Chapter VI she reiterates this claim. There she says that
First Being must be a person because only a person can create, i.e., call into being by
virtue of his will, and be the sustainer of a rational order.3 These two signs, freedom and
reason are the marks of personal Being according to Boethius, a definition accepted by
Thomas.4
The name of God
Edith Stein notes that the conclusion that First Being must be personal Being is
confirmed by revealed truth. God reveals himself as a person in the Hebrew scriptures:
“But,” says Moses to God, “When I go to the Israelites and say to them,
‘The God of your fathers has sent me to you,’ if they ask me, ‘What is his
name?’ what am I to tell them?” God replied, “I am who am.” The he
added, “This is what you shall tell the Israelites: I AM sent me to you.”5
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God’s name revealed to Moses is, “I am.” Edith Stein recognizes that only a person
reveals himself as “I.”6 Similarly, Fr. Robert Sokolowski, who has done more to develop
and promote Catholic phenomenology in the United States than any other philosopher,
points out that in the Christian scriptures, Jesus also reveals himself, and thus God, as a
person:
The revelation of the Holy Trinity took place first and foremost in the
words and actions of Jesus Christ. To reveal this mystery, Christ used
human language. This language allowed him to use the word I. By using
this word and its variants, Christ was able to express himself as the
speaker responsible for what he was saying. A responsible speaker,
someone who can say “I,” is a person.7
The divine “I am,” says Edith Stein, means: “I live,” “I know,” “I will,” “I love,” in a
perfect unity of one eternally divine act. The divine “I” is not an empty ego, she says, but
is the Lord of all fullness of meaning and Being. The divine “I am” is an eternally living
presence, in whom there is no distinction of form and fullness, or of quid and Being. This
unity, suggests Edith Stein, is best expressed in the Latin sum, where there is no
distinction between the “I” who lives and the act of living. The divine “I” and its life are
one.8
The divine Persons
Notwithstanding the unity of the divine “I am,” God—personal Being—is
revealed in Christian dogma as three divine Persons, Father, Son, and Spirit. Edith Stein
asks how this is to be understood and how it may explain the diversity of finite Being.
6
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She takes as her point of departure the Athanasian creed, in which the Son is described as
“generated, not created.”9 The Athanasian creed, or Quicumque vul, taken from its
opening words, “whosoever wishes [to be saved],” deals with two fundamental truths: the
trinity of the persons of God and the twofold nature of the one Divine Person of Jesus
Christ.10 With respect to the trinity of divine persons, the creed recites:
Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he
hold the Catholic Faith. Which Faith except everyone do keep whole and
undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. And the Catholic
Faith is this, that we worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity.
Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance. For there is
one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy
Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is
all One, the Glory Equal, the Majesty Co-Eternal. Such as the Father is,
such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost. The Father Uncreate, the Son
Uncreate, and the Holy Ghost Uncreate. The Father Incomprehensible, the
Son Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible. The Father
Eternal, the Son Eternal, and the Holy Ghost Eternal and yet they are not
Three Eternals but One Eternal. As also there are not Three Uncreated, nor
Three Incomprehensibles, but One Uncreated, and One
Uncomprehensible. So likewise the Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty,
and the Holy Ghost Almighty. And yet they are not Three Almighties but
One Almighty.
So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God.
And yet they are not Three Gods, but One God. So likewise the Father is
Lord, the Son Lord, and the Holy Ghost Lord. And yet not Three Lords
but One Lord. For, like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to
acknowledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord, so are we
forbidden by the Catholic Religion to say, there be Three Gods or Three
Lords. The Father is made of none, neither created, nor begotten. The Son
is of the Father alone; not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy
Ghost is of the Father, and of the Son neither made, nor created, nor
begotten, but proceeding.
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So there is One Father, not Three Fathers; one Son, not Three
Sons; One Holy Ghost, not Three Holy Ghosts. And in this Trinity none is
afore or after Other, None is greater or less than Another, but the whole
Three Persons are Co-eternal together, and Co-equal. So that in all things,
as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, is to be
worshipped. He therefore that will be saved, must thus think of the
Trinity.11
As Edith Stein points out, according to Catholic doctrine, the Son does not step into
existence as created beings do, but is co-eternal with the Father. His Being and essence
are identical with those of the Father. The Son is the perfect image of the Father, in a way
that is completely distinct from the reflected image of created things, for the Son and the
Father are one.
Edith Stein says that we can best understand this if we recall that God is
spirit/intellect (Geist). He sees himself in his own self through divine self-knowledge.
Human self-knowledge provides an illustration: “We see ourselves intellectually ‘as in an
image’ whenever we recognize our own human nature in other human beings.”12 This
would not be possible, she suggests, unless we knew ourselves by virtue of some
primordial, non-figurative insight, that “self-consciousness” in which we have immediate
awareness of ourselves and our Being. This knowledge is not clear, distinct, or complete,
but it is nevertheless the ground of everything that we know of ourselves and of others
like ourselves.
God’s self-knowledge, on the other hand, is perfectly clear and encompasses his
entire infinite Being. What our self-knowledge shares with God’s self-knowledge is
immediacy. This is not the knowledge that pertains to sensible things, but it is the self11
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knowledge that pertains to intellectual or spiritual Being as such. Thus, the generation of
the Son does not refer to the creation of a new being, but to an eternal,
spiritual/intellectual encompassing of the one, divine Being.
The difficulty, says Edith Stein, is in conceiving of this Being as a second person.
It pertains to the person as such to be aware of itself, but is the unity of the person
destroyed, she asks, when a second and third person are introduced in the divine Being?
Edith Stein suggests that the solution is to regard the trinity of persons as the divine
essence itself. In the case of finite persons, she proposes that we understand their Beingperson as the empty form of their fullness. In God, however, form and fullness are not
separated. It is not possible to oppose tri-personality as form to the fullness of the one
essence. What then becomes of the unity of the “I am” when there are three persons?
This, says Edith Stein, will provide the way out of the difficulty of explaining the oneness
of eternal Being and the diversity of finite Being. 13 Edith Stein explains her meaning:
Divine Being-person is the archetype (Urbild) for all finite Being-person.
The finite “I,” however, stands against a you—an “alter-ego,” as his
equal, as a being which demands understanding and a response, and with
whom, due to the common ground of “Being-I” (Ichseins), it lives in the
unity of “We.” This “we” is the form in which we experience the oneness
of a plurality of persons. This oneness does not cancel the multiplicity and
diversity of persons. The diversity is at once a diversity of Being, as we
have recognized as belonging to the essence of the “I”: the Beingincorporated into a higher unity does not cancel the “monadic” coherence
of the ego-life. But it is also a diversity of essence: the community of
species, which is the basis of “we-ness,” leaves room for a “personal
nature” (personlische Eigenart)¸ that which the “I” shares with no other. 14
The diversity of essence found in finite persons is not, however, found in the divine
persons. God’s “personal nature” is all-encompassing Being, the only all-encompassing
13
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Being, which is distinct from all finite Being. In God there is no distinction of universal
and particular, nor of essential and actual Being. The divine persons have their entire
essence in common. All that remains is the distinction of persons as such. In God there is
a perfect unity of the “we,” a perfect unity that is not found in the community of finite
persons, and yet there is a distinction of persons without which a community of “we” is
not possible.15 This distinction is articulated in the divine Trinity by the relations of the
divine persons.
Person and hypostasis
Historically, the philosophical development of the term person was interwoven
with attempts to define the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, i.e., to explain how the one God
is found as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Tertullian (c. 160 – c. 225 A.D.) is said to be the
one who first used the terms trinitas and persona to explain the Christian understanding
of God.16 In Chapter VII of Finite and Eternal Being, Edith Stein takes as her points of
departure for the discussion of the concept of person St. Augustine’s On the Trinity and
those portions of Thomas’s Summa Theologica which are concerned with the personhood
of God.
Augustine taught that the three persons of the Holy Trinity are one in substance,
which in this case means the same as essence, but distinguished in relation. The Father
“generates” (erzeugt) the Son, and both Father and Son, “breathe” (hauchen) the Holy
Spirit. There is a further distinction in the temporal appearances of the second and third
15
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persons: only the Son is born of a virgin, is crucified, dies, and is buried; and only the
Holy Spirit appears in the form of a dove or fiery tongues.17 These appearances, however,
are not distinctions between the persons as such. They are rather signs that point toward
the distinctions. The distinctions in themselves, however, are incomprehensible to us.18
The distinctions between the divine persons are called relations, but “relation” is
not used here as it is with respect to finite things. Augustine explains that relation with
respect to the divine persons denotes neither substance nor accident. The relations cannot
indicate substance/ essence because everything that is predicated of the substance of God
applies to all three persons equally and to each one of them separately, and this cannot be
said of the names of the divine persons. Likewise, the relations cannot be accidental
because the divine persons are not mutable as are finite things, and mutability pertains to
all accidents.19
In the case of the divine persons, therefore, it was necessary to distinguish the one
substance/essence (@ÛF\") from three related things articulated in the divine
substance/essence. Augustine explains:
They [i.e., the Greeks] indeed used also the word hypostasis; but they
intend to put a difference, I know not what, between @ÛF\" and
hypostasis: so that most of ourselves who treat these things in the Greek
language are accustomed to say, :4V< @ÛF\"<, JD,ÇH ßB`FJ"F,4H or in
Latin, one essence, three substances. But because with us the usage has
already obtained, that by essence we understand the same thing which is
understood by substance; we do not dare to say one essence, three
substances, but one essence or substance and three persons: as many
17
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writers in Latin, who treat of these things, and are of authority, have said,
in that they could not find any other more suitable way in which to
enunciate in words that which they understood without words. For, in
truth, as the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, and that
Holy Spirit who is also called the gift of God is neither the Father nor the
Son, certainly they are three. And so it is said plurally, “I and my Father
are one.” For He has not said, “is one,” as the Sabellians say: but “are
one.” Yet, when the question is asked, What three? human language
labors altogether under great poverty of speech. The answer, however, is
given, three “persons,” not that it might be [completely] spoken, but that
it might not be left [wholly] unspoken.20
Augustine explains that where the Greeks used the term ßB`FJ"F4H to distinguish the
three in one, the Latins used the term persona. Edith Stein understands the term
ßB`FJ"F4H to refer to the “carrier” (Träger) of the essence. Thus she says that the
distinction is that between the one divine substance and the three carriers of divine
substance.21
Edith Stein recognizes that everything else that we call person is “an individual
substance of a rational nature” (rationalis naturae individual substantia), the definition
given by Boethius and taken up by Thomas in the Summa Theologica. Edith Stein notes
that in the case of the finite individual, the term “person” indicates that its nature contains
something in its quid that is “incommunicable,” something that it shares and can share
with no one and nothing else. In the case of the Trinity, however, the three persons have
their entire quid in common.
The history of the term “person” requires explanation. Edith Stein alludes to this
history as set forth by Thomas in the Summa Theologica:
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[B]ecause in comedies and tragedies men of reputation are represented,
the name “person” came to be used to describe dignitaries….Therefore,
some give for person the definition: ‘the person is an hypostasis, whose
distinguishing characteristic is a dignity (propietate distnicta ad
dignitatem pertinente). And because it is a great honor to be carriers
(Träger) of a rational nature,22 each individual of a rational nature is called
a person…but the dignity of the divine nature surpasses all dignity;
wherefore the name person comes to be applied to God in the highest
degree.’23
Person, from the Latin, persona, indicates the masks worn by actors, and is derived from
persono, meaning “to sound through”; from this original usage, it came to indicate the
player, and from player, to the part one played in the world, and then, in law, to a being
having legal rights and obligations. 24 The Greek equivalent was BDF@B@< which was
also used of the actor’s mask and the character he represented.25 In Greek, however, the
meaning had not been applied to an individual human being as had that of persona:
Consequently, tres personae, tria prosopa, savoured of Sabellianism to the
Greeks. On the other hand their word hypostasis, from hypo-histemi
[“under” + “make to stand”], was taken to correspond to the Latin
substantia, from sub-stare under + to stand]. Tres hypostases therefore
appeared to conflict with the Nicene doctrine of unity of substance in the
22
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Trinity. This difference was the main cause of the Antiochene schism of
the fourth century. Eventually, in the West, it was recognized that the true
equivalent of hypostasis was not substantia but subsistentia [from
subistens, the present participle of subsisto = to take a stand, take position,
stand still, remain standing, halt, stop26], and in the East that to understand
prosopon in the sense of the Latin persona precluded the possibility of a
interpretation [sic]. By the First Council of Constantinople [331 A.D.],
therefore, it was recognized that the words hypostasis, prosopon, and
persona were equally applicable to the three Divine realities.27
According to an article by Helmut Köster in the Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament, the term ßB`FJ"F4H has a number of meanings. It can mean: 1. “support,” 2.
“ambush,” 3. “deposit,” “settlement,” and thus, “everything that settles,” and in the
philosophical sense, “existence,” or “reality,” Latin substantia; and 4. “lease.”28 The
earliest uses come from medicine, where ßB`FJ"F4H means “what settles,” especially the
sediment of urine, and from science. Aristotle, for example, used it for the slimy bottom
of stagnant waters, from which worms, and therefore, life arises. Based upon the
technical scientific usage, ßB`FJ"F4H was brought into philosophy by the Stoics,
specifically Posidonius, who used it with the meaning of “being that has attained reality,
which has come into existence.”29 Köster notes that ßB`FJ"F4H was differentiated from
@ÛF\": “Whereas @ÛF\" is by nature eternal being (= primal matter) as such, its
ßB`FJ"F4H is real being which has entered into existence, being manifested in the reality
26
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of existence, as present in individual phenomena…[but] [d]istinction…is possible only
conceptually. In fact primal matter always exists as actualized in form and quality. Thus
ßB`FJ"F4H comes to denote @ÛF\" in its actuality.”30
In the Letter to the Hebrews (c. 63-64 A.D.), ßB`FJ"F4H occurs three times, where
it has the meaning of the reality of transcendent future things or the present reality of
God.31 Outside of the New Testament, it does not become common in Christian literature
until Tatian,32 who uses it of God in the sense of “absolute, underived reality.”33 In neoPlatonism (3rd century A.D. to the close of Academy in 529 C.E.), ßB`FJ"F4H came to
mean a reality brought forth from the one, other and higher essentiality. It is the
“manifestation of the one which is dependent on true being and which is always at a
lower stage [of being].”34
Aristotle did not use the term ßB`FJ"F4H in the sense of person. In order to
explain the motion found in the universe, he posited an unmoved mover: §FJ4 J4 Ô @Û
64<@b:,<@< 64<,Ã, •Ä*4@< 6"Â @ÛF4" 6"Â ¦<XD(,4" @ÞF" (“there is something which
moves without being moved; something eternal which is both substance (@ÛF4") and
actuality (¦<XD(,4") —being and act”).35 There is no indication that Aristotle intended
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that the unmoved mover be called “person” or have personal characteristics. Thomas,
however, who included the need for a first cause—unmoved mover—in his list of five
proofs for the existence of God,36 went beyond Aristotle to ask whether the word
“person” should be said of God.37 Thomas answered the question of the personhood of
God in this way:
“Person” signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent
individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must
be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection,
this name “person” is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is
applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also,
which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed
above when treating the names of God.38
Once again we see a term used of God and other creatures analogically. Edith Stein notes
that Thomas applies the term hypostasis to God without equating it to person. He
designated substance in general as thing, subsistence, and hypostasis. To these three, he
said, corresponds to term “person” with respect rational substance. In other words, the
thing that is a rational substance is a person, that which subsists as a rational substance is
a person, and that which carries the accidents of a rational substance is a person.39
“Person,” is the narrower concept; “hypostasis” the broader one.
Now, Edith Stein, following Thomas, says that hypostasis cannot apply to the
divine persons in the sense of the carrier of accidents because the divine persons are not
the carriers of accidents. But to the extent that hypostasis means subsistentia, i.e., that
36
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which exists in itself and not in another, it can be applied to the divine persons, not in the
sense that they exist apart from each other, but in the sense that they exist (together) apart
from every created thing.
Edith uses the discussion of the application of the term person to the divine
persons to bring into clear relief her distinction between the carrier and the essence in
created things. For, she says, in the divine persons the carrier must be a carrier without
matter and without content. Thus the carrier, in all its many appearances, is simply the
empty form (leere Form) of the essential fullness (Wesensfülle).40 The empty form has
appeared in other contexts in Finite and Eternal Being: (1) in the pure ego as the Träger
of its full experiential content41; (2) in the finite person as the carrier of its individuality42;
(3) in the form of the “thing” as the Träger of its full contents43; and (4) in the most
general frame (Fassung) of the being as such—the “object” or the “something”—as the
Träger of the quid and of Being.44
In the divine Being, Edith Stein says, we see the archetype of the different
carrying forms (Trägerformen), but as has been true with respect to each of the
archetypes, an infinite distance separates the archetype and its images. Despite this
infinite distance, the meaning of the carrier in the image is nevertheless determined by
the meaning of the carrier in the archetype. The meaning of person as carrier in respect to
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finite beings must be understood in terms of the meaning of person as carrier with respect
to divine Being, which has been shown to be the empty form of essential fullness.
Person and spirit
In order to gain further insight into Being-person as such, Edith Stein turns to an
investigation of the essence of spirit/intellect (Geist). This move is required because
divine Being has been found to be spiritual/intellectual Being. Thus, if the divine Being is
three-personed Being, then Being-person must be spiritual/intellectual Being. Edith Stein
affirms that, “[w]hen the person was called the carrier of a rational nature, this indicated
the claim that it, too, is of a spiritual/intellectual nature. “Geist” and “Vernuft” (spirit
and reason) seem to belong together inseparably.”45
Geist has been characterized in a number of ways. It is non-spatial and
immaterial. It contains “interiority” in a completely non-spatial sense. It “remains within
itself” while going out of itself. This “going-out-of-itself” in turn pertains to it essentially:
it is completely “self-less,” not as if it has no self, but because it gives up itself entirely
without losing itself, and in this surrender is completely revealed—in contrast to the
concealment of the soul.46
Geist in its purest form is found in the total self-giving of the divine persons, in
which each person gives himself completely while remaining fully himself.47 The triune
deity is the authentic “realm of the spirit” and the “supernatural” as such. Thus Edith

45

ESG 307/FEB 360.

46

ESG 307-308/FEB 360.

47

I have retained the masculine pronouns that Edith Stein uses because she uses them and
because the use of a neuter pronoun tends to mask the personal Being of the divine Spirit.

140

Stein says that all spirituality or spiritual endowment of creatures means an “elevation” to
this realm.48
All other basic forms of Being have their primordial archetype in the realm of
spirit as well. “Bodily” Being indicates a being that owns its essence in a “born-out”
shape. In this sense, Edith Stein says that we can say that God also has a body—a
spiritual body—because he owns the fullness of his essence in a fully actualized, manifest
shape, which, though infinite, is fully enclosed with and by God’s own self. In addition,
that which pertains to the soul, understood as the “creative principle” or “source of life,”
also finds its archetype in divine Being, which is divine life eternally drawn from the
source of its own self and from its own depth. Divine Being is not only life, but the life
according to which all earthly life is but a remote image.49
Edith Stein thus suggests that there is an intimate connection between the three
divine persons and the three basic forms of real Being. To the Father, the primordial
creator, she says, corresponds the Being of the soul. To the Son corresponds all bodily
Being. And to the Spirit corresponds everything that may be called spirit/intellect.
Spirituality and personality are interrelated. The person is the carrier of a rational
(and thus spiritual/intellectual) nature. As the carrier of a rational nature, the person is
distinguished from the hypostasis which is the general essence-carrier (Wesensträger) in
a wider sense.
The ego is the carrier of its life. It is that from which inner life emanates and it is
that which lives in this life and experiences this life as its own. It is apparent that this
48
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carrying is different from that in which a thing is said to carry an essence. The ego is not
only the carrier of life, but the carrying itself is its life. To this life pertains beinginwardly-aware of itself. This awareness is not necessarily self-knowledge (in the
restricted sense of conceptual knowledge), nor necessarily a consciousness of the kind
that generates conceptual knowledge. This inner awareness is not yet understanding.
Understanding indicates the comprehension of an inner lawfulness of Being. A creature is
called rational when it can understand the lawfulness of its own Being and act
accordingly. This requires the gift of understanding (ratio) and the gift of freedom
(liberum arbitrium; Freiheit) which is the gift of molding one’s actions out of one’s own
self.50 Thus, Edith Stein concludes that every finite person must be an ego, but not every
ego need be a person. The inner awareness that belongs to the ego is implied in the gift of
intelligence.
God is person in the most eminent sense. God molds his life in absolute freedom
and is light through and through (God is he who from whom nothing is hidden). Because
personal life is going out of oneself and simultaneously be-ing and abiding in oneself,
and because both of these characteristics pertain to the essence of spirit, Edith Stein
concludes that personal Being must always be spiritual/intellectual Being.51
Human Being-Person
We have seen that the person is the carrier of its life. In God, there is no
distinction between life and essence. In human persons this is not the case. How, then,
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can the understanding of the divine persons inform an understanding of human personal
Being?
When we speak of the nature of humans, we are speaking of the essence of Beinghuman as such. This includes Being-person. If person is the carrier of the essence “Beinghuman,” Edith Stein asks (1) what pertains to Being-human, and (2) what does the
“carrying” of this essence entail.
Human beings as body, soul, spirit
First, Edith Stein affirms that to Being-human pertains a composite of body, soul,
and spirit. That Being-human involves a body seems the most obvious of the three. That
Being-human involves a spirit/intellect also seems apparent, but involves the denial of
materialism. Of the three, Being-human as soul is the most difficult to understand and to
appreciate. Edith Stein undertakes a careful investigation of the meaning of Being-human
as soul.
Being-human, she says, involves a spiritual life, which like all spiritual life, is a
going-out into the world while retaining a firm hold upon oneself. The human spirit, as
personal-Being, however, is conditioned in two ways. It carries and encloses its body and
its soul, but is at the same time carried and enclosed by both of them. Edith Stein says
that the spiritual life of the human being rises from the dark ground of the soul. It emits
light, but is not light through and through. Unlike the divine spirit, it is not transparent to
itself. It knows its present life, its conscious life, but this is not equivalent to its Being:
rather, “it resembles the exposed surface of a dark depth; [and] it is by this surface that
we try to penetrate these dark depths.”52
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In Being-human we find that we experience not only conscious ego-life, but also
something out of which ego-life arises. Edith Stein uses the example of a feeling of
“dullness” in trying to solve a difficult problem. The experience of dullness is not the
same as the conscious experience of thinking. The experience of dullness is a sort of
“inner perception,” which differs completely from consciousness, but is nevertheless a
part of ego-life. The inner perception includes a perception of “a thing-like something,”
which has certain enduring properties, such as mental gifts and emotional states, but also
has passing feelings or moods, such as the feeling of dullness. This something is subject
to external influences, but in turn effectively transcends its own inner world into outer
action. She notes that the fact that I feel dull-witted today indicates that this is a passing
condition of something, but not an unchanging quality of that something. And the fact
that this dullness feels like a heavy fog weighing upon my head, she says, opens up
questions about the relation of the body and the soul.53
In order to answer questions about the relation of the body and the soul, Edith
Stein turns to consideration of the living body. That which distinguishes a living body
from a corpse, she says, is what is called the soul. Wherever there is a living body there is
a soul, and wherever there is a soul, there is (or was) a body. Death, which is the
separation of body and soul, is the severance of this natural unity and does not destroy the
connection between the two.54 By this she reinforces her position that the soul is the “soul
of,” i.e., the form of, a body.
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A spiritual essence (Geistwesen), says Edith Stein, without a body is a pure spirit,
not a soul. The soul is the life principle of living material composite things. Thus it is
proper to speak of the bodies and souls of plants and animals, she says, as well as the
bodies and souls of human beings. It is not proper, however, to speak of the souls of
angels.
Thomas, following Aristotle, designated the soul to be the essential form
(Wesensform)55 of all animate beings (alles Lebendige). Aristotle and Thomas
distinguished different grades of the forms of animate beings depending upon whether the
forms include an inner life, and whether this inner life is merely sensory or is also
spiritual/intellectual. Thus Thomas, following Aristotle, distinguished vegetative,
sentient, and intellectual souls. The higher souls fulfill the functions of the lowers ones
while adding their own specific function. Thus, the rational soul is all that the sentient
soul is and does together with the added power of reason.56 Edith Stein suggests that
living souls are the forms of living beings, in a way that is similar, but not the same as the
way that informed matter is found in purely material structures. But the purely material
structures are “finished” in a way that living beings are not.
To be sure, material structures are capable of “becoming” in a certain sense, but
not as the result of developing and transforming themselves as is true in living beings.
The exception, which Edith Stein points to as a kind of bridge between inanimate and
animate beings, is the process of crystallization. In crystallization there is a process of
55

Sarah Borden Sharkey translates Wesensform with “substantial form.” See her
discussion of this choice at “Principles of Individuality,” in Thine Own Self, 104, fn. 2.
56

Edith Stein’s discussion of the relation between the various forms of animate
and inanimate Being, based in large part on the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, is
fascinating, but outside the scope of this paper. See ESG/FEB Chapter IV, especially the
concluding summary in section 5.
145

becoming that is not simply the result of external forces. Nevertheless, even crystals are
at some point “finished” in a way that living beings never are. Living Being is a continual
forming. A living being is a being that forms itself continuously, while being determined
and determinable with respect to itself. The determining element is the form, while that
which is being formed is the matter. The whole living being is generated and produced,
but it is also efficacious and determinative in a way that is quasi-creative. Edith Stein
says that with respect to undeveloped living beings, it is appropriate to speak of a
potential potentiality. The undeveloped living being, for example, may not have the
capability of sight, but it is capable of acquiring that capability.57
With respect to material beings it is appropriate to use the term substance, which
indicates a “self-standing (i.e., independent) and autonomous real being” (selbständiges
und selbsteigenes Wirkliches). This is a being that has its own essence and Being. Its
Being is the self-effecting (Sichauswirken) of an essential form (Wesensform). It is the
unfolding (Entfaltung) of an effective essence, the realization of possibilities grounded in
the essence (in which are included temporality and the “power of Being-independent”
(“Macht zum eigenen Sein”).58 In the case of matter (Stoff), this means self-unfolding
into space. In material structures, the form is unfolded in such a way that it is dispersed
throughout and is coextensive with the particular structure. In other words, a piece of
rock may be struck off, with both pieces remaining rock.
In the case of living beings, on the other hand, we find a “center” or soul, from
which Being emanates and unfolds. In the case of a living being, such as an animal, if a
57
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part is struck off, generally only one of the parts remains the living being. The other—a
separated limb, for example, dies.
With respect to human beings, this center is a personal soul. In all cases of living
beings, the soul is the potent efficacious principle out of which the being is formed. It
bears within itself the power of being. But in the human being, this center is personal, and
therefore responsible for its being in a completely different way.
Inanimate things and animate beings are examples of material composite
structures. Both inanimate things and animate beings are material. Of a different genera
altogether, however, is spirit/intellect. Edith Stein asserts that matter and spirit represent
two different realms of actuality and that neither can be reduced to the other.59
In the human being are found body, soul, and spirit. Edith Stein says that these are
not three genera of actuality, but three forms of actual Being. The form “body,” is that
which maintains itself as a self-enclosed structure; the form “spirit” is that which freely
gives and diffuses itself; the form “soul” is that which tends toward formation. Material
elements as such, she says, tend toward the form “body.” Spirits/intellects tend toward
the form “spirit” (or mind). The soul-principle, she says, does not tend toward a third
kind of fullness, but rather is either a material or spiritual/intellectual form.
Living beings represent the formation of a material body out of a material soulprinciple. Human beings are a distinct type of living being whose soul is both material
and spiritual/intellectual. The bodies of human beings are formed just as every other
living body is formed, but the minds of human beings are personally formed by the
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spiritual/intellectual soul, which is not a second soul, but a particular faculty or power of
the human soul.
In the case of material structures, the essence is rooted in the material-shaping
essential form (Wesensform). 60 If these structures are purely material, then form and
matter cannot be separated. In that case, the essence is the determined nature or formed
materiality; the matter (Stoff) is always peculiarly formed and is inconceivable without
form.
In the case of living beings, form and matter are separable. The form is a “living
form” or “soul.” It has the power to form the whole in a peculiar manner and to enliven it.
Its being is life, and life is the progressive material formation and thus a progressive
realization of the essence, consisting in the peculiar formation of the matter.61 Edith Stein
explains that:
The distinctive peculiarity of living forms over lifeless forms is their
supra-material power which is able to combine a manifold of already
existing material structures and reshape and form them into a structured
whole, and which continues to receive and form the structured whole in
the perpetual process of metabolism. Its Being is life, and life is the
formation of matter in three stages: transformation of anabolic material
elements, self-formation, and reproduction.62
The life that Edith Stein described as the life of living material structures she says is
distinct from the life of pure spirits. Matter-bound life is the coming to be of a being; it is
the gaining possession of an essence on its way to full possession of the self.
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Spiritual/intellectual life is “essential unfolding” as the activation of something
completed/perfected in its essence (eines in seiner Wesensart Vollendeten). These are two
meanings of life, both of which have in common the idea of autonomous movement. The
“matter-bound” life is a movement toward or on the way to the self, while the spiritual
life is a movement out of the self; it is a giving of the self without losing the self. Both of
these, says Edith Stein, are images of the divine life.63 Both of these are present in the
human being.
Conscious life
In the human person, inner life has become conscious. Edith Stein says the “I” has
been awakened, and is able to “see” both inwardly and outwardly. It is able to respond to
the multitude of its experiences in personal freedom. Because the human “I” is able to do
this, it is a spiritual/intellectual person; it is the carrier of its own life in the preeminent
sense of “having-itself-in-hand.”64 But human beings are nevertheless sentient beings,
and do not enjoy the complete freedom of pure spirits/intellects. In many ways, she says,
they abandon themselves to the pressures and forces of internal and external events.65
In contrast, created pure spirits are limited in their freedom only in that they are
not the source of their own Being. They receive their Being over the course of their
existence as an ever-renewed gift, but their Being is personal Being in the full sense.
Their Being is characterized by “blissful joy in knowing, loving, and serving, that is a
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simultaneous receiving and accepting, a free self-giving of this gift of life.”66 As fullness
of personal Being, the life of the created pure spirits provides a model of Being for
human beings.
It is the soul of the human being that is the mediator between pure spiritual Being
and pure bodily Being. It is in the human soul that spiritual and bodily Being meet. This
intertwining of spirit and body is what distinguishes the sentient soul from the spiritual
soul, and the spiritual soul from pure spirit. Human beings are neither brute animals nor
angels, but are both in one. Human beings feel what happens to and in their bodies, but
their feeling is a conscious experience that is ordained to passing over into an
understanding apperception. This understanding apperception is a kind of knowledge and
thus a spiritual activity in which knowing is confronted with the known. In a certain
sense, the “I” disengages from the body, and is able to rise above the body’s corporeality
and sensuality in personal freedom, while at the same time remaining rooted in the body.
The human spirit is capable of taking a stand on a higher ground and gaining mastery of
the lower Being of the life of sense. The “I” is able to determine the content and direction
of its own Being, and thus, in a certain sense, of generating its own life, but not in an
unconditional way. It is not the creator of its own self, but receives its life and freedom as
a gift. Nevertheless, its free acts retain the characteristic of self-engagement which is the
most authentic form of personal life.67
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I, soul, spirit, person
I, soul, spirit, and person are interrelated terms, but each has a special meaning.
The “I” is neither equivalent to the soul or the body, but “dwells” in the body and soul.
The name “I” is applied to the whole human being, but not all bodily life is ego-life. A
great deal of the unfolding and formation of the soul takes place without our being
consciously aware of them. Within the soul, there lies a “hidden life,” says Edith Stein,
which only occasionally manifests itself. The conscious life of the ego is the entrance to
the hidden life of the soul, just as the life of the sense is the entrance to the body and its
hidden life. The ego-life is the entrance to the soul because it is the manifestation of that
which takes place in the soul and is the actualization of the soul’s essence.
Every human being comes to know him or herself through the mere fact of living,
without having to make the self an object of observation or attempting to gain selfknowledge through introspection. But it is possible to turn primordial consciousness into
self-apperception by rising above the original experience and turning it into an object. In
this experience, the “I” beholds the soul as a thing-like substance with enduring
properties, faculties and powers, and changing conditions and activities. In this way, the
“I” envisions its own self, for it recognizes itself as the carrier of its own experiences, as
that which performs acts and receives impressions.
The human person is a conscious and free “I.” It determines its life out of its own
self in a conscious and free act. In its free acts, the person not only exercises dominion
over its body and soul, but also upon the surrounding world because of the efficacy of its
soul-body. Edith Stein says that the person is the carrier that stands behind and above the
soul-body; it is the comprehensive form of this fullness.
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The human person resembles pure spirit in its free and conscious mode of life, a
life which encompasses and carries its own fullness; but the human person lags behind
pure spirit in that it arises from and is carried by the dark ground of its soul. It is
incapable of personally forming, illumining, and governing the totality of its “self.” The
human soul is a spiritual creature, but it differs from pure spirit in that it is bound to
matter. It is the form of the human body. It is not merely the form of the body by virtue of
its lower powers, as is true of the vegetative and sentient souls. It is rather the form by
virtue of its unified essence, which includes the higher powers which distinguish the
human soul from those other souls and place it in close proximity to pure spirits.68
The status of the spiritual soul in the human being was a problem that Edith Stein
returned to in the second appendix to Finite and Eternal Being, where she laments the
loss of appreciation for and study of the soul in the nineteenth century and commends the
contribution that could be made to this effort by a study of the writings of the mystics,
such as Teresa.69 In the The Science of the Cross, there is also a section devoted to the
Soul, the “I”, and Freedom.70
In this section, we have begun to see how Edith Stein describes the place of the
human Being-person between sentient beings and pure spirits. In the next section, we will
take up portions of Edith Stein’s discussion of the specific image relation between the
human Being-person and divine Being. This, of course, was central to her overall project
of ascending to the meaning of Being.
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The Image of God in Human Beings
In Chapter VII, Section 9 of Finite and Eternal Being Edith Stein provides what is
perhaps the most valuable of her investigations. In this section, she discusses ways of
discovering the image of God in human beings.
The human soul compared to lower forms and pure spirits
Edith Stein describes all forms of corporeal structures as a stage in the transition
from personal spirit to space-filling matter. These forms are ways in which spirit forms
itself into space. These forms are the products of spirit and are arranged in an ascending
scale from lower to higher as they bear within themselves more of the nature of spirit. In
the animal soul, where there is found an individual life, a preliminary stage of spiritual
life is attained. Where the individual life of the soul receives a personal formation, the
spirit is fully marked and expressed. The human soul, however, is not a mean between
spirit and matter, but is a spiritual creature: it is not only a formed structure of the spirit,
but a forming spirit.71 It nevertheless differs from pure spirit in that it is the form of the
body and thus forms itself into space like the lower forms. Its spirituality is tied to matter
and its spiritual life rises from a hidden ground. Thus it differs both from the lower forms
and the higher spirits.
The forming of bodies and souls in both animals and human beings Edith Stein
notes, takes place initially in an involuntary manner. This involuntary manner continues
throughout life, but is supplemented by habituation when education begins. The
education of the child is like the training of an animal. It is an intermediary stage between
involuntary formation and fully personal formation. Fully personal formation occurs only
71
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with the inception of genuine spiritual/intellectual life, i.e., when the “I” awakens and
acquires consciousness of itself. This consciousness may pass over into genuine
understanding of the person’s own life as well as of the meaning encountered in the
external world. Thus, personal formation occurs when the “I’ learns to determine itself.
The “I” dwells in the soul. The human soul is like the pure spirit in that it is
conscious or can become conscious, but the human soul differs from the pure spirit in that
its free modes of expression are not coextensive with the soul, but rather exert an
influence over something that is in the process of evolution. The pure spirit, on the other
hand, receives a fully-formed essence. This fully-formed essence unfolds, but does not
undergo change (except in the case of the fallen angels). The human soul must gradually
gain possession of its essence and its life leads to that goal. This is why, suggests Edith
Stein, it is proper to speak of formation of the human soul. The formation of the human
soul differs from the formation of a merely sentient soul because the human soul is freely
formed. It has self-knowledge and is capable of “taking a stand” with respect to its own
self. The human soul must “find itself” in a dual sense: it must come to know itself and it
must come to be what it is destined to be.72
Stages of self-knowledge
Edith Stein has said that human soul must come to know itself. Self-knowledge,
she says, has multiple forms. The most primitive of these is the form associated with the
life of the ego. The ego is conscious of its “self” and its “life,” but not as objects. The
ego’s knowledge of itself (or perhaps mere awareness of itself) is simply given in
consciousness. But Edith Stein says that even this Being-conscious implies a
72
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transcending of the sphere of pure ego, for the “I” experiences its vital impulses and
activities as rising from a dark ground. This is the soul, from which all human spiritual
life arises. In ego-life, the soul attains the “daylight” of consciousness. It reveals itself as
soul-life and as spiritual-life. The soul is wider, if you will, than the pure-ego. Edith Stein
says that, “[i]t is a space which the ego is able to traverse, but unable to fill.”73 The
personal ego belongs to the human soul, but at the same time, it is in the life of the ego,
that the soul becomes living and conscious.
As a result of the dark depths of the soul, self-knowledge is a process in which the
ego increasingly takes possession of its soul. The primordial consciousness, which is
simply given, may pass over into free cognitive activity. There may arise a new
experiential unit—the comprehending grasp. This comprehending grasp is the first step in
the acquisition of knowledge in the genuine sense of that term. It is the first step in
establishing what the known object is—in grasping and conceptualizing the known
object. I may turn this comprehending grasp upon a particular experience, e.g., joy, or I
may turn it upon the “previously hidden depth illumined in my experience.”74 If I do, I
come to know things about myself that were not previously known. I come to know
“what sort of human being I am.”75
Edith Stein suggests that this turning inward can take two forms: (1) It can be the
turning toward the self as to an object, observing, verifying, examining, which is called
inner apperception; or (2) It can be the primordial and genuine experience of myself as
73

ESG 366/FEB 431.

74

ESG 364/FEB 432.

75

ESG 364/FEB 432.

155

subject in the innermost depths of the soul as in an “interior castle.”76 If it descends to
this depth, the ego fully encompasses itself with personal and transforming power.
The essence, the powers, and the life of the soul
The soul as a whole is the essential form (Wesensform) of the body. Even in the
animal soul, however, we have seen that the soul is something that has been formed, and
bears its form within itself:
The essence of the soul is that which forms its powers and life, and this
formation is based on [the fact] that in the essence itself, as has been said,
“meaning” (Sinn) and “power” (Kraft) are to be distinguished: the
meaning is the target form (Zielgestalt) to which the soul is ordained by its
essential determinateness (Wesensbestimmtheit); the power or Beingmight (Seinesmacht) is given to the soul in order for it to become what it
should be. The power unfolds in the life of the soul (‘life’ in the threefold
sense of the body-form, the inner soul, and the conscious ego-life). The
ego-life is in turn molded, i.e., filled with meaning.77
The ego-life receives its meaningful determinateness (Sinnbestimmtheit) through the
interaction of the essence of the soul with the external world and ultimately with God.
The life of the ego receives impressions, processes them, and responds to them. In this
way the unity of its stream of experiences is articulated into self-enclosed experiential
units. In accordance with its basic trends of receiving, processing, and responding, the
one power of the soul forms itself into a plurality of differentiated powers or potencies:
cognitive powers that are ordained to receiving, internal powers that are ordained to
retaining and processing, and powers of the will that are ordained to responding. These
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last, known in scholastic terminology as appetitive powers, are divided into the sense
appetite and the will.78
In the human soul as in the essential forms of lower animate beings, the
full measure of their essence is not present from the beginning, but must be acquired over
time through development and growth. The soul not only consumes power but is the
source of power. In the process of building up the body, the power of the soul is
replenished by the growing body. The soul also receives power through the influence of
the trans-objective world—spiritual reality—that becomes accessible in ego-life. The soul
is nourished through the meaning that it encounters in the world.79
The interiority of the soul
The cognitive powers exercise external functions and service in the castle of the
soul. They admit or draw in the things of the external world. The cognitive powers are
divided into sense and reason. Both sense perception and intellectual knowledge are
experiential units. The passing of the experiential units does not, however, mean that their
content is lost.
Meaningful content is retained in the retentive power of memory. It is retained
and can be brought back from time to time as memory or as part of knowledge and
experience. How long something is retained in memory depends upon how deeply it
originally penetrated.
Some types of intellectual activity leave the soul virtually untouched. In others,
the entire human being is engaged. This level of engagement is even expressed in
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external appearance—in the heart rate, respiration, sleep, and digestion. In this instance
we speak of “thinking with the heart.” We think of the heart as the center of the soul, as
the place where the connection between body and soul is felt.
In its innermost being the essence of the soul is broken open to itself. It
experiences in some measure the meaning of its being and feels its collected power.
When the ego’s life issues from this interiority, it lives a full life and attains the height of
its being. It may receive contents from without that penetrate to this very interiority and
become a source of strength to the soul. Conversely, it may receive contents that threaten
and devour the soul’s life, which the soul must resist with all its strength. The soul’s
response may be involuntary or voluntary. Things may penetrate to the interiority of the
soul such as to appeal to the person, who is able to understand what is happening, reflect
upon it in order to search out its meaning, and respond in freedom.
The personal spiritual life is integrated into the larger context of meaning. Edith
Stein asserts that every meaning understood calls for a corresponding attitude and
behavior in the person. This being-moved by something and moving-toward a meaningful
attitude and behavior is called motivation.80 What takes place, says Edith Stein, is not
what occurs in the process of cause and effect, but in the process of call and response.
The person is not “forced” to respond in a particular way by what approaches it. Even
when it is moved to an involuntary attitude of response, it need not allow itself simply to
“drift,” but is able to “’take a stand” with respect to its own position. The person is able
to use its power of reason to clarify its position, to discover the way that it ought to
behave, and to engage its personal power to freely pursue the required course.
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The personal “I” is most truly at home, says Edith Stein, in the innermost essence
of its soul. When the “I” lives in this interiority, it is able to freely dispose of and freely
engage the soul’s collected power. In this interiority, the “I” is closest to the meaning of
every event, most open to the demands with which it is confronted, and best able to
evaluate the significance and importance of these demands.81
Few human beings live such recollected lives, however. For most of them, the ego
takes its stand on the surface. It is occasionally shaken to its depths by an event, but
quickly returns to surface living after the extraordinary event is over. It is only those who
live a recollected life, says Edith Stein, who are able to see even the “little things” in their
larger context. They are the only persons capable of evaluating these little things
correctly and ordering and regulating their lives accordingly. Their souls are on their way
to ultimate formation and fullness of Being.
Some human beings never attain the ultimate depth of their Being. Some do not
even attain an anticipatory knowledge of the meaning of personal Being. Others come to
this knowledge as the result of crucial events in their personal lives, or by rational
argument and doctrinal instruction, or by a doctrine of religious faith that appeals to the
soul, calling it to enter into itself and to mold the human life from its center.
This innermost center of the soul, says Edith Stein, is the most spiritual part of the
soul. The Being of this spiritual soul may be detached from all sensibility and
corporeality. Edith Stein says that we are able to conceive of an inner life of the soul that
persists even in separation from the body and after the cessation of all sense impressions.
This is the way in which we envisage the life of the soul after death and prior to the
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resurrection of the body, and is also the manner of the life of the soul in ecstasy according
to the mystics.82
Edith Stein says that from the innermost center of the soul radiates the personal
essence. This radiation, which issues from the person and captivates other persons, is the
stronger the more recollectedly the person lives in the innermost center of the soul. The
more this is so, the more strongly marked are the manifestations of the person’s
individuality, since this individuality has its home at the center of the soul. Moreover, the
more a human being is at home in the innermost part of his soul, the stronger is her body
impregnated with her inner life and “spiritualized” by it. This, the “interior castle,” is thus
the true center of body, soul, and spirit.
As a mystic herself, Edith Stein is able to affirm that when the soul exists without
receiving external impressions or without preoccupation with its memory, it is completely
open to itself. It feels or experiences what it is and what state or condition it is in. This
does not mean that it is able to know itself as it is known, however.83 This feeling is a
spiritual experience; it is not intellectual knowledge which is capable of being reduced to
concepts or expressed verbally. A similar experience is present when the person’s actions
are guided by its conscience, which reveals the roots of these deeds in the depth of the
soul. Conscience, she says, relates the “I” to its depth. It recalls the “I” again and again to
its proper place and condition, and demands that the “I” answer for its actions. All actions
leave their trace in the soul, which is different before and after its act.
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The soul is something in and by itself. Its quid has been placed into the world by
God. The specific quality of this quid impresses its stamp upon the entire life in which
the individual quid unfolds. The soul in its interiority knows what it is and how it is. This
is the dark feeling that cannot be expressed in words, but indicates to the soul the mystery
of its Being. The soul bears in its quid the determination of what it is to become—by
virtue of what it receives and what it does. The soul feels whether what is received into it
is compatible with and beneficial for its own Being.84
The conscious life of the soul in the depth of its interiority is possible only after
spiritual/intellectual life has been awakened. At the time of the awakening of reason, the
soul already bears the stamp of what has happened in and to it. The soul is not capable of
comprehending itself from the very beginning of its existence, nor of understanding its
precise condition from the beginning. Its natural life is from the beginning directed out to
the natural world. That is why the natural direction of the soul-life is a going-out-of-itself
rather than a turning-into-itself. The life of the soul must be drawn into itself, and this,
according to Edith Stein, is brought about by the demands placed upon the soul and by
the voice of conscience.85
The ego, when it turns in upon itself, severs all links with the outside world. It
finds there ample material for consideration, reflection, and discussion. For many people,
says Edith Stein, their “own ego” becomes more fascinating than the rest of the world.
That which is taken hold of in inner perception and observation are (1) the forces and
faculties that are intended to serve human activities in the world; and (2) the results of
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such activities.86 This, she says, is not the true interiority of the soul, but merely the
residue of the original life of the soul.
When human beings actually withdraw from all surface activities, says Edith
Stein, they find not nothing, but an unaccustomed emptiness and quiet. Listening to
“one’s own heartbeat,” says Edith Stein, will not satisfy one long unless the ego is held
fast by something else. The interiority of the soul longs to be filled with something more
than the external world. This is what the masters of the inner life look toward. The
masters of the inner life long to break through to the innermost center of their being. St
Augustine wrote: ‘“If thou seekest an exalted place, a sacred place, then offer Good this
inner life as a temple. “For the temple of God is holy, and thou are his temple.” With thou
pray in the temple? Then pray within thine own self. But before thou doest, thou shouldst
be a temple of God, for in his temple he listens to the one who prays.’ And again: ‘Call
me back from my errant ways. Be thou my guide, and I shall return into myself and into
thee.’”87 Edith Stein, who of course was herself a mystic, explains:
Mystical grace gives as experience what faith teaches: the indwelling of
God in the soul. Those who, guided by the truth of faith, seek God, will by
free effort enter into the level where the mystical grace is drawn: they will
withdraw from the senses and the “images” of memory and from the
natural activities of the mind, and will retire into the solitude of the empty
interior, to stay there in dark faith—in a simple upward glance of the spirit
to the hidden God, who is presently veiled. Here the soul is in deep
peace—because it is at its place of rest—here it remains until it pleases the
Lord to transform faith into vision. This, in outline, is the Ascent to Mount
Carmel as taught by our Holy Father St. John of the Cross.88

86

ESG 373/FEB 443.

87

ESG 373/FEB 443-444; quoting Augustine, In Johannine 15, 25 (Przywara, Analogia
entis, p. 135; Augustine, Soliliquia, II 6, 9 (Przywara, Analogia entis, p. 135).
88

ESG 373-74/FEB 444.

162

In the preceding comments, Edith Stein has given a phenomenological description of her
own inner life. This material is an extremely valuable addition to the literature concerning
mystical experience. In this way, she provides one way of confirming the indwelling of
God in the human soul.
Capability, obligation, and the inner life
In addition to the mystical way, Edith Stein explores another way of access to the
indwelling of God in the human soul. This way is provided on the basis of the experience
that a person has of what he can do and ought to do. Edith Stein does attempt here to fully
develop an ethics based upon her investigations, but she does give indications of what
such an ethics might entail. In this section we see her moving far beyond the attempt of
Immanuel Kant to found ethics on the sense of duty.
Edith Stein gives the example of a physician who receives a call when he feels
that it is beyond his power to comply because of the day’s work that he has already given.
This perception of inability, she says, does not silence the demand. When a human life is
at stake, the physician may tell himself that he can because he ought. It is possible that
the demand really does exceed his natural capacity. When the physician finds that he is
able to respond, notwithstanding his weakness, he also learns that the source for the
additional strength required to respond lies outside his own nature. Through faith, he
knows that the source of this strength must be sought in God.89
God demands nothing of human beings, says Edith Stein, without at the same
time giving them the power to comply with the demand. This, she says, is what faith
teaches and this is what is confirmed in the experiences of the life of faith. The innermost
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being of the soul, she says, is like a vessel into which flows the spirit of God (i.e., the life
of grace) if the soul will but open itself to this spirit. This spirit of God is meaning and
power. God gives the soul a new life that makes it capable of doing things that by its own
nature it would be incapable of doing. Simultaneously, the spirit of God gives direction to
the soul’s activity. In the last analysis, says Edith Stein, every meaningful demand which
is made upon the soul with obligatory force is the word of God. For there is no meaning,
she says, that does not have its eternal home in the 7`(@H. And anyone who willingly
receives such a word of God simultaneously receives the divine power to comply with the
demand.90
Moreover, every increase in grace leads to a strengthening of the human being’s
spiritual being and opens up the soul to a richer and more penetrating insight into the
divine word, into the supernatural meaning that underlies every event and that becomes
articulate in the soul as an “inspiration.” This is why a soul which, by virtue of its
freedom, leans upon the spirit of God or upon the life of grace is capable of total
renovation and transformation. Its free activity, borne and sustained by the life of grace,
wields power over all the involuntary acts of the soul.91
Edith Stein gives one example of the cooperation of nature, freedom, and grace in
the forming of the soul, and that is the example of the soul’s ability to overcome its initial
feelings of aversion to a person. Her claim is that “nothing is freer than love” and that
“love is the height of freedom.”92 From the natural point of view, she says, this seems
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impossible. The soul seems to respond involuntarily to its first impression of a person. It
may respond with affection, with aversion, or with indifference, but it feels as if it’s
response is involuntary. It feels itself either attracted and repelled. Yet, says Edith Stein,
in these feelings there is ample room for delusion. Outward appearances may hide the
true Being of a person and thus veil the significance that one person has for another.
Natural inclinations and aversions must be examined and tested with the aid of reason,
and judgments formed by reason must be influenced by the will. The free play of
attraction and aversion, she says, is subject to the divine commandment: “you shall love
your neighbor as yourself.” This commandment is valid unconditionally and without
qualification. The neighbor is not the one I “like,” she says, but each and every human
being with whom I come in contact, without exception. Thus it is said that, “you can, for
you shall.” God demands it, and God does not demand the impossible. He rather makes
possible what would be naturally impossible.93
The saints who resolve to practice heroic love of their enemies, she says,
experienced this freedom of love. The natural aversion that they may feel with respect to
a particular person does not overcome their basic attitude of love. Their acts, which are
inspired and guided by supernatural love, bear this out. The divine life that fills their soul
quod nil tam liberum quam amare, et quanto amor maior, tanto liberior quanto magis liberum,
tanto minus necessarium necessitate coactionis. (It is certain that nothing is so free as love, and
the greater the love, the freer [the love], the freer the loving, the less need for coercion.). This is
the only direct reference to a work of Duns Scotus that appears in Finite and Eternal Being. For
other ideas, Edith Stein appears to have relied upon Gallus Manser, Das Wesen des Thomismus,
2d ed. (Freiburg, Switzerland: Paulus Verlag, 1935). See ESG 265, fn. 63/FEB 592, n. 61. Scotus
proposed that the divine will precedes divine knowledge. Thomas proposed the opposite. Thomas
said that the divine ideas and divine nature are the ultimate principle of the essence of things.
Edith Stein asserts that love is what is most fundamental and is that from which will and
knowledge proceed. See ESG 265, 380/FEB 307, 452.
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is a superior force. The one who does God’s will learns to know God himself. For by
doing what God demands of us with total surrender of our innermost being, we cause the
divine life to become our own inner life.94
When the soul has been filled with divine life, says Edith Stein, it has become an
image of the triune God in a new sense, in a higher sense than other creatures are, and in
a sense that makes it superior even to its own (natural) nature.
The image of God in the soul and in the total human being
Edith Stein explains that in the lower creatures the similitude between the divine
archetype is seen primarily on the side of form, rather than matter. This is so because
matter, in the dual sense of that which fills space and of the determinable indeterminate,
is wholly other with respect to God. It is only as formed matter that matter partakes of the
Godlikeness of created beings. Yet matter cannot be dispensed with for two reasons: (1)
as formed matter it is a symbol; and (2) the whole (the composite of form and matter) is
that which stands upon itself (i.e., @ÛF\" or substance). Edith Stein says that as @ÛF\",
this whole is an image of the primordial existent or of the Father, and that as a whole
filled with meaning and power, it is an image of the triune Deity.
Ascending from lower to higher forms, one arrives at the human soul. If we
regard the soul as the form of the body (as we must), Edith Stein says that we must seek
the divine image in the total human being, for it is the unified whole that has been placed
into existence and is an autonomous being. And it is the soul which makes this totality
meaningful and alive. Because the soul has neither its only nor its true Being in the
informing of the body (since the soul is capable of living independently in separation
94
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from the body), however, the soul in and by itself, she says, may also be regarded as an
image of the triune God. As a personal/spiritual essence it stands upon itself, is filled with
meaning and power, and forms itself in accordance with its meaning.95
The image of God in the natural spiritual life of human beings
Moving from the discussion of the image of God in the human soul to the image
of God in the natural spiritual life of the human being, Edith Stein draws upon Fr.
Przywara’s comments upon the work of Augustine. Based upon this reading, she asserts
that the natural spiritual/intellectual life of human beings must be regarded as threefold
and thus as an image of the divine Trinity.
Augustine designates the following dimensions of the human intellect as both
three and one: (1) love as such; (2) mind, love, and knowledge; and (3) memory, intellect,
and will.96
Love as such. Augustine starts his discussion from the human being, who is an
image of God. When the human being loves anything, three things are concerned: a lover,
the beloved, and love as such. Augustine suggests that this is true when the one loved is
the lover himself. For the created mind cannot love itself without knowing itself. It knows
itself by itself, because this is the way in which it knows incorporeal things. It knows
corporeal things through the senses and incorporeal things through itself. Therefore, says,
Augustine, it knows itself, which is an incorporeal thing, through itself.97
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Mind, love, knowledge. There are two things when the mind loves itself, mind and
the love of it, and two things when the mind knows itself, mind and knowledge of it.
Therefore, says Augustine, there are found three things: the mind itself, the love of it, and
the knowledge of it, and these three are one thing. When these three are perfect, he says,
they are equal, i.e., in proper proportion. When this is true, then these three, mind, love,
and knowledge are one, and are thus an image of the divine Trinity.98
Self-knowledge, says Augustine, is an image of the generation of the Son.99 Selfknowledge is born of the mind as the Son is born of the Father. The Son is known by the
Father before the Son knows himself, and he acquires knowledge of himself as the result
of inquiring and learning. The desire to know, however, pertains to the will. In this way,
love precedes knowledge. Edith Stein thus affirms that knowledge is generated by love,
but love itself is not generated. Rather, she says, when the mind knows and loves itself, it
receives knowledge (the word) as a gift from love: “Love is in the word, the word is in
love, and both are in the one who loves and speaks.”100 In its own self-knowledge, the
mind is an image of the Trinity.
Memory, intellect, will. In addition to mind, love, and knowledge, Augustine also
proposed memory, intellect, and will as a second image of the divine Trinity in the
created spirit/intellect. Edith Stein explains that Augustine felt this to be the more
illuminating of the two images. Augustine says that no one can love what it has no
knowledge of at all. The eagerness to know the unknown, he says, results from some
98
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awareness of this unknown. In order to seek knowledge, the intellect must know itself as
not-knowing. The intellect is not completely without knowledge of itself, but because it is
tied to a body, it must, in a sense, turn in upon itself to make itself present to itself. In this
presence, it finds itself as living and knowing. Living and knowing is the kind of Being
that belongs to it inseparably.101
Thinking, feeling, willing. From her discussion of Augustine, Edith Stein turns to
a second source for explication of the image of God in the natural spirit life of human
beings. She draws upon the work of Theodor Haecker, whose Creator and Creation was
published in 1934.102 Based upon Edith Stein’s comments, Haecker believed that the
Thomists of his day had lost sight of the tri-partition of the human intellect in favor of the
bi-partition of reason and will. He asserted that intellectual activity is impossible without
memory, but, more importantly for Edith Stein’s purposes, proposed a third tri-partition
of the human intellect, that of thinking, feeling, willing, which had its basis in
contemporary psychology. He felt that the discoverers of this partition had unwittingly
laid the foundation for a new understanding of the analogia Trinitatis.103 He believed that
the proper foundation of love lay in feeling, rather than willing, as asserted by the
Thomists.
Edith Stein’s solution. Despite the important contribution of Haecker, Edith Stein
remained committed to Augustine’s solution, which, she asserts, shows that love is the
way that leads to knowledge of the Trinity:
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For it is said: ‘He who abides in love abides in God.’ So those who gain
correct knowledge of love, will also gain knowledge of God. That is the
guideline.104
The will, she says, grows out of love, and thus, it is from loving that action springs. As
we fulfill the divine commandments, she says, our love increases. This love both
presupposes knowledge and increases in knowledge. The spiritual/personal life, she says,
is an ascending life. The three in one is the basic law of spiritual life, and therefore the
basic law of personal life. In a passage that is haunting in light of her life and death, Edith
Stein says:
Love is self-surrender to the loved good. And such self-giving in the true
sense is possible only where a person is the object of love, so that love in
the full and authentic sense proceeds from person to person….Selfsurrender aims at union, and it attains to its perfection only when the gift
of oneself is accepted by the beloved person. To be perfect, love thus
demands a mutual self-giving of persons. And only in this kind of selfgiving can love be affirmation in the full sense, since it is only in selfgiving that one person discloses or reveals himself to the other. A genuine
knowledge of persons is possible only in the oneness of the union of
persons. Love in this highest kind of fulfillment, therefore, includes
knowledge. It is simultaneously a receiving and a free act. It thus includes
the will and it is the fulfillment of desire. But love in its highest perfection
is fully actual only in God in the mutual love of the Divine Being. Love is
the being of God, the life of God, the essence of God.105
What is one in God, i.e., love, is divided in finite personal beings as memory, intellect,
and will. As we have seen, she asserts that love in its truest sense is self-giving. Thus, she
says, without memory, which is the retention of the self, the spiritual person could not
possess itself or give itself. Love, according to Edith Stein, is the deepest ground, the
most fundamental tri-unity. It is that in the spiritual person that most truly mirrors the
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divine Trinity because it endures. It is retained in the immortal soul and can be found
only there.106
Although there are various modes of love, the highest of these is mutual selfgiving. If this is so, says Edith Stein, it presupposes a union of persons, and thus a
plurality of persons.107 In the divine Persons, love is mutual self-giving, which is
simultaneously self-love and self-affirmation. One of its images in the created realm,
suggests Edith Stein, is the love between spouses. Although both Augustine and Thomas
rejected the proposition that the image of the divine trinity may be found in the plurality
of man, woman, and child, Edith Stein embraces it in a manner that became very
important in the writing of Pope John Paul II. Edith Stein says:
It is in the individual that they [Augustine and Thomas] wish to find the
image of God, regardless of whether it produces another or not. In
addition, physical procreation is something that the man has in common
with the animal, and what separates it from the pure spirits of God and
angels. However, that is only true if we take procreation in its animal form
and do not remember that it can and should be something different with
persons: a personal-free act, the physical expression of a spiritual,
devotional union between free people who are in love and are one in
common conviction will not only be physically fruitful. The union in love
brings a spiritual receiving of the loved one within oneself, and makes the
lover an “image” of the beloved. And what emerges as the fruit of that
union bears the stamp of a community of essence (Wesensgemeinsamkeit).
Such conception is only possible for spiritual persons (not for lower
organisms) and it is also available as a purely spiritual conception: in the
loving union of spirits which open themselves completely to the other and
in their essential agreement are fertile: through the atmosphere that
radiates from them to their environment, perhaps also by the works they
create collectively and through which the spiritually “reproduce.”108 One
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This finding confirms her earlier work in which she affirmed that the human person is
constituted in community. See, e.g., On the Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology
and the Humanities.
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Here I believe that she refers to the fruitfulness of relationships such as, for example,
that between Sts. Benedict and Scholastica, Sts. Francis and Clare, Sts. Teresa of Jesus and John
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may say that all the communities of finite persons have their archetype in
the divine Trinity (although in this as in all finite images of the eternal, the
image is infinitely distant and imperfect).109
The originality of this understanding of the spousal image of the divine in finite persons
is one of Edith Stein’s most significant contributions. Her understanding not only of the
unique nature of procreation between human persons but also the fruitfulness of spiritual
unions between persons of common conviction provide welcome reminders to all those
who would reduce human persons to something less than the spiritual beings they are
intended to be. 110
Nevertheless, she says that in the realm of creatures, the closest approximation to
the love of the divine persons is the total self-surrender of the finite person to God.111 In
this life, which is an indwelling of the divine persons in the individual soul, there is an
actual living-with and conforming-to the tri-personal divine life. This supernatural image
of God in the human soul, is the subject of the concluding sections of Chapter VII of
Finite and Eternal Being, but is outside the scope of this dissertation.

of the Cross, Sts. Francis de Sales and Jeanne de Chantal. In each case there is the well-attested
fruitfulness of the spiritual relationship between a celibate man and woman.
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CHAPTER 7
RECEPTION AND SIGNIFICANCE
Unfortunately Finite and Eternal Being was not read in the context in which it
was written. The manuscript was completed at the beginning of 1937, but was not
published until well after Edith Stein’s death and at the close of a temporary period of
interest in metaphysical questions in the first half of the twentieth century. Four reviews
of the work appeared upon its publication: one by James Collins,1 who had taken an early
interest in Edith Stein’s work; another by Fritz Kaufmann,2 who had attempted to find an
American publisher for the work; a third by Rudolf Allers,3 the Austrian physician,
psychologist and philosopher, who immigrated to the United States in 1938; and a fourth
by Fr. L.B. Geiger, O.P., a French Dominican and Thomist.4 In addition, an essay by Fr.
Erich Przywara, comparing the work of Edith Stein to that of Simone Weil, was
published in French in 1956 (and recently translated into English in 2014). Finally, any
discussion of the reception of Edith Stein’s work would be incomplete without mention
of her influence upon Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II).

1

James Collins, review of Endliches und Ewiges Sein, by Edith Stein, The Modern
Schoolman, 29 (1952): 139-45.
2

Kaufmann, Fritz, review of Endliches und Ewiges: Versuch eines Aufsteigs zum Sinn
des Seins, by Edith Stein, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12, no. 4 (June 1952):
572-77.
3

Rudolf Allers, review of Endliches und Ewiges. Versuch eines Aufsteigs zum Sinn des
Seins, by Edith Stein, New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 480-85.
4

L.B. Geiger, O.P., review of Endliches und Ewiges Sein, by Edith Stein, “Bulletin de
Philosophie,” in Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 38 (1954): 275-77.

Reviews of Finite and Eternal Being
James Collins
Collins begins by noting the important influence of Fr. Erich Przywara on Edith
Stein’s choice to engage traditional and modern thought. Collins says that it was Fr.
Przywara who directed her study of Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas,
John of the Cross, and Teresa of Avila. Collins notes that Edith Stein showed
independence in sometimes choosing the solutions of Duns Scotus and that of other
Scholastics in preference to those of Thomas. And he says that, unlike Fr. Przywara,
whose focus tended to be historical, Edith Stein attempted a direct rethinking of the
question of being. Collins describes Edith Stein’s aim as a perennial philosophy, not in
the sectarian sense, but as the “persevering efforts of men throughout history to arrive at
the truth of being.” Collins notes that this was the prevailing view of phenomenologists
and existentialists at that time who admitted the importance of the questions of
metaphysics.
Collins describes the method of Edith Stein, as we have done, and notes that,
following Maritain’s solution to the problem of Christian philosophy, Edith Stein
introduced dogmatic and mystical theology at appropriate places in her study. The result,
says Collins, “is a remarkably powerful synthesis between Scholasticism and
phenomenology.” Collins believed that the work would be of interest to other persons
who were attempting a similar synthesis. Especially important, he thought, was her
demonstration of how the facts of one’s own inner life can be examined for metaphysical
purposes without prejudice to the reality of the material world.
Collins further notes of the skillful use Edith Stein made of the Scholastic
distinction between essence and quiddity to prepare the ground for phenomenological
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distinctions between the actual essence and the pure, intended essence. He notes that the
distinction between real and logical being was used as the springboard for analyses of the
ways in which being can be actual, ideal, and merely conceived. Collins was particularly
impressed that Edith Stein gave “a surprisingly vital and pertinent treatment” to
metaphysical texts overlooked even by the Scholastics. This, he said, was especially
apparent in the sections concerning the transcendentals and angelology.
Collins also notes the highly personal evaluation of her sources made by Edith
Stein. Her work, a synthesis between realistic phenomenology and certain features of
Scholasticism, he says, is not simply a comparison of Husserl and Aquinas. Collins notes
two limits of Edith Stein’s work: her lack of historical awareness and her refusal to take
up the problem of knowledge. These, he says, facilitated her project but rendered its
results doubtful.
Collins includes a section on the differences between the conclusions of Edith
Stein and the teachings of Thomas. He lists: (1) her location of the principle of
individuation (which Collins says she sometimes confused with individuality) in the
form, rather than in matter; (2) her placement of spiritual matter in angels who are pure
spirits but not pure forms; (3) her claim that all creatures and not just human beings bear
the image of God; and (4) her notion that that universals have an irreducible essence of
their own. For these positions, Edith Stein appealed to Duns Scotus, but Collins notes that
Edith Stein failed to articulate her fundamental disagreement with Thomas, which would
have helped to explain these divergences. Collins thought that perhaps these fundamental
reasons remained unclear to Edith Stein herself.5
5

It seems to me that this difference lies in the primacy of love over knowledge. Some of
Edith Stein’s comments about the conclusions of Duns Scotus lead me to this conclusion. For

175

Edith Stein ultimately concluded that finite being is the unfolding of meanings.
Collins says that this was consistent with her contention that the pure forms or
meaningful essentialities arrived at by the phenomenological analysis are ontologically
more basic than either the act of real existence or the concepts of our minds. Edith Stein
used the term Existenz to include both Dasein, the unfolding of meaning in the world of
material beings, and the being of ideal objects, such as geometrical figures, which are not
actual (wirklich), but do enjoy an independent, subsistent meaning. Edith Stein asserted
that their meaning and existence are in the mind of God who alone is fully actual and
meaningful. God, as pure being and pure meaning, she said, is the ground for the unity
and order of the pure essences.
Finally, Collins notes that Edith Stein’s comments about Heidegger, completed
before 1936, are particularly valuable. Collins says that they “uncannily foreshadow[ed]

example, she says: “Whereas for Duns Scotus…the combination of simple essences to form
composite ideas (which must be regarded as the archetypes of things) rests on God’s free choice,
for St. Thomas Aquinas the divine knowledge precedes the divine will, so that not the will
(voluntas) but ‘the divine ideas and the divine nature’ are the ‘ultimate principle of the essence of
things.” ESG265/FEB 307. And later, with a footnote to Duns Scotus, “love is the highest
freedom, a giving of self as the act of one who fully possess humself (i.e., a person)” ESG
355/FEB 420. And still later: “As was previously stated, following Duns Scotus, there is nothing
that is freer than love, for love commands not only some individual personal urge or impulse, but
the personal self in its totality.” ESG 382/FEB 454.
A thorough study of Edith Stein’s comments on Pseudo-Dionysius’s On the Celestial
Hierarchy, in Finite and Eternal Being, Chapter VII, Section 5, might prove helpful in this
regard. Dionysius places the seraphim, rather than the cherubim, closest to God. As Edith Stein
explains, the name of the seraphim signifies the fire of love of these spirits and the capacity for
enkindling love in lower spirits, while the cherubim are named for their capacity for
contemplation and the imparting of wisdom. See ESG 330/FEB 387-88.
Given Edith Stein’s own mystical nature, I would expect to find that she was attracted to
Duns Scotus’s position concerning the primacy of love. A further and more thorough study of this
question is obviously needed.
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the very problems [Heidegger] was meditating on in subsequent years … as though his
latest phase were dictated by the need to answer the searching questions she asked of
him, especially the relation between human existence and the meaning of being, as well
as the relation between the absolute and the nought.”6 Collins says that the full
significance of Edith Stein’s aim in Finite and Eternal Being is found only in the
Heidegger appendix in which it becomes clear that she believed that it was necessary to
bring about an understanding between Heidegger and Aquinas as well as one between
Husserl and Aquinas.
As we have seen, Edith Stein regarded temporality rather than the relation
between essence and existence as the mark of finite being. Her thought, says Collins, fits
not only with Husserl’s stress on the unfolding and being unfolded of meanings, but also
with his emphasis upon the temporal character of Dasein. Edith Stein disagreed with
Heidegger’s proposal that time provides the portal to the grasping of the meaning of
being. She asserted, following Conrad-Martius, that it is only from the standpoint of
being that time can be understood. Collins closes with the assertion that Edith Stein’s
investigation of finite and eternal being was in fact a challenge to Heidegger “to declare,
for his own part, whether the finite must remain enclosed within itself or whether the
meaning of being is traced to its roots in the eternal being.”
Fritz Kaufmann
Fritz Kaufmann declared Finite and Eternal Being to be a “new Summa.” He
thought that the work was highly valuable to phenomenology proper in its wealth of

6

Collins, 145.

177

patient, phenomenological analyses, and he also thought that the work might prove
valuable to the rehabilitation of Catholic thought.
Kaufmann gives a helpful (because mercifully succinct) description of Edith
Stein’s project:
She attempts an integration of Plato’s self-subsistent ideas (Wesenheiten)
with Aristotle’s immanent substantial forms (Wesensformen) which,
ultimately individual themselves (Duns Scotus), unfold in the growth of
individual and real things. The conformity of the ideal world with the
sensory world is accounted for by the Neo-Platonic conception of the
ideas in God. God’s fiat gives birth to the world in accordance with His
ideas.7
Kaufmann notes the need for this final “theological lever” to account for the
transition from essence to existence, from ideal possibility to actual fact. He correctly
notes the need in any theory of ideas for a dynamic factor to explain the relation between
ideal archetypes and material beings in the real world. Edith Stein’s solution is, of course,
but one of these. Kaufmann points to “Husserl’s theory of transcendental Sinngebung
(noësis, bestowal of sense) and Heidegger’s analysis of life as a fabric of ‘concern’” as
non-religious alternatives.
Kaufmann further situates Edith Stein within the Göttingen-Munich group of
phenomenologists, taking special note of Edith Stein’s contributions, especially with
respect to understanding the life of the soul and the spirit and their formations.
Just as Collins, Kaufmann notes the very personal nature of Edith Stein’s
ontology “drawn by the hand of a genuine disciple of Thomas, combining thorough
circumspection and moderation in weighing and balancing intellectual motives with the
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firmness of intellectual motives of definite, yet never intransigent resolution.”8 He draws
attention, however, to her use of Jean Hering’s reintroduction of individual essences as a
counter to Thomas’s conception of matter as the principium individuationis and as the
basis for a differentiation of the meanings of “form” and “matter” in the inorganic,
organic, and spiritual realms.
Kaufmann provides an extremely helpful contrast of Husserl’s idealistic turn in
intentionality, which, he says, substitutes for the process of divine creation a noeticnoematic constitution of meaning in absolute consciousness, with the work of the
Göttingen-Munich group. This group, he says, went back to the Aristotelian concept of
ÔD,>4H (connation), and took the intentionality of the mind to be but a special case of the
universal tendency toward actualization which belongs to all finite existence.
Intentionality for these thinkers, says Kaufmann, is a refined form of participation in
being as such. Kaufmann explains that for these thinkers:
“[T]he soul is in a measure all things.” To know means to be in-formed.
The openness of the mind corresponds to the intelligibility of things.”To
things belongs a certain whatness and essential nature which are
communicated to and communicable by them. They are taken to be finite
(1) because this nature is specific; (2) because it unfolds only in a
temporal process which usually lags behind the purity of full performance;
and (3) because a real thing is never in the ‘position’ of enjoying the
fullness of actuality in the perfection of eternal being, it reached the height
of actuality only as in tangents, by passing for some time from one
vanishing moment to the other.9
As Kaufmann remarks and as we have seen, Edith Stein taught that all finite being
receives its being as a gift. In its quid as well as its quod it is granted a limited part in
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being as such. It owes both its form and its existence to the pure act of being. The
individual thing cannot be a self-subsisting thing in the same way that God is selfsubsisting. Rather, it is posited by God as a substance which comprises and unfolds its
own essence.
In contrast to Collins, Kaufmann praises the decision of the original German
editors to confine the discussion of Being and Time to footnotes. He believes that Edith
Stein’s criticisms of Heidegger were in fact answered by the time her work was published
and thus, are no longer relevant. He notes, however, as have we, that Edith Stein’s project
is the same as that of Heidegger insofar as it is a phenomenological inquiry into the
meaning of being (“logos of phenomena”).
Kaufmann remarks with approval upon Edith Stein’s recognition of the Trinity in
the order of creation as well as in the inner life of the Deity. He notes that she discovers
the image of God (Abbild) throughout creation, even in its present state of universal
corruption. For example, he says, Edith Stein finds examples of the Trinity in the idea of
substance as such; in the division of the world into inorganic, organic, and human realms;
in the three states of inanimate nature – solid, liquid, and gaseous; in the constitution of
the human being as body, soul, and spirit; in the formative power of the soul in forming
the body, the soul itself, and cultural life; and in the creative union of the sexes.10
Kaufmann claims that the book should be useful to those who do not subscribe to
its Catholic conclusions because the tenets of the faith are not used as premises for the
analysis, but rather as a means for illuminating things that otherwise might have passed
unnoticed.
10
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Rudolf Allers
Rudolf Allers begins his review with the note that Finite and Eternal Being was
the second volume of Edith Stein’s works to be published (the first being The Science of
the Cross). He refers to the series Edith Stein Werke published by Verlag Herder of
Freiburg and E. Nauwelaerts of Louvain. He then gives a brief biography of Edith Stein
before turning to her project, “an attempt at a realization of … [the] endeavor” to
integrate Husserl’s phenomenology with the philosophy of St. Thomas.11
Allers comments upon the many influences upon the work, including Husserl
(with enlightening comments about Husserl’s metaphysical positions), and Heidegger,
and a third, not mentioned by Edith Stein by name: Hegel. Allers says that Hegel may
have been an unrecognized influence, but says that it is “hardly conceivable that Dr. Stein
escaped altogether the influence of the ‘Hegel Renaissance’ in Germany.”12 He mentions
the possibility of an attempt to integrate Husserl’s views on “essence” with Hegel’s on
“spirit.”
Allers notes that all will agree that the sort of synthesis of such disparate elements
as Edith Stein attempted was not only necessary but timely, because those that espouse
the philosophia perennis cannot simply ignore the problems raised by contemporary
philosophy. Thus, he applauds Edith Stein’s effort and recommends the reading of Finite
and Eternal Being even for those who cannot ultimately accept her conclusions.
Allers gives a helpful clarification of the possible significance of the wesenhafte
Sein. He says that the distinction between wirkliche Sein and wesenhafte Sein appears to
11
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approximate that between esse existentiae and esse essentiae. Both are being, but esse
essentiae is a diminitum in that it lack efficacy, but at the same time possesses a greater
dignity in that it is exempt from change, immutable, and indifferent to whether it is only
thought or is realized in concreto.13
Allers concludes that the “greatest merit [of the work] is indubitably the
confrontation of modern and traditional ideas and the attempt at a much to be desired
integration.” 14 He again notes that the work should not be ignored simply because, in
some, places, it challenged traditional doctrines. Instead, these challenged, he says,
should stimulate further consideration.
Fr. L.B. Geiger, O.P.
The final review is that of Fr. L.B. Geiger, O.P.15 After giving some biographical
information about Edith Stein, Fr. Geiger asserts that the chief interest of Finite and
Eternal consists in the careful study by a spirit deeply marked by Husserl’s
phenomenology and the thought of St. Thomas. The central theme of all the
developments of the book, he says, remains the search for the meaning of being and
therefore the relationship between finite and absolute being. Fr. Geiger remarks upon the
density of the work which, as we have seen, prevents easy summation.
Along with the other reviewers, Fr. Geiger notes Edith Stein’s lack of an
historical understanding of Thomas. He says that she saw in Thomas primarily a
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Geiger was the author of the standard treatment of participation in medieval philosophy
during the twentieth century: Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d’ Aquin (Paris,
1942).
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philosophy of essences, or of concepts. Is it any wonder, then, he asks, that she felt more
attracted to Duns Scotus from which she adopted her theory of the composition of
separated substances and the principle of individuation. He notes a similar influence of
Scotus upon Heidegger, leading him to conclude that Husserlian phenomenology in its
early stages was the heir to the rationalism that had dominated modern thinking. This, he
says, is an historical finding, not a value judgment.
Fr. Erich Przywara, S.J.
Another way toward an evaluation of Edith Stein’s project has only recently
become available in English translation. This is the paper “Edith Stein and Simone Weil:
Two Fundamental Philosophical Themes” (1956), by Fr. Erich Przywara.16 Fr.
Przywara’s assessment is of special interest because of his role in suggesting texts for
study and translation by Edith Stein after she became Catholic. He describes Finite and
Eternal Being as “her final working out of a Thomistic metaphysics in the spirit of
Husserl.” He calls Edith Stein and Simone Weil “distinct representatives of the
intellectual antitheses of our time.” By this he means primarily the antithesis between an
“essential philosophy of essence” and an “existential philosophy of existence.” He asserts
that Edith Stein’s method remains that of an “essential philosopher of essence.” Even in
the interpretation of Thomas, he says, she remains the “most authentic disciple” of
Husserl’s phenomenological method, but not of his transcendental idealism. She, he says,
transfers all real existents (Realbestände) to the world of the “essential,” which is not a
16

In Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal
Rhythm, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014). The translators’ footnote explains that the
essay was never published in German, but was first published in French translation in Les Études
philosophiques 11 (1956), 458-72. The English translation is based upon the original German
typescript.
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self-enclosed “ideal world,” but a “free, ideal world” that depends solely upon the given
essence that is intuited in its own right. Fr. Przywara compares Edith Stein’s work to that
of Nikolai Hartmann, who, he says, unfettered an ideal Hegelian world from the
constraints of Hegel’s systematic ternary. Where Hartmann, he says, is guided by a freely
rhythmic world of “levels,” Edith Stein proposes a “free and colorfully displayed ‘world
of essences.’” She even goes beyond Hartmann in freeing the “ideal world” from the
constraints of systematic idealism (from Descartes to Hegel). She gives the “world of
essences” the “form of freedom for a free world.” Thus, Fr. Przywara concludes, she
brings about the definitive demise of an essential philosophy of essence: in a free-floating
essentialism.”17
Fr. Przywara distinguishes Edith Stein’s philosophy as “pure essentialism,” from
that of Simone Weil, which he calls “pure existentialism.” He says that Edith Stein’s
philosophy “connects the traditions of ancient Jewish and ancient Islamic philosophy
(understood in terms of Plotinian Aristotelianism) to the tradition of Thomas Aquinas
(understood in terms of the essentialism of the ordo universi), and in turn connects these
to the transition of an essential transcendentalism that begins with Descartes and comes
full circle in Husserl.”18
The antithesis between pure essentialism (in Edith Stein) and pure existentialism
(in Simone Weil), Fr. Przywara says, ultimately points beyond itself to the Aristotelian
and Lateran ‘analogy’ “that is ‘ever more greatly’ declared in the ‘however great’ of the
antithesis between them: the –88@ BDÎH –88@ (“other towards other”) to use Aristotle’s
17

Analogia Entis, 599.

18

Analogia Entis, 601.
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formula, for what is ultimate in being (the oscillation of a ‘free proportion’) between two
X’s, and the ‘ever greater dissimilarity within every similarity, however great,’ to use the
formula of the Fourth Lateran Council, for what is ultimate between Creator and
creature.”19
Fr. Przywara provides the most searching critique of Edith Stein’s work of any of
the others. Edith Stein, he says, made use of the analogia in Finite and Eternal Being, but
she subsumed it under the concept of a “common given reference,” failing to see that an
“analogical commonality” exists solely in the proportio – the “BDÎH” in the Aristotelian
analogy.20 In other words, Fr. Przywara says that Edith Stein still understands “analogy”
under the higher form of “common,” rather than as the “BDÎH” between the “–88@” and
“–88@.” That is, he says that rather than a genuinely rhythmic back-and-forth between
two poles, which is to say, “‘analogy as noetic method,’ her method is a consistently
practiced, static, and direct ‘intuition of essence,’ in which the ‘given essence’ is made
statically and directly ‘visible.’”21 She does not find the “similarity, however great,”
between finite and eternal being, intersected by an “ever greater dissimilarity” in a true
rhythm in infinitum. Rather, in each pair of concepts she sees primarily what is “other” or
“dissimilar” and attempts to compare these dissimilar essences for some possible
“similarity.” For her, analogy means relationship but never the “singular and irreducible
rhythm between ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ ‘in’ and ‘beyond,’ ‘unity’ and ‘disunity,’ found in the
formula of the Fourth Lateran Council.
19

Fr. Przywara here cites Met. V, 6, 1016b, 34-35; and Denzinger 432.

20

Analogia Entis, 602-03.

21

Analogia Entis, 603.
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These few excerpts are enough to suggest the direction of Fr. Przywara’s thoughts
and to suggest fertile ground for additional study.
Significance of Finite and Eternal Being
Without doubt the most important reception and dissemination of the thought of
Edith Stein has been that of Karol Wojtyła (Blessed Pope John Paul II). It is not known
how Karol Wojtyła first became aware of the philosophical work of Edith Stein, but his
interest in St. John of the Cross and Carmelite spirituality has been suggested as one
possibility for the connection.22 It is clear that Wojtyła was introduced to phenomenology
by Roman Ingarden who, with Edith Stein, was a fellow disciple of Edmund Husserl. As
Pope John Paul II, Wojtyła presided at the beatification of Edith Stein on May 1, 1987, in
Cologne, and at her canonization on October 11, 1998, in Rome. The homilies given on
those occasions dwell primarily upon Edith Stein’s spirituality and martyrdom rather than
her professional life.23 In the year of the canonization, however, the Pope issued his
encyclical letter Fides et Ratio (Faith and Reason). In this document, he mentions Edith
Stein by name (and she is the only woman who is singled out in this way) as one of those
who in recent times have undertaken “courageous research” into the relationship between
philosophy and the Word of God.24 One year later, Pope John Paul II declared St. Teresa
Benedicta of the Cross co-patroness of Europe along with St. Bridget of Sweden and St.
22

Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997), 54.
23

These homilies together with other pertinent documents are gathered together in
Holiness Befits Your House: Canonization of Edith Stein – A Documentation, ed. John Sullivan,
OCD (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000).
24

John Paul II, Encyclical Letter on the Relationship Between Faith and Reason Fides et
Ratio, September 14, 1998, § 74, at The Holy See, www.vatican.va.
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Catherine of Siena.25 Interest in Edith Stein and her work has multiplied appreciably in
the wake of these events.
While it is clear that Pope John Paul II was profoundly influenced by the life and
death of Edith Stein, it is less clear that he made explicit use of her philosophical writings
in his own work. Freda Mary Oben insisted that the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła “clearly
shows the influence of Edith Stein,” but others assert that they instead arrived at parallel
conclusions.26 Both Edith Stein and Karol Wojtyła were influenced by Max Scheler
(through Roman Ingarden), and by Thomas Aquinas. It is therefore not surprising to find
common themes in their work. In a paper comparing their studies of the person, Georges
Kalinowski concluded that there was no direct influence.27 On the other hand, an
excellent paper concerning the possibility of Edith Stein’s influence on Pope John Paul
II’s understanding of the “feminine genius” was prepared by Fr. Benjamin P. Bradshaw.28
I generally agree that it is more likely that Edith Stein and Karol Wojtyła arrived
at similar conclusions based upon their interests and training, but acknowledge that a
more thorough comparison of their work could prove otherwise. One passage from Finite
and Eternal Being will show the strong congruence of Edith Stein’s thought with that of
John Paul II. Edith Stein says:
25

L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English, no. 40, October 6, 1999, 9.
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Monika Rice, Review of The Life and Thought of St. Edith Stein by Freda Mary Oben,
The Review of Metaphysics, 56:1 (Sept., 2002), 196.
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Georges Kalinowski, “Edith Stein et Karol Wojtyła sur la personne,” Revue
Philosophie de Louvain 82 (1984), 545-61.
28

Benjamin P. Bradshaw, The Influence of St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross/Edith Stein
on Pope John Paul II’s Understanding of the Feminine Genius, Thesis (M.A.), Kenrick School of
Theology/Kenrick-Glennon Seminary, December 1, 2005, available at
www.catholicadultfaith.com/documents.
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Love is a self-surrender to the loved good. And such self-giving in the true
sense is possible only where the person is the object of love, so that love in
the full and authentic sense proceeds from person to person,
notwithstanding the fact that there are certain desires ‘in the nature or
manner of love’ which tend toward impersonal things. Self-surrender aims
at union (Einswerden), and it attains to its perfection only when the gift of
oneself is accepted by the beloved person. To be perfect, love thus
demands mutual self-giving of persons.29
Compare this to representative passages of Wojtyła’s Love and Responsibility:
Betrothed love differs from all aspects or forms of love analyzed hitherto.
Its decisive character is the giving of one person (to another). The essence
of the betrothed love is self-giving, the surrender of one’s ‘I.’… The
fullest, most uncompromising form of love consists precisely in
selfgiving, in making one’s inalienable and non-transferable ‘I’ someone
else’s property.30
****
Betrothed love comprises on the one hand the gift of the person, and on
the other hand, acceptance of that gift. Implicit in all this is the ‘mystery’
of reciprocity: acceptance must also be giving, and giving receiving. Love
is of its nature reciprocal.31
The theme of love as self-giving and mutuality between persons was carried
forward in a significant way in Pope John Paul II’s Apostolic Exhortation, Mulieris
Dignitatem (On the Dignity and Vocation of Women): “In the ‘unity of the two,’ man and
woman are called from the beginning not only to exist ‘side by side’ or ‘together,’ but
they are also called to exist mutually ‘one for the other’32; and in what has come to be

29

FEB 453.

30

Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, trans. H.T. Willets (San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1993), 95-96.
31

Love and Responsibility, 129.

32

John Paul II, Apostolic Letter on the Dignity and Vocation of Women Mulieris
Dignitatem (August 15, 1988), § 7, at The Holy See, www.vatican.va.
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known as the “Theology of the Body” consisting of a series of catechetical talks given by
Pope John Paul II between September 1979 and November 1984:
We can say that inner innocence (that is, the rightness of intention) in the
exchange of the gift consists in a reciprocal “acceptance” of the other in
such a way that it corresponds to the very essence of the gift; in this way,
the mutual gift creates the communion of persons. It is a question,
therefore, of “welcoming” the other human being and of “accepting” him
or her precisely because in this mutual relationship, about which Genesis
2:23–25 speaks, the man and the woman become a gift, each one for the
other, through the whole truth and evidence of their own body in its
masculinity and femininity. It is a question, therefore, of such an
“acceptance” or “welcome” in reciprocal nakedness that it expresses and
sustains the meaning of the gift and thus deepens its reciprocal dignity.33
In this last and throughout the Theology of the Body we hear that the authentic love is
only possible between spirits/persons. Moreover we see the carrying forward of Edith
Stein’s realization that procreation for human beings is, or should be, something totally
other than the mere reproduction of animals. These themes clearly provide fruit for
additional contemplation.

33

John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them (Boston: Pauline
Books and Media, 2011), 4338-343, Kindle Edition.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Even at some 500 pages in translation, Finite and Eternal Being is a deceptively
little book. I have tried to show in this brief introduction the breadth and depth of Edith
Stein’s. In the present day, in an era of ever-increasing academic specialization, it is
increasingly difficult to attain the breadth of learning and experience necessary to
appreciate Edith Stein’s achievement or to make further contributions to it. That is what
she intended and hoped, of course, that the idea of a common project of philosophy, a
common seeking-after truth, would be taken up based upon the foundational work that
she was able to achieve, or at least upon the questions that she raises.
This dissertation was able to touch on only two of the themes of Finite and
Eternal Being: being and personal being. With respect to the question of being, one of
Edith Stein’s enduring contributions is her emphasis upon the dynamism of being. Finite
being is not a “what,” but an act. In her words, it is an unfolding of possibilities, but it is
an unfolding which is grounded in that eternal being which is also eternal meaning. The
claim that meaning itself has its own unique form of being is, of course, the ontological
insight for which she is perhaps best known.
Edith Stein’s rereading of the problems raised in Thomas Aquinas’s On Being and
Essence through the method of Husserl’s phenomenology should have sparked continued
conversation and scholarship. Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson were the philosophers
who picked up the mantle of Thomism for Catholic philosophers of the twentieth century,
but there were few others like Edith Stein who were attempting to bridge the thought
worlds of Thomism and phenomenology. Of the many regrets over Edith Stein’s death is

the regret that there was no opportunity for the intellectual conversation that she hoped to
start to continue.
In the realm of the person, Edith Stein’s contributions are equally significant as
those in the wider realm of being, especially insofar as her insistence on the uniqueness
of each individual person, together with her insistence that “all that is” is one meaningful
whole, provide an appropriate philosophical grounding for the dignity of the human
beings. With this foundation, it should be possible to provide a philosophical
demonstration of the incomparable value of each individual human being, a
demonstration that has been lacking in the issues of the “culture war,” such as abortion
and euthanasia. Her suggestion that personhood is separable from physical being,
however, raises questions that require further attention.
One must also point to her finding of a true image of the divine in the union of
spouses as one of her most significant and, through the work of another saint, Pope John
Paul II, lasting contributions. As we have said, his Theology of the Body is grounded in
the mutual self-giving of persons, which is also the grounding for her claim that the
divine image may be found in personal procreation. This is another significant area for
further study insofar as it provides further philosophical support for the Catholic
Church’s continued insistence on the personal and societal harms wrought by the rampant
availability and use of artificial contraception.1

1

In addition to John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them, see Pope Paul VI, An
Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Birth Humanae vitae (The Holy See, July 25, 1968),
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_pvi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html; and Janet Smith, Why Humanae Vitae was Right: A
Reader (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993).
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It is in her contributions to the philosophy of the person that one gets a glimpse of
where her thoughts might have turned had she lived to write an ethics based upon her
phenomenological achievement and her mystical and practical experience. I think, for
example, about her comments concerning the changes that the artist makes in herself as
the result of her artistic creation, and about the fact that the soul not only forms the body
but is itself formed both physically and spiritually in action. The formation of the artist,
indeed the formation of each soul, shows itself in action. Edith Stein manifested the
particular formation of her own soul in her last days when she undertook the care and
comfort of the children of her despondent companions at Westerbork.2 The possibility of
an ethics built upon Edith Stein’s life and work begs for further exploration.

2

Testimony of Julius Markus, recounted in Waltraut Herbstrith, Edith Stein: the Untold
Story of the Philosopher and Mystic Who Lost Her Life in the Death Camps of Auschwitz, trans.
Bernard Beonwitz (HarperCollins Publishers, 1985), 183.
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